



Sharing Lives explores the most important human relationships which last for the 
longest period of our lives: those between adult children and their parents. Offering 
a new reference point for studies on the sociology of family, the book focuses on 
the reasons and results of lifelong intergenerational solidarity by looking at indi­
viduals, families and societies. This monograph combines theoretical reasoning 
with empirical research, based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE). The book focuses on the following areas: 
x adult family generations, from young adulthood to the end of life, and beyond; 
x contact, conflict, coresidence, money, time, inheritance; 
x consequences of lifelong solidarity; 
x family generations and the relationship of family and the welfare state; 
x connections between family cohesion and social inequality. 
Sharing Lives offers reliable findings on the basis of state-of-the-art methods and 
the best available data, and presents these findings in an accessible manner. This 
book will appeal to researchers, policymakers and graduate students in the areas 
of sociology, political science, psychology and economics. 
Marc Szydlik is Professor of Sociology at the University of Zurich. He previously 
worked at the German Institute for Economic Research, the Max Planck Institute 
for Human Development, the Free University of Berlin and the University of 
Erfurt. He was a visiting scholar at Harvard, Columbia, Oxford, Stanford and 
Cambridge Universities, and has published widely in the field of generations. 
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This book has come a long way. Over twenty years ago, at the Free University of 
Berlin, I began studying generations. More than ten years ago, I started working 
at the University of Zurich, expanding my previous research on selected aspects 
of intergenerational relations to a much broader perspective as well as to inter­
national comparisons. This book brings together these various strands of research. 
The aim is to capture the relationships of adult children and parents – 
comprehensively and in depth. The book’s concern is with family generations 
per se, but also with the relationship of family and state, of private and public 
intergenerational solidarity. It addresses consequences of lifelong solidarity, 
including connections between family cohesion and social inequality. What are 
the reasons for and results of lifelong intergenerational solidarity – for individuals, 
families and societies? 
Above all, the questions pursued are about sharing lives. In what way are adult 
daughters and sons connected with their mothers and fathers, and vice versa? 
Do we still find strong, perpetual bonds across separate households, or are the 
generations rather preoccupied with their own lives with no relevant attachment? 
How frequent are conflicts? Are quarrels and fights a typical reality of adult family 
generations? In regard to support, do daughters and sons care for their elderly 
parents, and do adult children benefit from lifelong financial transfers from their 
parents, all the way to notable inheritances? 
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1 Introduction 
Mother, father, daughter, son. Those who make up our family generations are 
some of the most important people in our lives. For many, they are even the most 
important ones. Acquaintances live their own lives, neighbours move away or are 
left behind, colleagues change from job to job, friends may come and go, even 
partners can drift away – but family generations have the potential for lifelong 
solidarity. For many, no relationship lasts longer than the connection between 
parents and children. 
Today, this is truer than ever before. Longer lives dramatically increase the 
time generations may spend together. When parents live as long as eighty or 
ninety years, relations with children may last five, six or even seven decades. 
Nowadays, we are able to accompany our closest relatives for the longest time 
ever in human history. This applies particularly to the shared lives of family
generations in adulthood. 
Increased longevity is one crucial part of demographic change. Lower fertility 
is another. Fewer children of the previous generation mean fewer siblings and 
cousins of the next generation, which again enhances the significance of parent-
child relationships. Both demographic factors, longer lives and lower fertility lead 
to the same result: we have fewer family members of the same generation, and 
more of a different one. Intergenerational relations have become more and more 
important (Lauterbach 1995, Nave-Herz 1998, Bertram 2000, Bengtson 2001, 
Noack and Buhl 2004, Saraceno 2008, Swartz 2009). 
This is one way to approach the bonds between adult children and parents. 
An alternative, very different reading insinuates crisis, conflict and alienation. 
According to that, families are in crisis, and their members are either in permanent 
conflict with or in total isolation from one another. In times of individualisation, 
flexibilisation and globalisation, close family members are thought to play an 
increasingly less important role in our lives. Fewer marriages, more divorces, 
more singles, fewer children, smaller households, increased geographical mobil­
ity: all these developments are seen as indicators of a ‘crisis of the family’. 
This ‘crisis’ can be represented by two scenarios. One scenario is conflict. Here, 
family members struggle to find common ground, internal and external pressure 
leads to permanent quarrels and fights, understanding and respect is non-existent, 
and a solution is not in sight. The second scenario is autonomy, which can also 
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be described in terms of alienation, isolation or individualisation. This scenario 
applies most notably to adult generations. ‘Out of sight, out of mind’ is the adage 
that seems most apt. In this perspective, rapid cultural, economic and technological 
change alienates parents and their adult children, who live separate lives, and 
whose interaction may be limited to no more than sending an occasional, brief 
electronic message from wherever they happen to be. This scenario also fits a 
presumption by Talcott Parsons (1942) claiming that married and employed adult 
children no longer have a continuous attachment to their parents. 
How can one decide between the above scenarios? Does solidarity, conflict or 
autonomy reflect reality more accurately? In fact, longer lives and fewer children 
are no proof of actual lifelong intergenerational solidarity. These developments 
only represent a potential for real connections between (adult) children and 
parents. The fact of having more joint lifetime offers the opportunity to spend 
this time together, but does not mean that people actually do so. Having fewer 
siblings and cousins may potentially lead to family generations turning to one 
another. In order to find out whether adult children and parents do indeed share 
their lives – and do not just live in parallel yet separate worlds – we need thorough 
empirical investigations. 
Questions 
The following are the general questions in this book: 
x Do family generations share their lives? Are we more likely to find proof of 
solidarity, conflict or autonomy? 
x How strong is the connection between adult children and parents exactly? To 
what extent do they care for one another, including giving and receiving time 
or money, and how often are they in conflict? 
x Who maintains stronger intergenerational relationships: the lower or higher 
educational classes, the rich or the poor, women or men, natives or migrants? 
Are there relevant differences between countries? 
x Which factors are responsible for greater or lesser intergenerational cohesion? 
What is the role of opportunities and needs, and how important are family 
structures and cultural contexts? 
x What is the connection between the welfare state and intergenerational rela­
tions? Does the welfare state reduce or strengthen family solidarity? 
x What is the relation between family solidarity and social stratification? Does 
intergenerational cohesion affect social inequality? 
In answering these questions, a number of comparisons will be drawn. In order 
to learn more about a specific situation, it is necessary to compare it with other 
circumstances. This applies to comparisons of individuals, generations (e.g., parents 
with children), families, population groups (e.g., in regard to education, income, 
gender and migration) and whole societies, including different extents of welfare 





allow the identification of best-practice examples that can serve as models for 
current and future policy considerations. Furthermore, this book compares all-
important features of intergenerational relations, including obligations, contact, 
conflict, space, money, help, care and inheritance. 
Theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence 
The ideal of scientific research is to connect theoretical reasoning with empirical 
research. By this, theoretical ideas are put against reality, and empirical results
are placed within a theoretical framework. When it comes to explaining inter-
generational relations, there is not an abundance of theoretical frameworks to 
turn to (Nauck and Steinbach 2010: 1061). In the following chapters, this book 
draws on a theoretical model that has been developed explicitly for the study of 
family generations (although it can be applied to other interpersonal connections 
as well). The aim is to employ a theoretical framework to describe and explain 
intergenerational relations. On this basis, empirically testable hypotheses can be
developed to link theory and empirical evidence. 
The model, which will be described in greater detail later on, identifies four 
groups of factors that are thought to be responsible for more or less intense 
relations between (adult) children and parents: opportunity, need, family and 
cultural-contextual structures. Thereby three levels of analysis are distinguished, 
namely individuals, families and societies. This general theoretical model is appli­
cable to all aspects of intergenerational relations, and will therefore be employed 
in all analyses throughout this book. 
The empirical investigations are based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This huge representative survey offers the best 
available information on adult family generations, including such information for 
a whole range of European countries, from north to south and west to east. In 
fact, intergenerational relations are a core theme of this survey. Among other 
things, SHARE offers comprehensive information on the existence of family gen­
erations, the geographical distance between them, obligations towards children 
and the elderly, intergenerational contact, conflict, coresidence, current monetary 
transfers, help, care and inheritance. This allows the investigation of generations 
in great detail and breadth. The survey makes it possible to look into a whole 
range of highly relevant aspects of intergenerational relations and gain a compre­
hensive picture thereof. 
A particular advantage is that the survey asked all respondents in all countries 
about all these individual aspects in exactly the same manner. This guards against 
the problem of incomparability, which studies based on diverse surveys and ques­
tionnaires typically face. For example, when asking about giving help to another 
person, ‘help’ needs to be defined in the exact same way. This is precisely what 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe does, thus providing a 
solid foundation for comparing individuals and families across societies. 
The respondents are at least 50 years of age. The survey gathers extensive 






children. The analyses include over 39,000 respondents with 12,500 child-parent 
and over 82,000 parent-child relationships. 
No fewer than fourteen countries are compared in this book, namely: Sweden, 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Greece. Additionally, separate 
results are documented for West and East Germany. 
All numbers presented in the figures refer to the first segment of the cor­
responding bar. Multivariate analyses are documented in the Appendix. In the 
chapters, coefficients are ‘transformed’ into pluses and minuses according to the 
magnitude of the effect. 
Outline of the book 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework for the following analyses. Before 
addressing family generations in more detail, we need to know more about
generations in general. Thus, the chapter starts with an overview of labels and 
concepts of generations, distinguishing between generations in family and society. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss the term ‘intergenerational solidarity’ and 
hereby identify a number of solidarities. Also, the relation between solidarity and 
conflict will be discussed. Ambivalence is another term that has been used in 
research on intergenerational relations, and this chapter shows that neither soli­
darity and conflict, nor solidarity, conflict and ambivalence need to be opposites. 
In fact, they can be reconciled with one another. The chapter goes on to provide 
an outline of the theoretical model, which already leads to a number of hypoth­
eses for the empirical analyses. Finally, connections between family and society 
will be addressed. When conducting international comparisons, it is necessary to 
define the theoretical framework applied. Here, welfare states play a major role. 
Moreover, the scope is expanded to include connections between private intergen­
erational solidarity and social inequality by employing a life course perspective. 
After having set the theoretical framework, Chapter 3 provides the first general 
empirical information. The aim here is not yet to present detailed analyses, but 
to give a first overview of potentials and types of contemporary intergenerational 
relations, drawing on the notion of the so-called ‘crisis of the family’. Before 
addressing intergenerational cohesion, the chapter explores how many people 
actually have living family generations with which they could possibly interact. 
How common are multigenerational families, and how many respondents have 
living parents and children? A second immensely important prerequisite of direct 
interaction is geographical distance. This distance may range anywhere from gen­
erations living within the same four walls all the way to family members living 
very far apart. Thirdly, obligations may play a relevant role, too. The extent to 
which population groups perceive a sense of obligation towards the previous and 
next generations will be determined. After discussing the potential for intergen­
erational family relationships, a general typology will be introduced, identifying
eight different types within four categories, based on summarised forms of
intergenerational solidarity and conflict. 
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Chapter 4 starts the more detailed and thorough analyses by analysing contact. 
All the empirical chapters are structured in the same way: following a brief out­
line of the corresponding form of intergenerational cohesion, previous research is 
documented and hypotheses are developed on the basis of the general theoretical 
model. The empirical section begins with the wording of the chapter’s topic in the 
questionnaire and proceeds with the presentation and discussion of the empirical 
results, offering a summary at the end. Chapter 4 investigates the most general 
form of intergenerational cohesion. How often, if at all, do adult children and 
parents stay in touch, even if they no longer live in the same household? Is there 
empirical truth in the notion of individualised family members, or do we rather 
find strong connections? And if so, are there differences between parents and 
children, higher and lower social classes, women and men, migrants and natives? 
When explaining different extents of intergenerational contact, the empirical 
investigations draw on relevant micro, meso and macro factors. 
Conflict is the topic of Chapter 5. The aim is to explore whether notions such 
as ‘battle’ or even ‘war of generations’ actually reflect general reality. Although 
there are all kinds of intergenerational relations, the first question here concerns 
general patterns. Do generations mainly quarrel and fight? Or are these relations 
of a more or less harmonious nature? The second question refers to population 
groups: where do we find more conflict? The third question deals with conflict 
factors: Can individual opportunities and needs, on the one hand, and family and 
societal structures, on the other, be made responsible for intergenerational contro­
versy? For example, this chapter will investigate whether the ‘strain hypothesis’ 
offers a suitable approach for analysing conflict. Do family members with little 
financial means and greater health problems report disputes with parents and adult 
children more frequently? Furthermore, connections between family conflict and 
the welfare state will be investigated. Do more social benefits come with fewer 
disputes amongst parents and children, and are there connections between family 
conflict and social stratification? 
The following chapters investigate functional solidarity across the life course: 
space, money, time and inheritance. They follow the main transfer routes. Space, 
money and inheritance are mainly provided by parents to children, whereas time 
transfers tend to go in the opposite direction. Chapter 6 starts with space. Living 
together – or not – may have valuable advantages. At the least, doing so saves 
money since one common household is less expensive than several. However, 
adult generations sharing the same space, to some degree, goes against the norm 
of and wish for autonomy, and comes with compromises in daily life. Thus, it is of 
particular interest to find out how many parents and adult children live together, 
and which generations do so. Does it really make sense to conclude the existence 
of a ‘crisis of the family’ from the fact that coresidence is less common among 
contemporary families than it has been in the past? The argument would be less 
convincing if adult family generations living together were to do so out of neces­
sity. In this perspective, it will also be crucial to compare individuals, families 
and especially countries. Are there influences of public expenditure on families’ 

















Chapter 7 addresses money. Financial transfers tend to run down the family 
line, supporting the so-called ‘cascade model’. This being the case, the chap­
ter concentrates on monetary transfers from parents to adult children. The focus 
is on current transfers; more precisely, financial assistance or gifts given during 
the last twelve months. Who gives money, and who receives it? Of particular 
interest are the resources of parents and the needs of children. How important is 
the financial situation of the transfer giver? Does every daughter and every son 
receive something, or are need structures the main trigger of such transfers? In 
this respect, it will be important to consider the employment situation of the adult 
child. Moreover, are siblings competitors when it comes to receiving (larger) sums 
of money from their parents? Is there reciprocity of money and time? Another 
crucial theme is the connection between private transfers and social inequality. 
Since it is one of the main topics of this book to investigate the consequences of 
intergenerational family solidarity for social stratification, this question needs to 
be given particular attention when researching intergenerational flows of money. 
Who helps, who cares? This is the subject of Chapter 8, which deals with time. 
At the centre of attention are two forms of support that adult children may provide 
to their parents: (a) help with household chores and paperwork and (b) personal 
care. One especially important task is the empirical examination of the so-called 
‘crowding-out’ and ‘crowding-in’ hypotheses. The question is whether the welfare 
state is more likely to encourage the retreat of relatives when it comes to taking 
care of parents in need, or whether family support is actually enhanced, since pub­
lic services take over especially strenuous tasks, thus opening up opportunities for 
family members to provide other forms of support. In the former, a strong welfare 
state would ‘crowd out’ family solidarity; in the latter, there would be ‘crowding­
in’. However, this is not the only issue addressed in this chapter. First of all, the 
chapter investigates how many adult children support their (elderly) parents in 
general, and addresses the question of reciprocity. Is there some kind of exchange 
of time (from adult children) and money (from parents)? Such an empirical result 
would imply that family members are more likely to support one another if they 
receive something in return. 
The last empirical Chapter 9 investigates inheritance. First of all, it answers
the question whether these mortis causa transfers are a topic for a book on
intergenerational family relations. In other words, do inheritances really stem
primarily from parents, or do other bequeathers also play a significant role?
Additional questions that are addressed refer to the time and extent of the
inheritance, and the chapter examines whether there are population groups
that have higher or lower chances of receiving a bequest. As in the previous
empirical chapters, relevant factors affecting intergenerational transfers will be
determined. Again, individual opportunities and needs as well as family and
cultural-contextual structures will provide the framework for the empirical
investigations. Are there connections between welfare state expenditure and the
assets that are bequeathed? As in the case of current transfers, a particular focus
is the connections between family relations and social inequality. What are the
consequences of intergenerational solidarity for social stratification? Do most
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inheritances favour those who are in greater need, or is wealth that is handed
down the family line more likely to benefit population groups that are already
in a considerably better economic situation? 
Finally, the book closes with a general summary of the most important results 
and draws a number of conclusions, especially with regard to the connections 










2 Concepts and contexts 
Generations 
Labelling 
What are ‘generations’? According to suggestions by scholars, writers and
journalists, there are a great number of different generations. For example,
there has been talk of pre-war, war, post-war, founding, rebuilding, economic
miracle, baby boomer, turnaround, reform, Gulf War and Intifada generations,
of Adenauer, Brandt, Kohl, Schröder, Merkel, Berlusconi, Blair, Obama, Putin,
Sarkozy, Thatcher, Benedict and Francis generations, as well as of global,
grey, heir, hippie, internship, jobless, maybe, me, no-future, power, problem,
project, protest, silver, single, stress, welfare, white-collar, wimp, youth and
yuppie ‘generations’. 
Furthermore, we read about abandoned, abused, affluent, alternative, authen­
tic, bankrupt, betrayed, casual, chosen, conformist, consumerist, demanding, 
digital, emotional, enquiring, fatherless, forgotten, greedy, helpless, heroic, 
heterogeneous, hybrid, indifferent, later-born, liberated, lost, love, materialis­
tic, misled, moralistic, narcissistic, open-minded, optimistic, post-alternative, 
post-materialistic, pragmatic, pseudo-political, pubertal, rebellious, sceptical, 
security-oriented, seeking, self-centred, selfish, shocked, silent, spoiled, stolen, 
superfluous, transcendental, unsure and wild ‘generations’. 
The list does not end there. Other labels refer to numbers, places, objects, 
activities, music genres and brands, such as: ’68, ’78, ’89, ’90, ’97, ’99, millen­
nial, G4, 13th, 50-plus, 60-plus, 70-plus, €700; Berlin, east, Europe, Fulda, PISA, 
Prague, Tenerife and Weimar; cell phone, chips, chocolate, clutter, gel, grill, 
iron, jeans, laptop, sandwich, smartphone, tape deck, TV and vodka; action, care, 
click, coffee shop, cuddle, cyber, doer, fun, helper, Internet, model, online, party, 
playback, spectator, thrill, upload and user; beat, disco, hip hop, jazz, pop, raver, 
rock and techno; Facebook, Gameboy, Golf, Google, MTV, Nintendo, Siemens, 
Tamagochi and YouTube. 
Even single letters are sufficient as labels for a new ‘generation’, as evidenced 
by generations A, B, C, D, e, J, P, Q, V, X, XXL, XTC, Y, Z and @. At any rate, 
journalists, writers and scholars seem to have become obsessed with generational 
labelling. Many of those who have coined a new generational label would
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probably agree to applying only one specific term to a certain group of people, 
just as long as it is their own term. 
In view of this ‘generation labelling mania’, it seems appropriate to consider 
various concepts of ‘generation’. In the following, generations in the narrow 
sense are discussed, before adding a few further usages of the term (see Szydlik 
2000: 19ff.). 
Generations in family and society 
‘Generation’ is a multifaceted concept. To clear a path through the jungle of 
generational terminology, we can generally identify generations in family and 
society. Furthermore, it is helpful to distinguish between generations, cohorts and 
age groups. 
Family generations refer to the micro level and describe family lineage:
grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren etc. They represent generations in 
the original sense of the word ‘generate’ (to bring into being). Accordingly, Vern 
Bengtson suggests applying the term mainly when referring to generations in this 
sense: ‘And we should use the term generation primarily to reflect ranked-descent 
ordering of individuals within families’ (Bengtson 1993: 10f.). In the same vein, 
Tamara Hareven argues: ‘A generation designates a kin relationship (e.g., parents 
and children or grandparents and grandchildren); it encompasses an age span often 
as wide as 30 years or more’ (Hareven 1995: 16). Empirically, intergenerational 
family relationships are frequently described as dyads, which represent relations 
between two individuals. The relationship between daughter and mother consti­
tutes a dyad, and the relationship of the same daughter to her father another dyad. 
Generation concepts come up against difficulties and disagreement when the 
aim is to describe social generations. In this case, what is meant by ‘generation’ 
is often only vaguely defined. This also holds true for the majority of the genera­
tional labels listed above. Even among generation researchers there is no agree­
ment as to the criteria to be applied in identifying specific social generations. We 
encounter a number of fundamental problems: 
x Many of the suggested generational labels refer to individuals who hardly have 
any key experiences or clearly defined sociocultural attributes in common. 
x These individuals do not appear as a collective actor in the public arena, nor 
can we speak of any common awareness or shared sense of representing a 
specific generation. 
x Many generational labels merely take up short-term trends and fashions. This 
contributes to the impression of ‘generation’ being an arbitrary concept. 
x A generational label is especially questionable when more or less vague 
cultural attributes are assumed for a group of people who do not share any 
particular political or economic conditions. 
x Oftentimes, the creators of generational labels project subjective percep­
tions of individual characteristics, or the characteristics of small groups, onto 
entire populations. 
 10 Concepts and contexts 
x It is often unclear where precisely the line is drawn between those who just 
barely still belong and who no longer belong to the proposed ‘generation’. 
x The concept of generation is frequently greatly overextended. It is much 
more useful to distinguish between ‘generation’, ‘cohort’ and ‘age group’. 
In principle, ‘social generation’ is a concept that refers to the meso or macro 
level. It comprises individuals who were born within a period of a few years and 
who share everlasting significant commonalities. Thus, a social generation is, by 
definition, also a birth cohort. The members of a cohort belong to the same group 
of people throughout their entire lives. 
This concept is in stark contrast to that of age groups: as people get older, their 
age group changes. Members of a young age group, over time, enter a middle-
aged age group until they belong to an old age group. Thus, the term ‘young 
generation’ would be a contradiction in terms if it were to imply age groups. 
However, it would be much more appropriate when referring to stable traits of a 
specific birth cohort or even to a family generation. In any case, for the sake of 
clarity, it is helpful to exercise some caution in using the concept of generations 
in connection with ‘age groups’. 
Equating the concept of cohort with social generation would neglect important 
aspects as well. ‘Generation’ means more than ‘cohort’ does. Cohorts are more 
or less random aggregations of people born within a few years. The concept of 
cohort therefore involves a greater degree of arbitrariness. Social generations, on 
the other hand, have additional characteristics in common beyond the period of 
birth alone. This adds another substantial dimension to the concept of cohort (e.g., 
common experiences). 
People who are merely born in the same time period (i.e., members of a ran­
dom cohort) thus do not form a social generation per se. Only with regard to some 
cohorts are we justified in speaking of a ‘generation’. A generation comprises 
a certain cohort, but a specific cohort does not constitute a generation. This is 
already emphasised in Karl Mannheim’s seminal work: 
[W]e pointed out that mere co-existence in time did not even suffice to bring 
about community of generation location (. . .). In order to share the same 
generation location, i.e. in order to be able passively to undergo or actively to 
use the handicaps and privileges inherent in a generation location, one must 
be born within the same historical and cultural region. Generation as an actuality, 
however, involves even more than mere co-presence in such a historical and 
social region. A further concrete nexus is needed to constitute generation as 
an actuality. This additional nexus may be described as participation in the 
common destiny of this historical and social unit. 
(Mannheim 1952: 303; 1928: 309) 
Family and social generations are generations in the literary and strict sense. 
Besides using the term ‘generation’ for age groups or cohorts, there are additional 
concepts that are sometimes more, sometimes less related to the concepts of 
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Demographic generations are based on the average difference between the 
year of birth of parents and children. 
Entry generations refer to the time of entry into an institution such as the labour 
market, a firm or an association. 
Immigrant generations are mostly defined in terms of their native country: 
the ‘first generation’ was born in the country of origin, whereas the term ‘second 
generation’ mostly refers to their children, who were born in the host country. 
Pedagogical generations refer to the relation of teachers and pupils. 
‘Present generation’ puts currently living persons into one category, whereas 
the term ‘future generation’ may refer to people who have yet to be born or are 
still quite young. Sometimes there is talk of ‘future generations’, which indicates 
a number of subsequent generations without really explaining them. 
Technology generations are based on cohorts who grew up with the emergence 
of some new technology, for instance, computers (Sackmann and Weymann 
1995; Korupp and Szydlik 2005; Sackmann and Winkler 2013). 
Political, cultural and economic generations 
Social generations can be distinguished further in political, cultural and economic 
generations. When Mannheim speaks of generations in his influential work, pub­
lished in 1928, he is referring to political generations. By this, he distinguishes 
three relevant aspects, which are: ‘generation location (Generationslagerung)’, 
‘generation as an actuality (Generations zusammenhang)’ and ‘generation unit 
(Generationseinheit)’. Generation location refers to individuals who are born 
into the same historical and social community. This group of people does not 
yet constitute a generation. Generation location, however, bears the potential 
for a generation as an actuality, i.e., a generation location can crystallise into a 
generation. Generation as an actuality comprises individuals who were not only 
born at the same time into the same historical and social community, but who also
share the common ‘destiny’ of this historical and social unit. In particular, major 
societal events are constitutive of generations (e.g., wars, major social upheaval 
etc.). Finally, generation units are based on ‘formative and interpretive principles 
[which] form a link between spatially separated individuals’. These units are ‘char­
acterized by [. . .] an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all 
move with and are formed by their common experiences’ (Mannheim 1952: 306;
1928: 313). That is to say, generations as an actuality can comprise generation units
that are in conflict with one another in terms of their opinions, goals and behaviours. 
Mannheim’s approach remains very useful today to identify political gen­
erations or to distinguish between political generations and mere cohorts. For 
instance, if we apply his terminology to the West-German ’68 generation, we 
can hold that the West Germans born in the 1940s share a common generation 
location, whereas those who were, to some degree, active at the time (mostly 
university students) make up the core of the respective generation as an actuality. 
Generation units were the extra-parliamentary opposition movement of the West 
German political left, on the one hand, but also conservative student associations, 
on the other (Kohli and Szydlik 2000). 
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Cultural generations comprise cohorts that are characterised by specific shared 
(life) experiences, attitudes and styles. Mannheim’s terminology can be applied in 
this context as well. At first glance, the majority of the generational labels listed 
above seem to fall into the category of cultural generations. Scepticism is nev­
ertheless in order here. It is questionable whether one should actually speak of a 
‘generation’ when referring to (parts of) age groups or cohorts without any shared 
generational consciousness, let alone any presence as a collective actor. Another 
objection is that many of the labels listed above merely refer to short-lived fea­
tures; one is even tempted to speak of fashions. By contrast, social generations are 
marked by cohorts sharing specific commonalities that clearly distinguish them 
from previous and subsequent cohorts, while the defining characteristics they 
have in common are not short-lived but leave an imprint on these cohorts over 
their entire lifetime. 
In fact, most of the said labels are highly problematic. One may be tempted 
to attract attention by introducing a new terminology, and to highlight certain 
aspects related to small groups that are then projected onto whole cohorts. Cer­
tain attitudes and behaviours encountered in certain small groups may even be 
observed to a lesser or greater degree among other members of the same cohort. 
Nevertheless, according to Mannheim, much more is required if we want to speak 
of a ‘generation’ (as an actuality). 
Again, we can take the ’68 generation as an example of a cultural generation. At 
the centre of attention in this context is less its involvement in extra-parliamentary
political opposition than its ultimate success in advancing a more liberal way of 
life; and in this respect, this generation is not only different from preceding but 
also from succeeding cohorts. Especially as a cultural generation, the ’68 gen­
eration was quite successful. At the same time, this example testifies to the fact 
that in cases where using the term ‘generation’ is justified, political and cultural 
generations are often linked. 
Economic generations are formed less by way of political or sociocultural 
commonalities, but instead, are cohorts whose members share specific economic 
opportunities or risks. Specific structural conditions – for example, via the labour 
market, economy or state – affect the life chances of the members of an economic 
generation. These conditions may be created by the respective generation itself 
or may be the product of external causes. For instance, the time of labour market 
entry can be an important determinant of career pathways. Depending on the busi­
ness cycle, the existence of excess labour supply or a labour shortage, as well as 
the specific economic situation, a cohort may encounter specific opportunities or 
risks. Members of large cohorts may be subject to greater competition for educa­
tion and employment opportunities compared to members of small cohorts. At the 
same time, the type of commodity production and the dominance of the primary, 
secondary or tertiary sector at the time of labour market entry may lead to substan­
tial inequality between cohorts (Easterlin 1980). 
In general usage, the term ‘generation’ is frequently referred to in the context 
of welfare state redistribution. In order to identify underlying ideas and motives, 
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This also applies to debates on the so-called ‘intergenerational contract’ in wel­
fare state contributions and benefits. Many of these discussions are difficult sim­
ply because it is not clear who precisely the debate is about: is it about age groups, 
cohorts or indeed generations? What criteria are applied in classifying a group 
of people as being advantaged or disadvantaged? Where precisely do we draw 
the line as to who belongs to this group of people, and who does not (e.g., which 
cohorts specifically)? 
Clarifying the underlying concept is also important in the debate on ‘intergen­
erational justice’ with regard to the welfare state. In this context, conflicts over the 
distribution of welfare benefits and burdens are sometimes even referred to by the 
(ineffable) expression ‘a war of generations’. First and foremost, the ‘intergen­
erational contract’ refers to age groups rather than to cohorts or even generations: 
to avoid poverty in old age, the economically active population supports pension­
ers and thus becomes entitled to receiving support in old age as well. However, 
when the terms ‘age group’ and ‘cohort’ are used interchangeably, this results in 
a conflict of objectives between two kinds of justice: justice between age groups 
versus justice between cohorts. Should priority be given to offsetting inequalities 
between current contributors and pensioners, or is the main objective to reduce 
discrepancies in cases where public redistribution affects birth cohorts to different
degrees over their entire lifetime? Answering these questions may also reveal 
more or less hidden controversies, for instance, when members of better-off 
groups in particular are interested in retreating from what they perceive to be
‘unjust’ public intergenerational redistribution. Some policy proposals that sug­
gest less inequality between cohorts would thus lead to more inequality between 
age groups and social classes instead. Some discussions about intergenerational 
justice tend to neglect or even disguise the much more relevant intragenerational 
discrepancies between those who are economically better and worse off (see 
Kohli 2005). 
In any case, it would be difficult to consider current contributors and pen­
sioners as economic generations in the light of the generation concept presented 
above. First of all, today’s contributors will be tomorrow’s pensioners, just as 
today’s pensioners were once contributors themselves. Therefore, we do not find 
an affiliation with a certain generation over an entire lifetime. Moreover, neither 
contributors nor pensioners constitute a group composed of members within a 
narrow birth range. Referring to 16–60 year olds as a ‘generation’ would contra­
dict the concepts referred to above, just as reference to 60–100 year olds would. 
We may be able to speak of generations when welfare state arrangements ben­
efit or disadvantage certain cohorts significantly and permanently (welfare state 
‘winners’ or ‘losers’; Thomson 1989; Leisering 2000). This may be the case, for 
instance, when higher social security contributions are accompanied by lower 
pensions in old age. Nevertheless, it is not such an easy task to clearly identify 
specific ‘welfare generations’ (May 2013). 
Breaking down social generations into political, cultural and economic
generations does not intend to imply that they are not at all connected. Economic 
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might argue that a social generation emerges especially when a specific cohort 
distinguishes itself economically as well as politically and culturally from previous 
and subsequent cohorts. The ’68 generation is a case in point when arguing that 
the political involvement of many members of this generation was not least rooted 
in a sense of economic security. In fact, the emergence of political and cultural 
generations can be based upon a specific economic situation. For example, a 
cohort’s collective economic situation may lead to the pursuit of more conserva­
tive or more progressive ideas and goals. 
All in all, identifying social generations involves major challenges, especially 
when considering Mannheim’s seminal work. Three simple conditions cast doubt 
on the applicability of most of the labels mentioned above: first, a generation 
encompasses a birth cohort; second, the members of this cohort share relevant 
(political, cultural or economic) experiences and characteristics; and third, these 
characteristics are lifelong and, ideally, separate a specific generation from the 
previous and following cohorts. 
These identification problems, which are typical of social generations, do not 
exist when referring to family generations. In the following and throughout this 
book, the term ‘generation’ is used in the literal sense, namely in regard to parents 
and children. 
Solidarity and conflict 
What is ‘intergenerational solidarity’? First of all, usage of the term depends 
on the concept of generation applied (see above). For example, the term is used 
when referring to the public ‘intergenerational contract’, i.e., the young and 
middle-aged working population supports elderly pensioners. When it comes 
to family generations, the basic source is the concept of solidarity suggested by 
Vern Bengtson and colleagues. This very influential and widely used concept is 
defined in general terms: ‘For the sake of clarity, we employ ‘solidarity’ (. . .) as a 
meta-construct subsuming characteristics of intergenerational bonds in families’ 
(Roberts et al. 1991: 12). Six dimensions are proposed in more detail: affectual, 
associational, consensual, functional, normative and structural solidarity (e.g., 
Bengtson and Roberts 1991; Lawton et al. 1994). 
Conceptualising intergenerational family solidarity across various dimensions 
has the benefit of taking into account its multifaceted nature. However, instead of 
employing this division into six dimensions, here the emphasis is placed on draw­
ing a clear distinction between the potential for solidarity and actual solidarity. 
This applies especially to structural, normative and consensual solidarity. In this 
perspective, intergenerational solidarity can be described adequately in terms of 
affectual, associational and functional solidarity (see Szydlik 2000: 34ff.). 
Bengtson and Roberts define ‘structural solidarity’ as an ‘[o]pportunity struc­
ture for intergenerational relationships reflected in number, type, and geographic
proximity of family member’ (1991: 857). It therefore refers to the opportunity or
the potential for intergenerational solidarity. The mere existence of (many) family
members such as parents and adult children does not necessarily mean that they are
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(closely) connected with one another. In fact, they may have no relationship at all. A
similar thing applies to geographical distance. Apart from coresidence as a form of
functional solidarity (see below), residential proximity between non-coresident gen­
erations can rather be seen as a crucial prerequisite for intergenerational solidarity. 
‘Normative solidarity’ is defined as ‘[s]trength of commitment to performance 
of familial roles and to meeting familial obligations’ (Bengtson and Roberts 
1991: 857), and describes the degree to which individuals feel obliged to practise 
solidarity. To what extent are family members convinced that they ought to sup­
port one another? So-called ‘normative solidarity’ is not necessarily focused on 
relationships with individual parents and children, but revolves around attitudes 
towards the family in general (see Silverstein et al. 1994: 252). It also represents 
a general principle that does not necessarily have to accord with actual action 
(Lawton et al. 1994: 35). Again, this involves ‘only’ a potential for solidarity but 
not intergenerational solidarity as such. 
‘Consensual solidarity’ describes commonalities between individuals in terms 
of values, attitudes and beliefs. To what extent do family members agree in politi­
cal, economic and cultural matters? Do they share the same opinions on political 
parties, unions or churches? Do they subscribe to the same values and lifestyles, 
or do they display major differences in this respect? Although assessing ‘con­
sensual solidarity’ involves comparing the views of certain family members, the 
opinions themselves do not necessarily refer to any specific relative of another 
generation. There may be consensus on a certain issue, but no more than that. 
Such a consensus may foster intergenerational family solidarity but does not nec­
essarily have to do so. 
Intergenerational family solidarity refers to bonds and interactions between 
family members of different generations. In this sense, it is interindividual, per­
sonal and dyadic in principle. It comprises a wide range of facets, which can be 
classified into three dimensions: the affectual, associational and functional dimen­
sions of solidarity. Although these dimensions can be linked to one another, this 
does not necessarily have to be the case. Whether and to what degree they actually 
overlap is ultimately an empirical matter. The associational and functional dimen­
sions refer to the element of action involved in solidarity, whereas the affectual 
dimension points to the existence of emotional bonds. 
Thus, it is suggested that, in principle, there are three dimensions of intergen­
erational family solidarity: 
x Affectual solidarity: sense of affiliation and common bond between people 
(emotional closeness, affection, sense of community) 
x Associational solidarity: shared activities and interaction (frequency and 
kind of contact) 
x Functional solidarity: the giving and taking of money, time and space 
(monetary transfers, assistance in the form of time and coresidence). 
Affectual solidarity describes emotional bonds and affection. A measure for such 
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such as adult children and parents (e.g., Szydlik 1995, 1996, 2000, 2008a; Bertogg 
and Szydlik 2016). Affectual solidarity refers to the subjective sense of a common 
bond and a feeling of togetherness between individuals, hence, this also implies 
that the other is significant to one’s own life. 
Associational solidarity pertains to shared activities and interaction. It refers 
to the question of whether individuals are involved with one another in the first 
place and, if so, how frequently they are in contact. Different kinds of contact are 
subsumed by the dimension of associational solidarity, for instance, meeting in 
person, talking on the phone, writing, spending a holiday together or providing 
personal help and care. 
Functional solidarity is another dimension of family solidarity related to
action. It comprises three ‘currencies’ of intergenerational transfers, namely
the giving and taking of money, time and space (see Soldo and Hill 1993).
Thus, functional solidarity can be divided into three subdimensions: mone­
tary transfers, assistance in the form of time and coresidence. Monetary
transfers include voluntary or involuntary financial assistance, which may
occur once or repeatedly, on a regular or irregular basis. They also refer to
gifts of money and things, loans and bequests. Assistance in the form of time
involves a wide range of services. It includes, for instance, helping in the
household, in the garden, doing repair work, running errands, providing care,
looking after grandchildren and offering advice, consolation and encourage­
ment. Coresidence, that is, sharing the same household, can go hand in hand
with financial support, but also with giving and saving time. A person who
pays no or only modest rent saves money, and so do those who share a house­
hold with others compared to a single-person household. This applies in a
similar manner to saving time with regard to chores, such as cleaning, home
maintenance and doing the laundry. Thus, we can argue that coresidence is
not quite on a par with the other two modes of transfer but is subordinate to
the giving and taking of money and time. Moreover, this underscores that
the three basic ‘currencies’ cannot always be neatly separated. Time can be
‘translated’ into financial transfers in cases where outside help would have to
be engaged instead. Conversely, financial transfers can serve to pay for help
and care services. 
Solidarity and conflict 
What is the relationship between solidarity and conflict? One way of thinking 
about this is to treat them as opposites. From this perspective, a relationship 
between people is marked either by solidarity or conflict, and furthermore, is 
rated as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. However, this perspective is not applied here. 
On the contrary, it is argued that solidarity must not be mistaken for harmony. 
Accordingly, the opposite of solidarity is not conflict. Relationships based on 
solidarity are not necessarily characterised by an absence of discord. Also, more 
solidarity is not inevitably ‘better’ per se (see Bengtson et al. 2002: 571). Here are 
just a few examples of affectual, associational and functional solidarity: 
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x	 The relationship between adult children and their parents can be too close 
if either the parents cling to their adult children, or adult children have such 
close emotional ties to their parents that they are unable to move toward 
independence. 
x	 Frequent contact may be seen as a helpful means to avoid loneliness and 
promote family integration. However, not all contact is perfectly voluntary 
and without friction. 
x	 From a superficial perspective, we might be inclined to view intergenerational 
transfers as a generally ‘positive’ aspect of intergenerational solidarity. 
After all, family members often support one another in cases of financial 
difficulties. Such transfers, however, may also represent dependence, come 
with implicit or explicit demands and may put a strain on both transfer givers 
and receivers (Chapters 5 and 7). Also, adult children caring permanently 
for elderly parents might not be in the interest of either the children or their 
parents (Chapter 8). 
Accordingly, all conflict is not necessarily and always ‘bad’. Obviously, there 
are intense, destructive fights. However, to some extent, open disagreement and 
debate between family members can also provide an opportunity for negotiating 
opposing opinions and wishes (see Stierlin 1974: 180f.). Respectful discussions 
permit the parties involved to explain their different views, which can contrib­
ute to improving mutual understanding and further developing the relationship 
(Chapter 5). One can even treat such conflict as an element in human bonding. A 
person who engages in respectful debates with another person may be showing his 
or her interest and the wish to maintain that relationship. A person who no longer 
has anything to say to the other, who has broken off the relationship, is no longer 
inclined to argue with that other person either. 
If we agree that solidarity and conflict are not opposites per se, it follows 
that intergenerational relations are not necessarily marked by either cohesion or 
dispute. In fact, both forms of interpersonal behaviour can occur in the same rela­
tionship, even at the same time, and sometimes they presuppose one another. 
Conflict can be a reaction to solidarity, for instance, in times of monetary trans­
fers to adult children or personal care for frail elderly parents. Help and care can 
place an excessive burden on families and thus lead to quarrels. Conversely, as 
mentioned above, sharing and respecting different views can enhance cohesion. 
However, bitter controversies may also lead to diminished contact or even ter­
mination of the relationship. We should be cautious about painting a picture of 
intergenerational conflict that is too pessimistic or too optimistic. The impact of 
controversy on a relationship depends not least on its frequency and intensity. 
For example, previous analyses indicate that noteworthy conflict between family 
generations is quite rare, but if it does occur, it may lead to avoiding the other 
person (Szydlik 2008a). 
Figure 2.1 depicts the possible connections between interpersonal solidarity
and conflict. It positions human relations in a space defined by four poles: symbiosis, 
















18 Concepts and contexts
 
Figure 2.1 Solidarity and conflict 
line and a conflict line, respectively. Their positioning in the figure implies that 
conflict does not preclude support, and a close relationship between generations 
may be accompanied by disputes as well. The solidarity line connects ‘total 
symbiosis’ and ‘absolute autonomy’; the conflict line ranges from ‘complete har­
mony’ to ‘outright hostility’. Total symbiosis and absolute autonomy represent 
two ends of an imagined continuum along which the specific intergenerational 
relationships can be positioned closer to one end or the other. The same applies to 
the continuum between complete harmony and outright hostility. 
Of course, the four poles represent extremes that are rarely found in reality.
Nevertheless, in order to identify the spectrum, it makes sense to have a brief look
at these extremes. Total symbiosis implies an absolute connectedness between fam­
ily generations. There is no room for a person’s own individual perspective; the only
possible unit is ‘we’. In this case, adult children and their parents live together, the
children never manage to separate from their parents, and the generations spend all
available time together; if one person is in need, the other helps without hesitation
and limitation. On the other side of the continuum, absolute autonomy means the
complete absence of any bond, which at the same time involves total independ­
ence of the family generations. There is no contact at all, no postcard, no mail, no
emotion and even no thinking of the other person. Complete harmony would imply
that there is no discussion whatsoever: all parties are always in concord over every
aspect, even minor ones; everyone agrees on every single word that the other person
says, and there exists a perfect consonance of opinions in all matters, ranging
from politics to lifestyle and small everyday decisions. The other side of the contin­
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Every single word is disputed, loud discussions are endless, and since we are
imagining an extreme pole, all-out conflict may also involve strong emotional and
physical abuse, as well as the involvement of the police, lawyers and the courts. 
Since total symbiosis, absolute autonomy, complete harmony and outright 
hostility are extraordinary exceptions, the great majority of the relations can 
be expected to be located somewhere between these four poles. In order to fill 
this theoretical model with empirical results, the grey area gives a preview of 
the following analyses. Of course, the figure offers only a very general view of 
adult family generations, neglecting differences between forms of solidarity and 
degrees of variation in child-parent and parent-child relationships. 
x Most parents and adult children find themselves within the category of 
consensual solidarity (tight and close; see Table 3.1). These relations are 
marked by profound solidarity and weak conflict. All in all, parents and adult 
children rarely report noteworthy controversies. If disputes occur, they do 
not tend to be excessive. The generations show strong bonds, help each other 
when in need and are in frequent contact. 
x Conflictual solidarity (strained and entangled) means that family generations are 
very close to one another, which becomes apparent by frequent contact, and at the 
same time, we observe considerable conflict. Some of these controversies may 
go back to difficult situations of need, which are at least partly met by intergen­
erational support. All in all, this category represents the second smallest group. 
x Relations with frequent conflict and low solidarity can be labelled as con­
flictual autonomy (obligatory and divided). On the one hand, there are 
considerable controversies; on the other, contact is less frequent. In this case, 
the generations are possibly in the process of more or less permanent separa­
tion (Szydlik 2008a: 107f.). The empirical results indicate that these relations 
form the smallest group of all. 
x Last but not least, consensual autonomy (customary and separate) defines a 
situation in which the generations do not quarrel with one another (anymore) 
and there is also not much contact. In some cases, the relationship has ceased 
to exist, be it after a long struggle, be it in terms of the adage, ‘Out of sight, 
out of mind’. This is the second largest group, but still much smaller than 
consensual solidarity (see Figure 3.5). 
Theoretical model 
The following theoretical model provides the basis for explaining intergenera­
tional relations. The aim is to understand which family generations lead which 
relationships – and why. Why do some adult children and parents show more 
cohesion than others? The ONFC model (based on opportunity, need, family and 
cultural-contextual structures) links the descriptive solidarity-conflict model with 
corresponding explanations. It offers a general conceptual framework for more 
detailed theoretical reasoning as a basis for empirical analyses. Throughout this 
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contact, conflict, space, money, time and inheritance. In doing so, the model 
connects theoretical assumptions with empirical investigations. 
Originally, the model was developed to explain emotional closeness between 
parents and adult children (Szydlik 1995). In the meantime, it has found widespread
use for addressing a host of intergenerational issues, such as the provision of 
living space, help and care as well as financial transfers between generations 
(e.g., Szydlik 2000, 2004, 2008a; Brandt et al. 2009; Leopold and Schneider 2010; 
Steinbach and Kopp 2010; Deindl 2011; Isengard and Szydlik 2012). 
The three circles at the centre of Figure 2.2 symbolise the three solidarity dimen­
sions addressed in the previous chapter, namely affectual (emotional closeness),
associational (contact) and functional solidarity (giving and taking of money, time
and space). 
Which factors influence intergenerational relations? The diverse determinants 
can be classified into four groups, namely opportunity, need, family and cultural-
contextual structures. In so doing, three levels of analysis are distinguished: 
individual, family and society. Intergenerational relations are generally dyadic, 
which means that essentially two people are involved (e.g., adult child and par­
ent), each with specific opportunities and needs. This relationship is embedded in 
a family and, beyond that, in a societal context. Among the groups of factors are 
influences and dependencies (represented by arrows). 
The general model provides a tool for developing appropriate hypotheses as a 
basis for empirical research. Therefore, a variable may be attributed to opportuni­
ties in one case, whereas the same variable may represent a hypothesis referring 
to need structures when explaining another aspect of intergenerational relations. 
Since one and the same variable may be involved in various hypotheses, the ONFC
model ‘forces’ the researcher to decide what the main hypotheses are. Of course,
this decision has to be reviewed in the light of the corresponding empirical results. 
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In the following, the four groups of factors as well as the applicability of the 
model will be illustrated by briefly naming a number of relevant hypotheses for 
the empirical analyses of this book. Those (and further) hypotheses will be
illustrated in more detail in the corresponding chapters. 
Opportunity structures 
Opportunity structures reflect opportunities or resources. They enable, promote, 
hinder or prevent social interaction. To interrelate with someone typically requires 
suitable conditions and means. Opportunities describe favourable circumstances 
for social interaction and comprise all kinds of available resources (see Foa and 
Foa 1980; Foa et al. 1993), such as skills and abilities, knowledge and informa­
tion, money, goods, time, health, power, status and social ties. 
Frequent personal contact amongst adult generations can be expected to depend 
on living in close proximity. It is much easier to meet somebody on a regular basis 
when people live in the same neighbourhood. Good health is another prerequisite 
that facilitates the ability to meet. Moreover, financial resources, including a pro­
spective bequest, might foster intergenerational contact. 
Since conflict is likely to emerge especially under stressful conditions, finan­
cial resources may increase concord. Additionally, conflict between people requires
contact, so that a high frequency of contact provides potential opportunities for more
quarrelling. However, conflict may also lead to less intergenerational cohesion. 
With regard to space, a likely prerequisite for adult children and parents core-
siding is the availability of living space. A sufficient number of rooms offers 
the opportunity to share the same four walls. At the same time, educational and 
financial resources may provide the means for greater independence and thus for 
separate residences of adult family generations. 
Financial resources are also likely to play an important role in the giving of money. 
Supporting relatives in the form of monetary transfers depends on having sufficient
means at one’s disposal, via household income or savings. Furthermore, one cannot
preclude that frequent contact offers more opportunities to give and receive. 
Closer geographic proximity is likely to enable adult children to give time in 
the form of personal help or care to a parent. The health of potential helpers and 
carers may be a crucial resource, too, since people in poor health are less able to 
help others. Conversely, if the parents possess financial resources, this may lead 
to better chances of being helped or cared for by an adult child. 
Research has shown that inheritances mostly stem from parents. Adult chil­
dren are therefore more likely to have received a previous inheritance if their par­
ents have already passed away. Conversely, adult children have a greater chance 
of expecting a future bequest if their parents are still alive. 
Need structures 
Need structures indicate the needs for social interaction. They also include desires,
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significant others. In fact, a whole range of needs can be listed (e.g., Maslow 
1943, 1954; Max-Neef et al. 1991; Kenrick et al. 2010). In the context of
intergenerational relations, needs, for example, can be of a financial nature (i.e., 
during education, unemployment or due to insufficient financial savings in old 
age), they can stem from health problems (be it a short-term or long-term illness 
or even one requiring lifelong help or care), there can be a need for information 
and advice, or there can be emotional needs (i.e., for appreciation, belonging, 
consolation, understanding, self-determina tion). Moreover, parents may want the 
best for their children and wish to support them throughout their whole lives and 
even thereafter (see Table 2.1), and adult children may feel the need to spend 
time with their elderly parents. The underlying premise is that human behaviour 
is not least guided by needs and wants (including the implicit wish to comply 
with norms), the fulfilment of which depends on opportunities that are influenced 
by immediate and general contexts. Human relations are embedded in meso and 
macro structures, which enable, hinder or mediate individual behaviour. 
From this perspective, opportunities and needs may be intertwined (repre­
sented by arrows in Figure 2.2). The needs of one person may correspond with the 
opportunities of the same or another person, and they may match or contradict the 
needs of another. For example, a child’s need for monetary support may be met 
by parental resources, or the care needs of a frail parent may contradict an adult 
child’s wish for self-determination. In any case, the fulfilment of one person’s 
needs may depend not only on that person’s own opportunities but also on the 
resources and needs of the other person, as well as on the conditions, norms, regu­
lations, traditions etc. of family and society. Furthermore, although intergenera­
tional relations can play a part in addressing and fulfilling individual needs, there 
is also a need for independence from symbiotic relationships, persistent demands, 
continuous control and strict regulation. 
Financial needs may motivate generations to stay in contact, and monetary 
transfers, including presents, may nurture the bonds between adult children and 
parents. It is an empirical question whether older people’s greater need for atten­
tion and support leads to more intergenerational contact. The same is true for the 
consequences of poor health. 
Strenuous situations can lead to conflict. This can apply to situations of finan­
cial need, for instance, when one generation transfers money to the other. Health 
problems may also evoke conflict, especially when relatives need intense help 
or even care. In contrast, one might hypothesise that age decreases the desire to 
engage in controversies with the next generation. 
Parents providing space is much more probable when adult children are com­
paratively young. This is a time when they may still need to live with their par­
ents, owing to a lack of sufficient financial resources of their own. Adult children 
in education are also more likely to coreside with their parents, in contrast to 
children in gainful employment. 
Naturally, adult children who are still in education are much more in need of 
money. In general, it is younger adult children in particular who need financial 
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Furthermore, the needs of elderly parents for help and care may lead to reciprocity 
in terms of monetary ‘rewards’. 
Elderly parents in poor health are in special need of considerable time transfers 
by their adult children, be it due to a short-term or long-term illness, or even a 
condition requiring intense care. Conversely, one could argue that adult children 
with greater financial needs are more likely to help or care for their parents. 
Poor people are in much greater need of an inheritance than wealthy ones. 
The analyses will show whether respondents with no property are actually more 
likely to receive a bequest. At the same time, helping and caring for elderly parents 
in need may increase the chances of receiving a ‘gratification’ in the form of a
future inheritance. 
Family structures 
The relation between parent and child is embedded in family structures. They 
include, for example, family size and composition, earlier family events as well 
as family roles and norms. Factors of this kind are number of children, marital 
status, gender combination of the dyad (daughter-mother, daughter-father etc.) 
and socialisation, even going back to early childhood. For instance, growing up 
with divorced parents may have lifelong consequences for the intergenerational 
solidarity of adult children with both parents. 
We can assume that mothers and daughters have the most frequent intergen­
erational contact, especially compared to fathers and sons. We can also expect 
relatively few contacts in relationships with divorced fathers. Additionally, having 
more children may lead to somewhat fewer meetings and conversations with each 
adult child. 
Since women in particular are deemed responsible for assuming help and care 
tasks for their elderly parents, it is quite likely that daughters, in contrast to sons, 
have more conflict with their parents. The existence of grandchildren may reduce 
controversies between parent and an adult child, owing to the middle generation’s 
‘gatekeeper’ position. 
It can be expected that adult children without a partner are much more likely 
to still share living space with their parents. Married children can be assumed to 
be more likely to have left their parents’ home. This also applies to adult children 
who are parents themselves. Overall, it is adult sons who are more likely to still 
live with a parent. 
Family structures may also play a role when it comes to giving money. Since 
resources are generally limited, it is likely that in larger families there will be 
fewer transfers per person. In other words, the more children, the less money for 
each adult child. Correspondingly, the existence of grandchildren may reduce the 
direct transfers to adult children as well. 
The obvious hypothesis is that daughters much more often than sons spend time
helping and caring for their parents. However, when parents (still) have a partner,
help and care from adult children should be less probable. Having siblings and 
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A similar situation applies to inheritance. The number of siblings, and hence the
number of competitors for an inheritance, may play an important role when it comes
to receiving wealth from parents. This may also be the case with regard to (grand) 
children if they emerge as additional ‘competitors’ for the bequests from parents. 
Cultural-contextual structures 
Cultural-contextual structures represent societal conditions in which intergen­
erational relations develop. These include social, political, economic and cultural 
conditions as well as rules and norms of institutions and groups. Cultural-
contextual as well as family structures represent factors in their own right. However,
they can be interrelated (family norms can be generalised and societal regulations 
may ‘translate’ into family features), and they may also have strong influences on 
individual opportunities and needs (indicated by arrows in Figure 2.2). The term 
‘culture’ is used in a broad sense, including characteristics of migrants as well as 
institutions and structures at societal level, such as welfare state regulations and 
social stratification. 
Regarding intergenerational contact, one can develop contradicting hypoth­
eses on the basis of welfare state regulations: higher social and family expenditure 
might ‘crowd out’ family cohesion or, on the contrary, lead to closer intergenera­
tional contact as a result of easing the burden of intense care tasks. Deciding this 
controversy requires empirical analyses. 
Generating clear hypotheses is a much easier task in the case of family conflict: 
it can be argued that a strong welfare state leads to considerably less difficult situ­
ations for family members due to public support in the form of money or services. 
Correspondingly, greater poverty in a society might also be associated with more 
intergenerational controversies. 
Assuming that adult children and parents, at least at some point, would prefer 
to live in their own space, more public financial support, such as social benefits 
and family allowances, should decrease intergenerational coresidence amongst 
adults. Conversely, greater poverty may lead to more family generations living 
within the same four walls. 
A stronger welfare state that relieves families of financial burdens and
thus leaves resources for the private transfer of money might lead to more
intergenerational transfers. This may also apply to countries with more
wealth per capita, whereas poverty may lead family generations to spend less
money on others. 
The extent of social and family expenditure may also play a role in the
kind and extent of time transfers that adult children provide to their (elderly)
parents. A stronger welfare state is likely to unburden adult children of intense
care tasks. The question is whether this will lead to more frequent but less
burdensome help. 
Wealthy countries most probably offer better chances of bequeathing sub­
stantial sums from one generation to the next. By contrast, poverty is likely to 
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and future. Furthermore, we can expect considerably fewer bequests for migrants 
compared to the native population. 
Solidarity, conflict and ambivalence 
As elaborated above, the ONFC model is a helpful theoretical tool for empirically
investigating both solidarity and conflict. The model can be used to study all forms
of intergenerational cohesion, including affectual, associational and functional soli­
darity as well as various forms and extents of controversies. But what about another
term that has been used in the realm of generation research, namely ‘ambivalence’
(e.g., Lüscher and Pillemer 1998; Connidis and McMullin 2002a, b; Connidis 2015.
For a critical review see, for example, Bengtson et al. 2002; Hogerbrugge and
Komter 2012)? Since a few – partly different, partly intertwined – ‘ambivalences’
have been suggested, we first need to outline what is actually meant by the term. 
Much research has addressed ‘psychological ambivalence’, suggesting mixed, 
contradictory or conflicting feelings of individuals, and implying both ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ emotions at the same time (e.g., Pillemer et al. 2007: 775; 2012: 
1106). Mixed emotions may occur, for example, when individuals feel both affec­
tion and aversion toward another person. From this perspective, ‘ambivalence 
has a relatively long history in psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and 
psychology’ (Connidis and McMullin 2002b: 599; Lüscher 2002). Thus, besides 
identifying cases experiencing mixed and contradictory emotions, research has 
tried to identify the impact of ambivalences on individual well-being, including 
depression, neuroticism and psychological distress (e.g., Lowenstein 2007;
Fingerman et al. 2008; Kiecolt et al. 2011). 
‘Sociological ambivalence’ refers to contradictory norms (Lüscher and Pil­
lemer 1998: 415, based on Merton and Barber 1963 and Coser 1966). Those 
normative contradictions may then give rise to ambivalences at the individual 
level. Examples are ‘conflict between norms regarding solidarity with children 
and expectations that adult children should become independent’ (Pillemer et al. 
2007: 776). Connidis and McMullin treat ‘ambivalence as structurally created 
contradictions that are experienced by individuals in their interaction with others’ 
(2002a: 559). This perspective sheds light on contradictions in social structure 
and thus in social roles. For example, having frail elderly parents can lead to 
severe ambivalence due to conflicting job demands and family obligations. More­
over, not caring for grandchildren may result in more ‘structured ambivalence’ –
defined as ‘the contradiction between behaviour and cultural norms’ – when 
living in a country where grandchild care is highly obligatory (Neuberger and 
Haberkern 2014: 171). From this perspective, one might debate whether ambiva­
lences ‘designate contradictions in relationships between parents and adult off­
spring that cannot be reconciled’ (Lüscher and Pillemer 1998: 416) or whether 
‘social actors regularly attempt to reconcile ambivalence or risk living in a
constant state of inaction’ (Connidis and McMullin 2002a: 563). 
Further forms of ambivalence have been suggested as well, for example, 
with regard to incongruent forms of solidarity, including relationships that are 
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emotionally close but involve only infrequent contact (Silverstein and Bengtson 
1997: 433; Bengtson et al. 2002: 571). The concurrent appearance of solidarity 
and conflict has also been perceived as ambivalent (Steinbach 2008: 120; Ferring 
et al. 2009: 256ff.; Kiecolt et al. 2011: 373; Lendon et al. 2014). Furthermore, 
‘[a]mbivalence may also be viewed as a collective ambivalence of mixed feelings 
across multiple children – positive with some children but less positive with oth­
ers’ (Ward et al. 2009: 162). 
Of course, empirical studies of ambivalence depend crucially on its defini­
tion and measurement. Although there have been approaches to operationalise 
‘ambivalence’, no agreement on these issues has been reached. For example, 
should a survey ask people directly about mixed feelings, or should it employ a 
more indirect approach, or are both strategies in fact equally suitable (e.g., Kiecolt 
et al. 2011; Suitor et al. 2011; Lendon et al. 2014)? 
The ambivalence hypothesis underlines that intergenerational relationships 
involve contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas, such as between closeness and 
distance, dependence and autonomy, obligation and self-interest, harmony and 
conflict, or loyalty and opposition. Solidarity can be the result of coming to terms 
productively with ambivalence. The ability to acknowledge and deal with those 
contradictions can be seen as an important prerequisite for long-lasting cohe­
sion. Previous notions along the lines of ‘intimacy at a distance’ (Rosenmayr and 
Köckeis 1961, 1963) or ‘inner closeness through outer distance’ (Tartler 1961) 
point in the same direction. 
Solidarity and ambivalence neither compete with one another (e.g., Bengtson 
et al. 2002: 573; Giarrusso et al. 2005), nor is the concept of solidarity impaired 
by these contradictions and dilemmas. Depending on its definition, ambivalence 
can be integrated into the solidarity-conflict model. If the concurrent existence of 
solidarity and conflict is the issue, the area of ‘conflictual solidarity’ in Figure 2.1
could be labelled as ‘ambivalence’. If the focus is on ‘psychological ambiva­
lence’, mixed feelings might be addressed within a broad conception of affectual 
solidarity. However, it is quite difficult to subsume ‘sociological ambivalence’ 
into a pure solidarity-conflict model (see Curran 2002; Connidis and McMul­
lin 2002b). The main reason is that this model rather reflects a description of 
human bonding, whereas explanations of such bonding get the short end of the 
stick. Thus, there is a need for a more thorough model that addresses the complex 
conditions of interpersonal relations, including individual, familial and societal 
factors. In empirical terms, the solidarity-conflict model rather reflects depend­
ent variables (which may be interlinked), whereas the ONFC model (Figure 2.2) 
provides a broader perspective in order to achieve a thorough picture of solidarity 
and conflict. 
In fact, the ONFC model can be used to identify a number of possible ambiva­
lences. This applies to both contradictions within and between the four groups of 
factors (Szydlik 2000: 52f.). Opportunity structures include dilemmas between 
closeness and distance. It is not possible to live in the same home with one’s 
parents and far away from them at the same time. The same applies to time: 
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does not. Contradictions apply especially to need structures: (adult) children
and parents may want to be connected with one another, which may contradict 
the often simultaneous wish for autonomy. Needing time or money is often set 
against the desire for independence. The needs of one generation may contradict 
the needs of another. Family structures may involve ambivalence, too, for exam­
ple, when caring for grandchildren as a form of intergenerational solidarity comes 
with interference in parenting. Furthermore, members of the middle generation 
in a ‘sandwich’ situation may experience mixed feelings as a result of concur­
rent obligations towards frail parents and dependent children. Cultural-contextual 
structures not least indicate differing norms: on the one hand, adult children are 
supposed to be independent and thus ‘cut the cord’ from their parents; on the other 
hand, general norms demand maintaining contact and exercising intergenerational 
solidarity. Another dilemma goes back to discrepancies between work and family, 
when job demands for geographical flexibility stand against obligations to care 
for (frail) parents. 
Opportunity structures may contradict the other three groups of factors, for 
instance, when financial or time resources are set against one’s wishes and needs 
or when a lack of resources forbids helping other family members. Needs for
individual autonomy or solidarity may contrast conditions at the family or soci­
etal level. How should individuals react when family and society demand that 
they sacrifice their own needs in order to care for relatives? Family structures
may contradict individual opportunities and needs as well as societal settings and 
demands. It may be helpful for families at large when specific family members 
take on tasks of intergenerational solidarity. However, this must not necessarily 
also be in the interest of the individual support provider. Furthermore, family-
specific norms may not be in accordance with general norms. Last but not least, 
cultural-contextual structures may result in more or less ambivalence for individ­
uals and families. For example, living in a strong welfare state with considerable 
public services and relatively few normative obligations requiring adult children 
to care for the elderly, may lead to less mixed feelings about having professionals 
care for one’s parents. 
Generation and state 
Worlds of welfare 
Is there a way to organise countries into a specific order based on their welfare 
systems, or must we assume that every single country features its own unique 
arrangements that do not correspond to any general pattern of any kind? These 
alternative perspectives are discussed in the following, leading to a ‘third way’ of 
theoretical reasoning and empirical investigation. 
Three basic welfare regimes may serve as a starting point, namely the social-
democratic, liberal and conservative model (Esping-Andersen 1990). However, it 
has been argued that the conservative model actually consists of two types, which 
has led to distinguishing a fourth model: the familistic regime (e.g., Leibfried 1992;
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Lessenich 1994; Ferrera 1996, 1998). Additionally, these four models only refer 
to Western welfare states and neglect post-socialist countries. Furthermore, some 
countries cannot easily be assigned to one of the general welfare regimes, leading 
to the notion of ‘mixed forms’, or ‘special cases’. In fact, theoretical ‘ideal types’ 
are rarely found in reality, which leads to the need to exercise some degree of 
discretion in assigning countries to the various types. For Europe, one can suggest 
the following general models: 
1 	 Social-democratic: Compared to the other types, the social-democratic regime 
represents the strongest welfare state. It tends to focus on equality and 
offers comparatively generous social benefits to the whole population. The 
Scandinavian countries are prominent examples of this type of welfare regime. 
It is therefore especially fortunate that Sweden and Denmark are included in
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, and thus in this book. 
The smallest of the ‘three worlds’ was developed by social democracy, in 
particular, promoting ‘an equality of the highest standards, not an equality 
of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). 
The social-democratic welfare state seeks to compensate the effects of mar­
ket forces; it aims to reduce social inequality and provide a high degree of 
social protection. Naturally, a strong welfare state is associated with high 
costs. Accordingly, the acceptance of high taxes is crucial. High employment 
also reduces unemployment costs and increases revenue from income tax and 
social security contributions. The high level of social service provision makes 
it easier for individuals – and especially for family caretakers – to combine 
family and work. In contrast to the other proposed welfare regimes, the social-
democratic model is less contested with regard to its theoretical suitability 
for welfare state research. This also applies to the general assignment of the 
Northern European states to this type of welfare regime. 
2 	 Liberal: At the opposite end of the market-state continuum, we find quite 
weak, even residual welfare states. In these market-oriented political econo­
mies, the welfare state only steps in when individuals prove to be in substantial 
need of social benefits. To the extent that benefits are provided at all, they 
are means-tested and quite modest. ‘Benefits cater mainly to a clientele of 
low-income, usually working- class, state dependents. (. . .) The archetypical 
examples of this model are the United States, Canada and Australia’ (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 26f.). Less clearly attributable European examples are Great 
Britain (which unfortunately does not take part in SHARE), and to some 
extent, Ireland (which is included). Later on, Esping-Andersen responded to 
criticism that Great Britain is one of the countries that might be difficult 
to assign to one of the three regimes: ‘Britain is mainly a problem because 
the typology does not take into account mutation. (. . .) Britain appears 
increasingly liberal. Britain is an example of regime-shifting or, perhaps, 
of stalled “social democratization”’ (1999: 87). Ireland does not seem to fit 
the liberal model perfectly either, since this country is assigned to the group 
with medium labour market regulation, along with Japan, the Netherlands, 
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Finland, Norway and Sweden (1999: 85). In the liberal welfare regime, con­
siderably lower social benefits come with lower general costs, and therefore 
lower taxes as well. Moreover, the state generally supports private insurance 
for social protection. 
3 	 Conservative: Whereas social-democratic and liberal regimes focus more 
on individuals, the following two models move the family to the centre of 
attention. With regard to the strength of the welfare state, the conservative 
regime can be placed in between the social-democratic and liberal types. 
Conservative welfare states are not as comprehensive as the social-democratic 
ones, yet they are not as weak as liberal regimes either. A main feature is 
status protection. In contrast to the social-democratic type, the conservative 
welfare state is less inclined to compensate the effects of market forces, and 
is thus less geared toward achieving more equality in society. Social ben­
efits tend rather to be a reflection of previous contributions to the public 
social security system, which means that inequality tends to be preserved. 
In contrast to the liberal type, the conservative welfare state does provide 
considerable social expenditure. However, in doing so, the model supports 
traditional family patterns, not least based on influences from the church. 
‘[T]he state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its mem­
bers is exhausted. (. . .) In the conservative tradition, of course, women are 
discouraged from working; in the liberal ideal, concerns of gender matter 
less than the sanctity of the market’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27f.). Three 
prominent country examples of conservative welfare regimes are included in 
the empirical studies in this book, namely Germany, Austria and France. 
4 	 Familistic: Initially, ‘familistic’ states were subsumed under the conserva­
tive type. However, a distinct familistic regime was suggested later on to 
account for the situation in Southern European countries, including Italy, 
Spain and Greece (Leibfried 1992; Lessenich 1994; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 
1997; Trifiletti 1999; Flaquer 2000). Within the triangle of market, state and 
family as the main providers of social security, these countries are closer 
to the family angle. Responsibility for social security is assigned primarily 
to the family. A weak and even residual welfare state goes hand in hand 
with strong norms regarding family solidarity, and it is women especially 
who are made responsible for these tasks. In fact, when assessing welfare 
regimes, it makes sense to consider their effects on gender inequality (e.g., 
Sainsbury 1994; Haberkern et al. 2015). Nevertheless, there are also argu­
ments suggesting that the Mediterranean countries can still be assigned to the 
conservative regime. For example, Castles concludes that ‘the countries of 
Southern Europe must be seen as quite typical members of the Conservative 
family of nations, which happen to spend less than others in the grouping only 
because they are poor and have relatively youthful populations’ (1995: 311).
However, in his influential paper, Reher (1998: 203) distinguishes between 
‘strong and weak family systems’, whereas the former applies to the 
‘Mediterranean region’ and the latter to the ‘center and north of Europe’ (for 
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5 	 Post-socialist: Do the transitory Eastern European, post-‘socialist/communist’ 
countries form a welfare regime of their own? Various authors come to
different conclusions. Bahle (2008: 104ff.), for example, offers ‘alternative 
hypothetical scenarios’. Zukowski (2009: 28f., see also Cerami 2006) pro­
poses that ‘the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe form a 
unique welfare model.’ Rys (2001: 180) argues that ‘[s]ome common trends 
are noted in healthcare but this does not seem to add up to a special model.’ 
Ferge (2008: 158) concludes that ‘welfare culture does not seem to be very 
different in the east and west of Europe.’ King and Szelényi (2005) distin­
guish three general varieties of post-communism (‘capitalism from without, 
above and below’). Kollmorgen (2009: 84) discusses three post-socialists 
welfare regimes on the basis of Esping-Andersen’s model. Fenger (2007: 
27) finds that ‘the post-communist welfare states cannot be reduced to any of 
Esping-Andersen’s or any other well-known types of welfare states.’ In any 
case, one should not neglect the ‘socialist’ past when it comes to investigat­
ing contemporary families. This applies particularly to adult intergenerational 
relations, which are rooted in (previous) societal contexts during childhood, 
youth and early adulthood. SHARE offers information on Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Furthermore, long-term influences of the situation in the 
former German Democratic Republic will be investigated via separate analy­
ses for East Germany. 
6 	 Special cases: Some countries are particularly difficult to assign to a ‘family of 
nations’. A good example is Switzerland, which is sometimes assigned to the 
liberal model, sometimes to the conservative regime, sometimes even associ­
ated with familistic countries and sometimes described as a ‘mixed’, ‘hybrid’ 
or ‘special’ case (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Bonoli 1997; Ferrera 
1998; Obinger 1998; Armingeon 2001; Wicki 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2002; 
Imhof 2006). In some ways, the Swiss insurance schemes tend to resemble 
the conservative model; in others, liberal ideas prevail. Health insurance 
is obligatory, but there is competition amongst insurance companies. The 
pension system consists of three pillars: public, occupational and private.
‘[M]ost scholars agree to qualify Switzerland as a mixed conservative-liberal 
welfare state (. . .) – possibly with a predominance of continental charac­
teristics’ (Oesch 2008: 537). An argument can also be made that a once 
rudimentary Swiss welfare state has developed over time into a state with 
more comprehensive social benefits (e.g., Nollert 2007). The ‘special case’ 
interpretation with regard to Switzerland is underscored by the Swiss fed­
eral system, which involves a variety of welfare designs within the same 
country (e.g., Armingeon et al. 2004; Obinger et al. 2005). Another example 
of a special case is the Netherlands. Even Esping-Andersen states: ‘[T]he 
Netherlands remains a Janus-headed welfare regime, combining both social 
democratic and conservative attributes’ (1999: 88). 
It needs to be pointed out that the previous classification of welfare regimes is
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welfare states to a larger or smaller number of ‘families of nations’, depend­
ing on what is identified as the main underlying principle(s) of differentiation.
For example, Esping-Andersen’s original model has been criticised for its
negligence of gender aspects (e.g., Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993;
Anttonen and Sipilä 1996) as well as for discrepancies between the ‘pure’ theo­
retical models and empirical reality. For an overview of a number of welfare
state typologies (which quite often resemble the one suggested by Esping-
Andersen) as well as various classifications of countries, see Arts and Gelissen
2002 and Bambra 2007. 
It is also noteworthy that there are a number of explanations for different 
political economies, focusing on, amongst other things, historical and cultural 
backgrounds, educational systems, labour market structures, family allowances, 
social protection and social stratification. Unsurprisingly, these various aspects 
are linked to a whole range of consequences for individuals and families over the 
whole life course, including success in education and vocation, career mobility, 
income inequality, fertility, housing, family stability, compatibility of family and 
work, and retirement (e.g., Mayer 2001, 2004; Szydlik 2002). 
There are even classifications with a particular focus on families. For exam­
ple, Todd (1983, 1990: 29ff.) speaks of four historical family forms in Europe: 
‘famille nucléaire absolue, famille nucléaire égalitaire, famille souche, famille 
communautaire’ [absolute nuclear family, egalitarian nuclear family, stem 
family, communitarian family]. Lewis (1992) suggests a ‘male-breadwinner fam­
ily model’. Leitner (2003) identifies varieties of familialism by differentiating 
between ‘explicit, optional, implicit and de-familialism’. Saraceno and Keck 
(2010: 675) propose a ‘three-fold conceptualisation of familialism by default, 
supported familialism and de-familialisation’. 
In any case, one needs to ask to what extent there is any regime typology
at all that can serve as the basis for identifying international differences in
intergenerational relations. 
Worlds or states? 
Should we refer to ‘worlds of welfare’, or is it more appropriate to focus on states 
when investigating intergenerational relations? To answer this question, we need 
to consider a number of issues: 
x Regime typologies are often ‘ideal types’ that reflect theory rather than real­
ity. They refer to theoretically distinct concepts that are supported by reality 
to a greater or lesser extent. Quite often, these theoretical ideal types are 
based on a single core country, which is surrounded by a few peripheral coun­
tries that are more or less similar to the core country. 
x The assignment of a country to a specific regime depends strongly on the 
selected criteria. One could, for example, concentrate on (a combination of) 
care, culture, economy, education, employment, family, gender, history, norms, 
pensions, policy, religion, rights, social stratification or/and welfare designs. 
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x Regime types offer somewhat debatable coherence. Within these ‘worlds’, 
we may find huge discrepancies. One indication supporting this observa­
tion is that the former conservative type was later divided into two ‘worlds’, 
leading to the identification of the aforementioned distinct familistic model. 
There are also considerable differences between countries that are supposed 
to belong to the same regime. 
x Countries with ‘mixed backgrounds’, as well as those that are located on the 
periphery of regime types, are quite likely to fall between typologies. Some 
countries are even described as ‘special cases’. These countries stand out­
side the proposed typology to varying degrees, which means they cannot be 
ascribed to a specific type at all, or they form types of their own, consisting 
of a single, specific country. 
x How can pronounced historical discrepancies between parts of the same 
country be taken into consideration? Germany, in particular, comes to mind 
here. It will still take a long time until all the effects of the different conditions 
in the ‘former’ Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic have disappeared. 
x The risk of lumping together countries into single ‘worlds’ can also be 
assessed by considering differences within countries that did not formerly 
belong to distinct political and economic regimes. In some cases, profound 
regional differentiation can be observed, not least owing to divergent eco­
nomic conditions and developments. 
x Countries change. For example, the Eastern European post-‘socialist’ states 
have been in fundamental transition, which makes it no easy task to decide 
whether they form a unique welfare regime or whether these countries are 
taking different paths, which may or may not lead to one of the previously 
proposed welfare types. 
Suggesting ‘worlds of welfare’ offers great advantages, but we also need to avoid 
the pitfalls. Drawing on theoretical and empirical research on ‘families of nations’ 
provides helpful prerequisites for investigating intergenerational relations. Instead 
of number crunching without theory, we are offered relevant ideas and findings on 
international similarities and differences. Instead of a far too detailed preoccupa­
tion with all kinds of historical, economical, political, cultural etc. peculiarities of 
fourteen individual countries, we are now able to conduct international generation 
research with reference to general welfare models, thus taking a middle course 
between drowning in too much detail on the one hand, and neglecting important 
international differences on the other. 
Nevertheless, although providing a helpful background, these general ‘worlds’ 
represent rather rough outlines of welfare states. The closer one looks, the more 
relevant details emerge, and the less convincing some of the general models 
appear. Of course, they represent theoretical ‘ideal’ types. In reality, however, 
when investigating countries, we find mixtures of theoretically pure forms of 
political economies that are, to a greater or lesser extent, close to the theoretical 
‘idealisations’. Therefore, when addressing intergenerational solidarity, it makes 
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sense to conduct thorough empirical analyses of countries instead of prematurely 
grouping a number of states into an ideal-type ‘regime’ and, in doing so, running 
the risk of neglecting crucial differences. At the very least, one needs to conduct 
empirical analyses of countries before conclusively identifying the same pattern 
for a number of states. 
In the following, the fourteen countries under consideration will not be lumped 
together into three, four or five groups per se. Instead, all countries – and addi­
tionally two parts of one country in the case of East and West Germany – will be 
subjected to empirical investigation. 
Family in context 
Identifying differences between the countries is a crucial first step. One would like 
to know whether intergenerational relations depend largely on the country where 
the adult children and parents live. The second step involves introducing other 
relevant factors into the empirical analyses. Different intergenerational relations 
in different countries might simply be the product of different population charac­
teristics. In statistical terms, we therefore need to control for those characteristics. 
There is also a third step. It is important to find country similarities and dis­
parities while controlling for relevant characteristics of individuals and families. 
It seems natural to interpret these results on the basis of theoretical reasoning. For 
example, if we find more intergenerational care in Italy than in Sweden, we might 
conclude that those country differences are caused by different welfare regimes. 
However, there is a missing link. Differences between Sweden and Italy in inter-
generational care may go back to supposed regime influences, but they may just as 
well not. If we find more private intergenerational care in Italy than in Sweden – 
even after considering individual and family characteristics – we might 
conclude that this empirical result is rooted in more public expenditure for families 
in Sweden. However, empirically we simply discovered country differences 
without proving that these empirical disparities are really the result of welfare 
policies. Therefore, we need to identify specific country contexts – so-called 
‘macro indicators’ – that potentially influence corresponding human behaviour. 
Such macro indicators are suggested in the following. Their impact will be 
assessed by empirical analyses. 
Figure 2.3 presents the four macro indicators that are employed throughout 
this book (details on their sources can be found in Table A3). Social and fam­
ily expenditure represent the scale of the welfare state in the respective country. 
Wealth per capita and the poverty rate are indicators of social stratification. 
The percentages of social expenditure document total public spending (for old 
age, survivors, incapacity related, families, active labour market programmes, 
housing, other social policy areas) in per cent of GDP per country. Public expend­
iture represents welfare conditions that are likely to influence private intergen­
erational solidarity. The figure shows comparatively strong welfare states in 
Northern Europe. Sweden and Denmark represent the ‘social-democratic’ regime 
and, according to the characteristics of this type of welfare system, more public 
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Figure 2.3 Family in context 
Sources: OECD 2012 (social expenditure and family expenditure); Davies et al. 2007 (wealth per 
capita); OECD 2008 (poverty rate). 
means are available to the population in these countries. This is in stark contrast 
to Eastern and Southern European states. From this perspective, inhabitants of 
‘post-socialist’ countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, face overall 
conditions similar to those confronting residents in the familistic states of Spain 
and Greece. Conservative welfare states such as France, Germany and Austria are 
marked by substantial social expenditure, the extent of which is quite similar to 
that of the northern countries. 
Family expenditure offers a closer look at public support for private (intergen­
erational) relations. Such expenditure consists of family allowances, maternity and 
parental leave, other cash benefits, day care/home-help services and other benefits 
in kind in per cent of GDP per country. Midway between the extremes of Denmark 
and Sweden at one end and Poland and Greece at the other lies Germany. Com­
pared to social expenditure, we find an even more pronounced south-north gradient 
of family welfare, with particularly high rates in the north and especially low rates 
in the south. The situation is similar for the east-west gradient: post-socialist coun­
tries are less able to offer their citizens sizeable family allowances. This is espe­
cially striking when we consider where these countries are coming from, namely 
from a political system with a wide range of state-run social services. It also shows 
the importance of successful economies, which are better able to provide social 
benefits to their inhabitants. 
The other two variables represent indicators of social stratification. Figure 2.3 
documents per capita wealth per country adjusted for purchasing power parity 
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in 10,000 €. Switzerland is the richest country with 150,000 euros (converted) 
per person. An immense fortune has been accumulated, not least as a result of 
its strong performance in finance and the economy, and the fact that these gains 
have not been wiped out by war or inflation. On the opposite side of the spectrum, 
we find Poland and the Czech Republic. In the former ‘socialist’ states, private 
wealth was greatly restricted, and the time after the fall of the Iron Curtain has not 
been sufficient for the general population to acquire substantial assets. Moreover, 
the accumulation of wealth is a very long process, including bequeathing fortunes 
over generations. To a lesser degree, this also applies to East Germany, which 
somewhat reduces overall wealth in Germany. The figure also shows considerable 
assets in Ireland, Italy and Spain, which are countries with a comparatively high 
rate of private home ownership. 
Last but not least, poverty can be expected to have an influence on intergenera­
tional relations. The figure documents the percentage of people below 60 per cent 
of the median net equivalent income in a country. Poverty not only means that 
people are deprived of common goods and living conditions. The rate of poverty 
in a country may also have an influence on common norms and rules as well as on 
people’s feeling of security with regard to their private lives. The figure indicates 
that countries with relatively large wealth per capita are not necessarily those with 
less poverty, and vice versa. With few exceptions, one can identify three groups. 
In the middle of Europe, wealth and poverty are inversely proportional: the more 
wealth, the less poverty. This general picture applies neither to the north nor to the 
south of Europe. In the northern countries, wealth per capita is below the average, 
yet poverty is especially low in Sweden and Denmark. At the opposite end, we 
find Italy and Spain, which have considerable mean assets, but at the same time 
extreme poverty. This also applies to Ireland. 
Crowding-out, crowding-in 
Obviously, there are weaker and stronger welfare states. But what are the conse­
quences for intergenerational family relations? In principle, there are two basic 
scenarios: 
x Welfare states ‘crowd out’ intergenerational solidarity. In other words, public 
welfare displaces the family as the main provider of support. Since the wel­
fare state takes over, families retreat. 
x Welfare states ‘crowd in’ intergenerational solidarity. In other words, public 
welfare enhances family resources to provide support. Since the welfare state 
takes over some tasks, family solidarity is stimulated and strengthened. 
With reference to ‘crowding-out’, one can consider the ‘traditional’ family as 
the main institution for supporting relatives in need (e.g., Kohli 1999). Absence 
of welfare state support means, for example, that frail elderly persons have to be 
cared for by family members, and in the ‘traditional’ family, it is typically women 















36 Concepts and contexts 
importance in individuals’ lives. From this perspective, family becomes a space 
with young children. ‘The influence of the family is reduced to the period before 
and during schooling (. . .). The risks of work and of old age are no longer covered 
by the family but by the newly developed welfare state’ (Kohli 1999: 83). Into 
this picture fits Talcott Parsons’ credo that relations between adult children and 
parents are quite weak, if not non-existent: ‘Hence, when the children of a couple 
have become independent through marriage and occupational status the parental 
couple is left without attachment to any continuous kinship group’ (1942: 615f.). 
At first glance, the ‘crowding-in’ argument seems to be contradictory: why
should family members give more to one another when support is provided by other
sources? There are several possible answers to this question. First, concentrating
all efforts and available resources on one dependent relative may lead to reducing
support for many others. If one person receives everything, nothing is left for all
the others. In other words, the resources spent on one family member in great need
can restrict opportunity structures for others. For example, if families are relieved
of intense care for a frail elderly person, more time and attention may be available
for helping others. Second, the strain hypothesis suggests that stressful situations
and long-lasting dependence may lead to estrangement and conflict amongst fam­
ily members, which in turn may reduce future solidarity. Third, (need for) support
can overburden relatives and thus weaken families in the longer run. For exam­
ple, intense care of frail elderly family members can be extremely strenuous for
the carers, even to a point where they become care-dependent themselves, limiting
resources and increasing demands even more (e.g., Colombo et al. 2011: 85ff.). 
Furthermore, crowding-in assumes additional stimulation of family solidarity 
by public services. Here it is helpful to differentiate between basic and further 
needs. A priori, basic physical needs have to be fulfilled, including eating, per­
sonal hygiene etc. In a weak welfare state, these basic tasks mainly fall upon 
family members, leaving fewer resources for further engagement. However, if 
those basic needs are fulfilled by outside sources, crowding-in implies that fam­
ilies are able to take over other tasks that go beyond basic physical demands. 
Relieving family carers of the emotionally and physically most strenuous tasks 
may free up more time and energy for further help, including attention, emotional 
devotion as well as coordinating the various carers and care tasks. 
Whereas the crowding-out scenario proposes in principle an either/or perspec­
tive, crowding-in rather points to a combination of private and public responsibility 
in terms of a mixed welfare regime, engaging both family and state. Developing 
this idea even further, one might speak of ‘mixed responsibility’, ‘functional dif­
ferentiation’, ‘task-specificity’ or ‘specialisation’ (Litwak 1985; Künemund and 
Rein 1999; Daatland and Herlofson 2003b; Litwak et al. 2003; Daatland and 
Lowenstein 2005; Motel-Klingebiel et al. 2005; Igel et al. 2009). In such a mixed 
welfare regime, family and state complement one another, each fulfilling tasks for 
which it is particularly well suited. For example, heavy burdens, including intense 
care, are taken over by professionals, whereas other kinds of help, including
sporadic assistance as well as emotional attention, are provided by close relatives. 
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entity can do best, providing comprehensive help to persons in need that exceeds 
basic physical demands, and at the same time, preventing an overburdening of 
families in general and daughters in particular (Haberkern et al. 2015). 
Crowding-out and crowding-in arguments assume a vivid connection between 
welfare regime and family solidarity. Again, we need empirical investigations 
to address the relevant questions: Does the family really step into the breach in 
the case of a weak welfare state? Does public expenditure reduce or enhance the 
provision of private support? Is there, indeed, any indication of a specialisation of 
private and public solidarity? 
Generation and inequality 
Connections between family and society go in both directions. Cultural-contextual 
structures have an impact on intergenerational family relations. At the same time, 
individuals and families influence societal structures as well. This applies most 
prominently to connections between intergenerational solidarity and social ine­
quality over the whole life course. 
Table 2.1 provides an overview that displays (a) central forms of support pro­
vided by parents, (b) their effects on children and (c) their consequences for social 
inequality. It identifies key stages in the children’s life course that represent deci­
sive junctions and differentiates between childhood and youth on the one hand 
and adulthood on the other (see Szydlik 2012a). 
Childhood and youth 
Stage one: Home 
Immediately after birth and in early childhood, parents provide their small children
with a more or less favourable environment. This includes the home as such, for
instance, whether the child has a room of his or her own, the size and furnishings of
the home and the room, and whether there is a garden. Additionally, the parents, via
choice of neighbourhood, determine the social background of their children’s first
friends, their educational ambitions, and the preschool and other educational facilities
that their children will attend. Moreover, parents’ financial resources can affect their
children’s allowances, their access to brand-name clothing, computers, sports equip­
ment and long-distance holidays. All of this may enhance or reduce the children’s
quality of life as well as the social prestige they receive from their peers. The question
is whether parents are able to offer their children a lot, or whether the living conditions
are cramped or otherwise unfavourable, perhaps even to the point of poverty. 
Of course, money and space are not the only factors to affect early childhood. 
Parental attention and educational effort, in particular, is a key factor in setting 
the course for child development. Books play an important role in acquiring skills, 
particularly as part of reading socialisation in the family, which includes reading 
children’s books aloud and looking at picture books together. Moreover, early 
access to and attentive supervision of handling information technologies may 
 
 
 Table 2.1 Generation and inequality 
Support of parents Effect on children Inequality effect 
Childhood/  Space, money, time:  Home  Quality of life Inequality in the 
youth House, garden,  and esteem. Friends quality of life in 
room, city, (neighbourhood) (early) childhood 
neighbourhood, 
books, education 
 Aspirations, time,  School  Choice of  Lifelong inequality:
 money: Computer, school and school  Education o
help with success: Lower, income, prestige, 
 homework, private medium, higher (un)employment, 
tutoring school partner, health, . . . 
Aspirations,  Work  Choice of Inequality in 
information, profession, vocation and 
 network, money: vocational success career 
Internship, 
apprenticeship, job 
Adulthood Provision of living  Space   Saving Inequality in living 
space and time money and time. conditions and 
Investments in education 
education 
 Monetary support:  Money  Quality of life. Inequality in 
Payments, goods, Investments in education and 
presents, education and  quality of life in 
securities. Passing vocation. Wealth adulthood 
on of wealth creation 
Bequest  Inheritance  Quality Inequality in quality 
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contribute to a so-called ‘digital divide’ (e.g., DiMaggio et al. 2001; Korupp and 
Szydlik 2005). All in all, parents who place great emphasis on education and fos­
tering their children’s abilities intensively early on results in lifelong benefits for 
these children (e.g., Ermisch et al. 2012). 
Conversely, the children of parents with a lower educational background who 
harbour lower educational aspirations are at a disadvantage their whole life. In 
this way, unequal living conditions and different parenting styles lead to an une­
qual quality of life and unequal preconditions for the child generation, thus laying 
the foundations for lifelong inequality. 
Stage two: School 
In an education society, one of the most important, if not the most important, junc­
tion in life is the type of school attended. Inequality in education contributes to
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lifelong social differences early on. The better educated achieve higher incomes 
in more secure employment, receive greater professional prestige, enjoy a more 
favourable position in partner and marriage ‘markets’, are in a better state of health 
and live longer (e.g., Szydlik 1994, 2002; Blossfeld 2009; Mackenbach et al. 
2008). The type of school is strongly influenced by the parents (e.g., Becker and
Lauterbach 2010; König 2016). In this respect, early parental support, but also the 
parents’ wishes and aspirations, affect the transition to schools offering advanced-
track education. As a primary effect of social background, better-educated parents 
with more resources are more likely to offer their children an encouraging learning 
environment right from the start. This results in greater educational achievement 
and thus facilitates the transition to higher education. As a secondary effect of 
social background, parents with lower education and fewer resources tend to send 
their children to the lower tracks of education, even if their children perform well 
in school. By contrast, for better-educated parents it is a matter of course that their 
children attend advanced schools, all the way to college or university (Boudon 
1974). In fact, a major reason for relatively low numbers of university students 
from a lower social background is choice of school at a very young age. 
Parental influence, however, does not stop with the choice of school. Instead, 
parents continue to promote their children’s development throughout their entire 
school career to a greater or lesser degree. Better-educated parents are better 
prepared to provide their children with a learning environment at home that is 
conducive to developing school-related skills (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1971; 
Buchmann and Kriesi 2010; Angelone and Ramseier 2012). This includes assis­
tance with and supervision of homework as well as providing equipment, such 
as school materials, computers, musical instruments, language courses and, if 
necessary, with costly private tutoring. Therefore, it comes as no surprise when 
empirical studies attest to a significant correlation between parental resources and 
their children’s skills. For example, the PISA study (Programme for International 
Student Assessment) shows that reading proficiency varies greatly according 
to parental status. In the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development), the children in the lowest of four status groups scored 451 points, 
whereas the offspring in the highest status group scored 540 on the reading scale. 
In other words, youths whose parents fall into the bottom status group score 
nearly 100 points lower on the reading scale than 15 year olds in the top quarter. 
Differences related to parental status are much more pronounced compared to 
those related to gender (female 513, male 474) or migration status (migrants 457, 
natives 499; OECD 2010a/b; Szydlik 2012a: 63). 
Stage three: Work 
Besides parents laying the foundations for all vocational prospects because of 
their immense influence on education, they can also play a direct role in the tran­
sition from education to employment. This may involve the contacts they can 
provide, for instance, to help find an internship, an apprenticeship position or even 
employment. For example, the children of employees or important customers may 
have an advantage compared to youths and young adults who cannot draw on 
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parental resources of this kind. It can be helpful when parents own a business or 
can provide orientation and assist in decision making drawing on their own expe­
rience, or that of friends and acquaintances. The taken-for-granted application of 
cultural rules in the sense of ‘subtle distinctions’ (Bourdieu 1979) can also be ben­
eficial in the search for employment. Parents’ different endowments with various 
resources are therefore a crucial factor in determining the opportunities that the 
next generation faces in the course of their lives, thus leading to reinforcing and 
deepening social disparities. This applies not only to the better chances of already 
privileged children, but also to the continuous disadvantages of underprivileged 
offspring. In any case, empirical research shows that ‘living conditions during 
childhood and adolescence structure socio-economic circumstances in midlife’ 
(Bäckman and Nilsson 2011: 107). 
Adulthood 
Since, in anticipation of the empirical results of this book, intergenerational rela­
tionships do not cease once the children have become adults, the question is to 
what extent parents continue to be a source of intergenerational support, and what 
consequences this entails for their offspring and for social inequality. 
Stage four: Space 
When children become adults they do not necessarily move out of their par­
ents’ homes. Provision of living space is a valuable form of functional solidarity, 
which will be addressed in detail in Chapter 6. Adult children still living with 
their parents are mostly of a younger age (Figure 6.1), which means that they 
are postponing leaving the parental home rather than staying there forever. 
Coresident adult daughters and sons save money since they do not have to pay 
rent for their own place, and they also often receive support in the form of time
spent on cooking, cleaning and doing laundry, for example. Thus, when assess­
ing the consequences of coresidence, one should not neglect the time parents 
spend in supporting their adult children who still live within the same four walls. 
Furthermore, provision of space can often also be seen as an investment in edu­
cation. For example, university students still living ‘at home’ may enjoy a more 
favourable learning environment than those who have to earn their own living 
and provide for their own housing. 
In any case, there are benefits involved – whether in the form of financial sav­
ings, time support or investments in education – to the children of parents who are 
able to provide living space to their adult children. These benefits, or the absence 
thereof, can be considered a form of inequality between young adult children 
whose parents have the opportunity to do so and those who do not. This type of 
support may comprise coresidence in the strict sense, namely sharing the same 
household, or near coresidence – that is, living in the same building although in 
different apartments – as well as supporting adult children financially when mov­
ing out and living on their own, at a greater or lesser geographical distance. 
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In fact, most adult children and parents do not live in the same household any­
more, especially when the adult child is beyond the age of thirty. Therefore, when 
researching adult intergenerational solidarity and its consequences for social ine­
quality, we need to address, in particular, the monetary resources passed on from 
parents to adult children, while differentiating between inter vivos and mortis 
causa transfers, i.e., financial support amongst living generations as well as inher­
itances from deceased parents. 
Stage five: Money 
Table 2.1 lists payments, goods, presents and securities as monetary support from 
parents to adult children as well as the passing on of wealth in the form of substan­
tial gifts. All of these are important sources of support. They can take the form of 
financial assistance for children in higher education, at times of unemployment, 
when starting or redirecting one’s career, during further training, or in establish­
ing self-employment. Such support can involve contributions in the case of family 
events, such as the birth of a child (grandchild from the parents’ perspective), 
marriage or divorce, as well as loan guarantees or direct transfers to acquire a 
home or set up a household. Furthermore, presents – for instance, on birthdays, at 
Christmas, for a wedding etc. – serve an important function. Besides the financial 
gain, they act as a signal symbolising affection and close bonds, encourage future 
reciprocity and consolidate intergenerational relationships beyond the boundaries 
of the household. 
Chapter 7 investigates monetary transfers from parents to adult children. One of 
the questions raised in this context pertains to the connection between these trans­
fers and social inequality. Previous studies show that such transfers are, indeed, 
often a response to need. When the adult child is (still) in education, this increases 
the likelihood of transfers considerably (Szydlik 2000: 136; see also Künemund 
et al. 2005). From this perspective, intergenerational transfers can temporarily 
reduce social inequality in the children’s generation, as such financial support 
decreases income differentials between students in higher education and young 
workers in the short term. However, graduates of higher education typically earn a 
significantly higher income, so that the support provided by parents to children in 
higher education tends to contribute to increasing social inequality in the long run.
Intergenerational transfers make higher education possible in the first place, and it 
is much easier to focus on one’s studies without having to worry about earning a 
living. Moreover, according to empirical findings (see above and Chapter 7), par­
ents’ financial resources are a tremendously important factor in intergenerational 
transfers. The more income and financial assets parents have, the more likely they 
are to give money or goods to their adult children. Parents who have more give 
more. Parents who have no resources cannot support their descendants financially,
no matter how great the need of their adult children may be. 
Apart from everyday assistance, inter vivos transfers include extraordinary 
gifts, which can also involve the transfer of wealth. Previous findings show that 
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their lifetime than inheritances (Szydlik 2000; see also Leopold and Schneider 
2010). However, gifts occur less often than inheritances. Apparently, parents are 
reluctant to part with the whole of their property too early. After a lifetime of sav­
ing to live in their own home, many parents do not want to end up living in their 
children’s house. Besides, along the lines of a ‘King Lear effect’, prospective 
testators are perhaps not completely sure that their future heirs will still provide 
sufficient attention or even care if those heirs have already received everything. 
Nevertheless, the findings also provide evidence that the upper classes in particu­
lar are frequent beneficiaries of substantial gifts, so that those who have already 
benefited most from intergenerational transfers by parents during childhood and 
adolescence are at a further advantage. 
Stage six: Inheritance 
Receiving a sizeable bequest may lead to (more) wealth, financial security and 
independence as well as greater influence in the family and beyond. Previous 
studies show that inheritances stem mostly from parents (Szydlik 2004, 2011b). 
Inheritance research is intergenerational research. However, only fairly small 
portions of the population are beneficiaries of large bequests. Furthermore, 
inheritances are less likely to accord with need. Beneficiaries are frequently adult 
children with more than sufficient income. By contrast, those who could use an 
inheritance most seem to be the least likely to receive one. This is reinforced 
further by educational background. Here, the consequences of lifelong intergen­
erational solidarity are particularly apparent. Parents who are able to offer their 
children better educational opportunities from the start are also in a position to
bequeath larger estates at the end of their lives. Yet it is the lower educational 
classes that would need such financial gain the most. 
Since passing assets from one generation to the next generally occurs along
family lines, such transfers do not contribute to changing social inequality when
viewed from a family perspective: poor families stay poor, and wealthy families
stay wealthy. An argument can also be made that a smaller sum may represent 
a comparatively larger relative gain for people without previous possessions. To a
millionaire, an inheritance of a million euros may stand for a lower relative gain with
regard to the person’s previous wealth, compared to a much smaller sum inherited
by a person with little or no prior wealth at all. To someone whose previous ‘wealth’
amounted to one euro, an inheritance worth one hundred euros (e.g., a few used
clothes or simple tableware) is mathematically one hundred times greater in relative
terms than a million euros is to a millionaire. Thus, one needs to take absolute sums
into account in order to assess the usefulness of an inheritance for improving previ­
ous living conditions. Moreover, the empirical findings show that heirs are strongly
favoured as it is. Before the death of their parents, they will already have received
substantially greater support over their entire lifetime compared to what lower-class
parents will have been able to provide to their children owing to a lack of resources. 
If the analyses in Chapter 9 confirm these findings, we can conclude that, from 
a life course perspective, inheritances at least stabilise, if not deepen, previously 
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existing social inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged children. The 
increase in inequality over the life course via lifelong intergenerational support 
is especially pronounced when it comes to education and choice of school, that 
is, early in life. However, differentiation between children according to parental 
resources does not end here but lasts over the parents’ entire lifetime – and even 
beyond in the case of bequests. 
Summary 
This chapter lays the groundwork for the empirical investigations later on. In a 
book about generations, the first task is to outline what ‘generations’ are about. In 
principle, two concepts are distinguished, namely generations in family and soci­
ety. Family generations refer to grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren 
etc. They represent the term ‘generation’ in the closest and clearest sense. Other 
concepts – and especially the abundance of generational labels that have been 
coined on the basis of more or less sound foundations – are much more difficult 
to grasp. Nevertheless, one can identify social generations, which, in principle, 
can be further distinguished as political, cultural and economic generations. How­
ever, there are several challenges and conditions to be met when trying to identify 
social generations, in contrast to family generations. 
Since this book addresses intergenerational family solidarity, we also need to 
clarify what is meant by this term. Generally, it refers to bonds and interactions 
between family members of different generations. Three main dimensions can be 
distinguished, namely affectual, associational and functional solidarity. Affectual 
solidarity describes emotional closeness, associational solidarity refers to contact 
and functional solidarity comprises the giving and taking of money, time and 
space. Furthermore, one has to note that solidarity is not necessarily ‘good’, just 
as conflict is not inevitably ‘bad’; these are rather empirical questions. Nor does 
solidarity imply that these relationships are devoid of controversy. These con­
siderations lead to Figure 2.1 which illustrates the connection between solidarity 
and conflict that shows that most intergenerational relations can be attributed to 
‘consensual solidarity’. 
To explain intergenerational cohesion, a general theoretical model is proposed, 
comprising opportunity, need, family and cultural-contextual structures (ONFC). 
Opportunity structures reflect opportunities or resources. They enable, promote, 
hinder or prevent social interaction. Need structures indicate the needs for social 
interaction. They also include desires, goals, interests, motives, wants and wishes 
of individuals, for themselves or for significant others. The relation between par­
ent and child is embedded in family structures. They include, for example, family 
size and composition, earlier family events as well as family roles and norms. 
Cultural-contextual structures represent societal conditions in which intergenera­
tional relations develop. These include social, political, economic and cultural 
conditions as well as rules and norms of institutions and groups. Furthermore, in 
continuation of the previous subchapter, the ONFC model is related to the notion 
of ambivalence. 
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As a basis for the international comparisons, various general welfare types 
are distinguished, namely social-democratic, liberal, conservative, familistic and 
post-socialist regimes. Furthermore, one can identify ‘special cases’. Should we 
thus speak of ‘worlds of welfare’, or is it more appropriate to consider different 
states? In between these two opposites, the book pursues a third way: its theo­
retical reasoning includes arguments connected with the aforementioned welfare 
types, whereas the empirical investigations will refer to states. Classifications 
of countries can be helpful orientation points. However, for empirical analyses 
of intergenerational relations, country-oriented analyses seem to provide a more 
suitable approach. Furthermore, four macro indicators are suggested, which put 
family cohesion in context: social and family expenditure, wealth and poverty. 
The potential impact of weaker and stronger welfare states on intergenerational 
solidarity is discussed via the ‘crowding-out’ and ‘crowding-in’ hypotheses, 
which provide alternative scenarios for the subsequent international analyses. 
Last but not least, the chapter addresses connections between private intergen­
erational solidarity and social inequality. Applying a life course perspective, it 
discusses most relevant forms of support from parents to children, spanning from 
cradle to grave. Six stages are identified: home, school, work, space, money and 
inheritance. The first three stages refer to childhood and youth. Affluent parents 
succeed in many ways by ensuring that their offspring enjoy a particularly high 
quality of life. Of special importance are parental efforts to promote the educa­
tional success of their children, leading to lifelong disparities between educational 
classes, including income, prestige, (un)employment, success in partner and mar­
riage ‘markets’ as well as lifelong health and even longevity. Further support for 
adult children comprises space, regular monetary support and extraordinary gifts 
as well as bequests. Children of affluent parents seem to be advantaged over their 
entire life course. The precarious connection between solidarity and inequality 











3 Crisis? What crisis? 
Introduction 
Many arguments have been made about why families seem to be in crisis: 
decreasing fertility, increasing longevity of frail elderly relatives, a higher care 
burden and smaller care capacity, more flexibility demands in the labour market, 
individualisation, high divorce rates, geographical mobility, unemployment, 
mounting intergenerational conflict, negative consequences of the retreat of the 
welfare state, shrinking household sizes, separation of generations due to techno­
logical change, a lower degree of family orientation as a consequence of rising 
female employment, obstinate youth and stubborn elders, egoistic adult children 
and irresponsible parents who would rather spend their children’s inheritance, and 
so on. The crisis scenario is indeed worrying, since it may easily result in a crisis 
of society at large. 
How true is this so-called crisis? How many families actually experience crisis 
in reality? This is one of the general questions addressed in this book. In order
to find out whether demographic change, flexibilisation, individualisation,
welfare state retreat, and so forth, have indeed resulted in alienation between 
(adult) children and parents, we need empirical investigations on intergenerational 
cohesion. At the same time, a closer look at these bonds can help assess whether 
there exists a sound basis to withstand those challenges in the future. 
Before investigating contact, conflict, space, money, time and inheritance in
detail, this chapter provides a general outline of intergenerational cohesion. This
first empirical chapter rests on two pillars. It starts with the identification of basic
potentials for intergenerational cohesion, namely the existence and distance of fam­
ily generations as well as norms of obligation. Naturally, the first prerequisite of
intergenerational solidarity is the existence of generations. If one does not have 
living parents, it makes no sense to consider current solidarity between adult chil­
dren and parents. In the same vein, potential bonds with adult children depend first
of all on the existence of an adult daughter or son. The second relevant prerequi­
site is close geographical distance, which provides opportunities for direct personal
interaction without long-distance travel or technological mediation. A third potential
for solidarity are norms of obligation, which provide a framework for intergenera­
tional cohesion and support among family members. The first part of this chapter
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The other pillar on which this chapter rests is an empirical overview of intergen­
erational relationships, which revolves around solidarity and conflict. Is it symbiosis
or autonomy, or is it harmony or hostility that prevails? The empirical results are
organised into a general typology on the basis of the four categories developed in
Chapter 2 (Figure 2.1), namely consensual solidarity, conflictual solidarity, con­
flictual autonomy and consensual autonomy. Furthermore, it will be shown whether
there are differences in the distribution of relevant types among educational classes,
income groups, women and men, as well as migrants and natives. 
Both parts of the chapter aim to provide a basis for the following in-depth 
investigations of intergenerational relations between adult children and parents. 
Potentials 
Existence 
Figure 3.1 documents the percentage of respondents who are part of families
consisting of one, two, three or (at least) four generations. For example, the notation 
‘4 generations’ means that these SHARE participants live in at least a four-
generation family, including themselves. Under consideration are parents, 
children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren (the survey does not provide 
information on the respondents’ grandparents). 
Figure 3.1 Multigenerational families 
Source: SHARE (n: 39,045). 
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First of all, the figure indicates that family generations are indeed very common. 
The great majority, namely 90 per cent of those aged 50, have at least one more 
living generation. In turn, only a tenth report neither a parent, nor a child or a 
(great-) grandchild. Further differentiation of these 10 per cent (not presented in 
the figure) shows that people without a partner and sibling account for only 2 per 
cent. Being without any other family member at all, or having only more distant 
relatives, such as aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews or cousins, is thus very rare. 
There seems to be great potential for intergenerational solidarity. A quite 
impressive fact is that close to a fifth of the European population of at least 50 
years of age even lives in a four-generation family, which means that they have 
three other living family generations, be they parents, children and grandchildren, 
or children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren (in the figure, families consist­
ing of five generations are subsumed into this category as well; however, they are 
almost non-existent). Over half of the respondents live in three-generation fami­
lies, i.e., with parents and children, children and grandchildren etc. Nearly another 
fifth have one living family generation, be it at least one parent or one offspring. 
What about population groups? Lower education is associated with a higher 
number of family generations, at least when it comes to four-generation families. 
One in five of those with relatively low education has a family consisting of three 
other living generations, whereas this applies to only 13 per cent of the academ­
ics. Reasons include timing of childbirth and number of children. Fewer children 
(Figure 3.2) and later birth over several generations – which is quite typical of the 
better educated – lead to less (great-)grandparenthood. Further investigations show 
that over two-thirds of the lower class has at least one grandchild, whereas this 
‘only’ applies to 43 per cent of the academics. Twelve per cent of the former and 
3 per cent of the latter group report great-grandchildren. This does not mean that 
academics are less likely to have any other living generation at all. In fact, the 
better educated have fewer multigenerational families. They are, however, not less 
likely to be without any other family generation. 
With regard to multigenerational families, income groups show a similar pat­
tern to the educational classes (although the differences are less pronounced). 
Poorer households have more generations. One possible reason is that this 
simply reflects educational background. Financial obligations towards more 
family members may at times also lead to a situation in which making ends meet 
becomes a difficult task. 
Women are much more likely to have more living generations. This applies 
to grandchildren and great-grandchildren in particular, suggesting a strong influ­
ence of longevity on shared lifetime with these younger family members. In this 
respect, men are at a disadvantage. The difference between migrants and natives 
is small here and attributable to children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. 
Figure 3.2 provides a more detailed picture of the potential availability of
parents and children. The left part focuses on the parental side. The first group 
consists of those respondents whose parents are both still alive. In total, this 
applies to 6 per cent of the respondents. At first glance, this percentage may seem 
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Figure 3.2 Parents and children 
Source: SHARE (n: 38,599/39,151). 
and older. Furthermore, when one considers respondents with a living mother or 
father, more than a quarter of those aged 50 have the potential for intergenera­
tional solidarity with a parent. 
Further investigations show that this number depends on age in particular. 
More than three in five of the 50–55 year olds have at least one living parent. This 
applies to three in ten of the 56–65 year olds, but only to 3 per cent of the older 
respondents. This means that upward intergenerational relationships are basically 
limited to people under the age of 66 years. Unsurprisingly, we find more living 
mothers than fathers owing to the longer lives of women and their younger age at 
the time of the child’s birth. 
When considering relationships with parents, one might also think of
parents-in-law (not shown in the figure). Including them adds another 8 per
cent to the proportion of respondents with a living relative on the parental side.
All in all, a third of the SHARE participants have at least one living mother
(-in-law) or father(-in-law). This applies to over seven in ten of the 50–55 year
olds, four in ten of the 56–65 year olds and 6 per cent of the older popula­
tion. For these respondents, the potential for intergenerational relationships with a 
parent(-in-law) is still intact. 
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Particularly striking differences between population groups with regard to the 
potential availability of parents are associated with educational class. The better-
educated population is much more likely to have a living parent, which reflects the 
longer lives of the upper classes (Mackenbach et al. 2008). This also indicates that 
the small number of upper-class respondents without any other family generation 
in Figure 3.1 is a result of more academics having living parents. Only 4 per cent 
of those with a lower educational background still have both parents, whereas 
this applies to 11 per cent of the academics, 38 per cent of which have at least 
one parent (48% including parents-in-law) compared to only 18 per cent of the 
lower educational class (24% including parents-in-law). Due to social immobil­
ity, higher-educated children have higher-educated parents (who live longer), and 
lower-educated children have lower-educated parents (who pass away earlier). 
In contrast to class, differences between income groups are less pronounced, 
and migrants do not differ from natives in this respect. However, we find some 
gender disparities. Women live longer than men, and are more likely to survive 
their parents. Four in ten male interviewees are potentially able to experience 
intergenerational solidarity with the previous generation (including parents-in­
law), whereas this applies to fewer than three in ten female respondents. 
The right part of Figure 3.2 documents potential relationships with the next 
generation. Of the European population aged 50 years or more, 87 per cent have at 
least one child. This means that, when parent-child relationships are investigated, 
only 13 per cent are excluded from the analyses. More than two-thirds have at 
least two children, nearly a third three or more descendants, one in eight has at 
least four offspring and 5 per cent even five or more children. Indeed, there is 
huge potential for intergenerational solidarity. 
The lower educated have fewer living parents but more children. This is pri­
marily a result of parents having more children, and much less owing to different 
shares of childlessness. A similar thing applies to income groups and migrants 
compared with the native population. 
Further investigations (not shown in the figures) indicate that the potential 
for intergenerational solidarity reaches beyond the next generation. Three in five 
respondents have at least one grandchild, nearly half of the interviewees report 
two or more grandchildren, a third three or more, a quarter four or more, a sixth 
five or more, and 12 per cent have at least six grandchildren. Moreover, 8 per cent 
mention at least one great-grandchild. Grandchildren and great-grandchildren are 
more frequent in the lower classes and income groups as well as amongst female 
respondents and migrants. 
Distance 
When it comes to potentials for intergenerational solidarity, one prerequisite is the 
existence of parents and children. Another is geographical distance. Close distance 
provides opportunities for personal contact; it allows spontaneous encounters and 
a range of interaction forms. Meeting in person and talking face to face is likely to 
foster a different quality of relationship compared to contact by electronic devices 
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such as telephone and computer. Living close by also facilitates quick help, for 
instance, in times of illness or when there is a need for support with gardening, 
household chores, running errands and taking care of one another. One might 
also presume that living in the same city, village or region can contribute to a bet­
ter mutual understanding since this involves sharing similar living environments. 
Seeing and meeting each other on a regular basis can be expected to contribute to 
being informed about the current needs of the other person, and may also foster a 
stronger sense of responsibility. 
Research has indeed shown that distance is a crucial factor for intergenerational 
support (e.g., Szydlik 2000; Brandt et al. 2009; Haberkern and Szydlik 2010; Igel 
and Szydlik 2011). This is also supported by the analyses presented in this book. 
A shorter distance increases the frequency of contact considerably (Chapter 4) as 
well as the amount of help and care provided (Chapter 8). 
Figure 3.3 offers information on geographical distances of those aged 50
from parents and adult children. Only persons with at least one living parent or 
adult child, respectively, are surveyed. In the case that both of a respondent’s 
parents or several children live at different distances, the closest one is reported in 
order to assess the potential for solidarity. 
First of all, only a very small fraction (below 1%) of the respondents share the 
same household with a parent, and a mere 6 per cent reside in the same house. 
Figure 3.3 Distance
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However, this does not mean that parents generally live far away. In fact, for
22 per cent the spatial distance is less than 1 kilometre and for 43 per cent up to 
5 kilometres. Nearly two-thirds reside at a distance of up to 25 kilometres from a 
parent, and close to four out of five report a distance of 100 kilometres at the most. 
Half of the remaining respondents live between 100 and 500 kilometres away, a 
quarter more than 500 kilometres, and the last quarter (i.e., 5% overall) more than 
500 kilometres away in another country. 
Nevertheless, there are striking differences between educational classes.
Figure 3.3 confirms previous analyses that observed a considerably lower like­
lihood of geographical proximity for the higher classes (e.g., Szydlik 2000).
Academics face flexibility demands in education and employment that result
in greater distances from their family of origin. Less spatial proximity can also
be found amongst the highest income group. In contrast, there does not seem
to be a great difference in geographical distance from parents between daugh­
ters and sons. However, as expected, there is an immense disparity between
migrants and the native population. Of course, migration very often involves
greater distances from mothers and fathers. Two-thirds of the natives live 25
kilometres away from a parent at the most. This applies to less than one-third
of migrants. If we consider a range of up to 500 kilometres, the difference is
94 versus 48 per cent. 
The right part of Figure 3.3 presents geographical distance from adult children. 
Close to 40 per cent of the parents aged 50 live under the same roof with at 
least one adult child. If we add those parents whose closest child lives a maxi­
mum of 1 kilometre away, we arrive at a total of 54 per cent. If we consider a 
radius of 5 kilometres, we find that seven out of ten parents have at least one 
adult child who lives in close vicinity. Expanding that distance to 25 kilometres 
includes 84 per cent of the parents. More than nine out of ten parents live within
100 kilometres of an adult child, 98 per cent within 500 kilometres. 
In what way do the distances differ according to education, income, gender and 
migration? Better-educated parents, who are more likely to have better-educated 
children, live at a greater spatial distance from their offspring, which reflects the 
greater geographical mobility of the higher educational classes. The situation is 
similar for income groups, whereas mothers and fathers do not report notable 
differences in terms of spatial separation. Although migration seems to lead to 
fewer children living nearby, the difference from the native population is not very 
pronounced. The major discrepancy between migrants and natives is rather their 
geographical detachment from parents. 
Further investigations refer to the distance of generations living in separate 
households (not shown in figures). Since there are very few respondents who live 
with their parents, the picture is very similar to the one in the left part of Figure 
3.3. However, this is not the case for parents living with children. If we only con­
sider parents and adult children in separate households, a third still lives within 1 
kilometre, 56 per cent within 5 kilometres, for more than three in four the distance 
does not exceed 25 kilometres, and nearly 90 per cent live within a maximum dis­
tance of 100 kilometres. This means that even after leaving their parents’ home, 
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most adult children do not move very far away. In fact, they tend to stay in close 
proximity. 
The results with regard to class confirm the previous findings: again, the lower 
classes are more likely to live close to their children even after they have left 
home. This also applies to income groups. Mothers are somewhat more likely to 
live close to an adult child. This is less probable for migrants, although the differ­
ence from the native population is not overwhelming. 
Obligations 
A third prerequisite of intergenerational solidarity is norms of obligation. General 
norms about how things ought to be and what one should or should not do may 
lead to significant acts of solidarity, not least out of a sense of duty. The existence 
of parents or children and a close distance between family generations are crucial 
factors. However, if people do not feel obliged to help one another, it may well 
be that they will not. In fact, family obligations can be seen as normative guide­
lines that stimulate solidarity behaviour. They are ‘stable, but striving to be more 
adaptive’ (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a: 127; see also Finch and Mason 1990; 
Elmelech 2005; Gans and Silverstein 2006; Merz et al. 2009). 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe addresses obliga­
tions with regard to older people and children in different ways. The left part 
of Figure 3.4 refers to responsibilities of families as opposed to the state when 
it comes to older persons. Apart from obligations to provide financial support 
and/or help with household chores, SHARE asks: ‘In your opinion, who – the 
family or the State – should bear the responsibility for (. . .) [p]ersonal care for 
older persons who are in need such as nursing or help with bathing or dressing?’ 
Five answers are possible: ‘Totally family’ – ‘Mainly family’ – ‘Both equally’ – 
‘Mainly state’ – ‘Totally state’. 
The right part of the figure refers to a statement on obligations towards children: 
‘Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own 
well-being’. The five possible answers are: ‘Strongly agree’ – ‘Agree’ – ‘Neither 
agree nor disagree’ – ‘Disagree’ – ‘Strongly disagree’. Again, the last category is 
represented in the figure by the empty spaces between the bars and the total of 100 
per cent. 
First of all, when assessing the overall shares of care obligations regarding older 
people (not least parents from the respondents’ point of view), one notices that 
the middle category of ‘both equally’ receives the most approval of all response 
options: 46 per cent of the respondents agree that family and state are equally 
responsible. Although this is not the majority, those who see responsibility resting 
either more with the family or more with the state each represent a smaller group. 
Further indication of mixed responsibility is that the extreme groups – namely 
‘totally family’ and ‘totally state’ – are especially underrepresented (5% and 6%, 
respectively). If we add up those respondents who do not favour one of these 
extreme groups and lean toward a mix of public and private instead, we arrive at 
very impressive numbers. Nine out of ten interviewees are in favour of some kind 




Source: SHARE (n: 24,048/24,197).
 
of mixed arrangement between family and state, be the emphasis more on the 
family or more on the state. 
Educational classes, income groups, women and men, migrants and natives – 
all these groups follow the general pattern overall. However, some differences can 
be noted regarding education and income. Extreme points of view, such as abso­
lute family or state orientation, as rare as they are in general, are more frequent 
in the lower educational and income groups, whereas academics especially often 
favour mixes of family and state. In fact, we find a linear relationship: the more 
education and income, the less extreme the respondents’ opinions. At the same 
time, higher education and income are associated with fewer family obligations, 
indicating that since the affluent classes are more able to afford professional care, 
they are less likely to feel entirely responsible themselves (Finley et al. 1988; 
Gans and Silverstein 2006). 
Further investigations refer to help and money. It is worth comparing where 
the interviewees see the primary responsibility when it comes to helping with 
household chores (cleaning, washing etc.), personal care and financial support for 
the elderly. Whereas help in particular is rated as a family affair, many respond­
ents are in favour of the state when monetary assistance is the issue. More than 
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a third believe that the family is mainly (30%) or even totally (6%) responsible 
when it comes to providing assistance with household chores for older people in 
need. The corresponding shares for financial means are only 12% and 3%. While, 
overall, household help tends to be attributed more to the family and financial 
transfers more to the state, personal care does not lean one way or the other. 
Moreover, further country results support the general assumptions on welfare 
regimes (Chapter 2), showing much greater preference for the state in the north 
and more family orientation in the east and south. Nevertheless, in all countries, 
the vast majority agrees to a mix of private and public support. 
When considering obligations towards children according to the right part of 
Figure 3.4, it is impressive how many people (strongly) agree with the statement 
that ‘[p]arents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of 
their own well-being’. In fact, this applies to nearly three-quarters of the respond­
ents (and this even includes the childless). Every third respondent strongly agrees 
to put children first, even if this involves personal disadvantages. This is an indi­
cation of an immense solidarity potential. Only every tenth person disagrees, and 
just 2 per cent disagree strongly. 
Solidarity norms are especially prevalent among the lower social class, 
which has less opportunity to draw on outside sources (see above). Four out of 
five respondents with lower education agree to this statement; two in five even 
strongly. By contrast, this applies to ‘only’ a quarter of the academics. However, 
also amongst academics a large majority of 62 per cent agrees to put children first. 
The situation is similar with regard to income groups. If the household is able to 
make ends meet easily, less obligation is felt towards the next generation. A dif­
ficult income situation, however, is associated with an increased sense of duty 
toward children. Nevertheless, norms of intergenerational solidarity are strong 
across all income groups. This is also the case for women and men as well as for 
migrants and the native population. 
High rates in the sense of obligation towards children are found in the familis­
tic south in particular, and it is no surprise that family-oriented Ireland and Poland 
also show very high shares of approval. Further results indicate that it makes 
sense to consider individual countries instead of regimes, since several states that 
are actually attributed to the same regime seem to differ in the populations’ point 
of view on matters of intergenerational obligations. 
Types 
There are a number of ways to identify types of intergenerational relations, includ­
ing different analytical and methodological strategies, based on different data 
sets, resulting in different outcomes with regard to the number and share of types 
of relationships as well as the labels that they are assigned (e.g., Silverstein et al. 
1994; Silverstein and Bengtson 1997; Szydlik 2000; Van Gaalen and Dykstra 
2006; Fokkema et al. 2008; Ferring et al. 2009; Nauck 2009; Silverstein et al. 
2010; Dykstra and Fokkema 2011). Following the theoretical reasoning illustrated 
in Figure 2.1, a quite simple procedure is chosen in the context of this analysis.
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To provide a general picture of the relationships between family generations, 
three dimensions are summarised: contact, conflict and support. Solidarity and 
conflict are related to one another in the process, including associational (contact) 
and functional solidarity (support). The three dimensions result in eight relationship 
types; two of each belong to the four categories described in Figure 2.1. 
Tight 
The generations are in frequent personal contact, there is no or only rare conflict, 
and they provide support. These parents and adult children have tight relationships. 
Close 
There is frequent contact and no serious disputes, but also no current support. This 
does not mean that help is denied. Instead, close contact and few quarrels indicate 
that help is currently not needed, and that the generations will step in if necessary. 
Strained 
Contact in this case involves conflicts and support. These are close relations as 
well, but ones in which controversies emerge, for instance, as a consequence of 
financial or health-related stresses and strains. 
Entangled 
There is contact and conflict, but no current support. The generations may refrain 
from (accepting) transfers, and although quarrelling is quite common, parents and 
adult children are still in touch with one another on a regular basis. 
Obligatory 
Here, contact is rare and comes with conflict and transfers. Although family 
generations provide support, they prefer not to spend too much time together, and 
if they do, disputes are not far away. 
Table 3.1 Generation types 
Category Type Contact Conflict Support 
A Consensual 1 Tight x x 
solidarity 2 Close x 
B Conflictual 3 Strained x x x 
solidarity 4 Entangled x x 
C Conflictual 5 Obligatory x x 
autonomy 6 Divided x 
D Consensual 7 Customary x 
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Divided 
Parents and children do not see, write or talk to one another regularly, do not sup­
port each other, and if they are in contact, there is often quarrelling. 
Customary 
There is infrequent contact and disputes, but there is assistance. The generations 
do not really spend much time with one another, and they do not argue often. 
However, these relationships are nevertheless supportive. 
Separate 
There is no or only rare contact, no frequent debate, and there is no support. In 
fact, these generations lead their own separate lives without much interaction with 
one another, if at all. 
Figure 3.5 provides a general overview of the respondents’ relationship with 
parents and adult children. For the typology, (a) frequent personal contact is 
defined as occurring at least once a week (more details can be found in Chapter 4),
representing associational solidarity; (b) generations are regarded as being in
conflict if the respondents state that they often experience conflict with their 
Figure 3.5 Types
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parents or children (Chapter 5); and (c) support exists if the generations live in 
the same household (Chapter 6), or give money (Chapter 7), or help or care for 
one another (Chapter 8). These patterns reflect functional solidarity, i.e., giving 
or receiving money, time or space. The analyses refer to interviewees who have 
living parents or adult children, respectively. Since most generations are found 
to live in tight, close or separate relationships, Figure 3.5 concentrates on these 
types. The empty spaces between the bars and the total of 100 per cent repre­
sent the other relationships. Naturally, the figure documents quite general shares, 
which will be subject to more detailed analysis throughout this book. 
Overall, the vast majority display consensual solidarity consisting of tight
and close relations. The main reason is frequent contact. These adult children
and parents see, talk or write to one another at least once a week, even when
most of them no longer live in the same household. Pronounced conflict is not
a frequent phenomenon at all. Although disagreements may occur from time
to time, essentially conflictual relationships are quite seldom. This applies par­
ticularly to the category of ‘conflictual autonomy’: disputes of any significance
seem more likely to lead to reduced contact, which confirms previous empirical
results (Szydlik 2008a). Additionally, one should not neglect separate family
generations, which describe the relationship of every seventh person aged 50
to their parents. Most of these adult children and parents are only loosely
connected, if at all. 
Relationships with parents seem to be somewhat less tight than those with 
children. First, there is more support from respondents for their offspring, which 
results in a higher share of tight relationships. Second, there is a higher rate of no 
or loose ties to parents than there is to children. These results imply that respond­
ents are more inclined to turn to their children than to their parents. When push 
comes to shove, people seem to feel even more responsible for the generation that 
they have brought into the world than for the one from which they originated. In 
other words, people do everything for their children and nearly everything for 
their parents. Nevertheless, one should not overinterpret these results: relation­
ships with parents are also impressively strong, and more functional solidarity 
with regard to children may also reflect differences in current need structures 
rather than discrepancies in intergenerational devotion. 
Belonging to either tight or close relationships depends on intergenerational 
support. Academics are more likely to have a tight relationship with their parents 
and adult children than members of the lower educational class. By contrast, the 
lower educational class has more close relationships, which leads to a balanced 
overall share of consensual solidarity. 
The more money, the more consensual solidarity. If the household is able to 
make ends meet fairly easily there is a greater likelihood of parents and adult 
children staying in frequent contact. Money can be used for intergenerational 
transfers to support relatives, it can cement intergenerational bonds, and sufficient 
financial resources may also lead to less burdensome relationships with family 
members. Additionally, a difficult financial situation seems to be associated with 
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As expected, women entertain closer intergenerational relationships than men, 
especially with regard to their parents. Daughters are more likely to fulfil the 
so-called kinkeeper function (e.g., Rossi and Rossi 1990) in holding the family 
together. By contrast, sons report a separation from their parents more often than 
daughters do (19% vs. 11%). However, the figure suggests that gender differences 
in parent-adult child relationships are rather small. Further analyses in the following
chapters will investigate in much more detail to what extent this applies to the 
diverse forms of intergenerational solidarity. 
In contrast to the native population, migrants show considerably fewer intense 
connections with their parents. This is reflected in the different shares of tight and 
close relationships as well as in a considerably lower percentage of migrants who 
experience consensual solidarity with their parents (63% vs. 77%). Moreover, 
separation from parents is more widespread amongst migrants (22% vs. 15%). 
Moving to another country often means leaving one’s parents behind, which 
results in less solidarity and more autonomy. 
Further investigations reveal that the highest rates of consensual solidarity with 
parents can be observed in the Southern European countries of Italy, Spain and 
Greece (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, tight relations with parents are often found 
in Northern European countries such as Sweden and Denmark. These results 
provide a first indication that strong welfare states can indeed show marked 
intergenerational solidarity. Separation is somewhat more frequent amongst 
the Eastern countries Poland and the Czech Republic, followed by the Western 
European countries and is especially rare in the south. However, identifying
quite general categories and types neglects valuable insights into implications of 
cultural-contextual structures for intergenerational relations. It is the task of the 
following chapters to investigate these patterns in more depth and detail. 
Summary 
Many arguments have been brought forward to propagate a so-called crisis of the 
family. One image evoked in this context is that of more or less isolated individu­
als, who fend for themselves and are preoccupied only with their own advantage. 
It is suggested that both long-term and recent developments support this kind of 
‘single (wo)man’. When companies force employees to migrate from one place 
to another in order to follow jobs, it seems quite unlikely that permanent close 
connections with other individuals would emerge. At the same time, an argument 
can be made that a lack of societal solidarity is also not likely to provide stable 
foundations for interindividual solidarity. In the light of these – and many more –
crisis scenarios listed in the introduction to this chapter, it is crucial to subject this 
view to a reality check with the help of empirical investigations. This first empiri­
cal chapter provides initial clues for a more realistic picture of adult child-parent 
relationships. 
The results show that the existence of family generations represents immense 
potential for solidarity. Nine out of ten Europeans aged 50 years and older have 
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are part of a family consisting of at least three generations. Women are more 
likely to live in a family with many generations, and so are members of the lower 
educational class. Nearly nine out of ten respondents have at least one child, 
close to a third even have three children or more. Inevitably, the likelihood of 
living parents amongst those aged 50 is lower and declines further the older the
population. Nevertheless, more than three in five 50–55 year olds still have at 
least one living parent. The lower class has more children, whereas the higher 
classes tend to have more living parents. 
At the same time, most family generations live close by. All in all, the
results on geographical distance attest to ample opportunity for many forms
of intergenerational solidarity. Most people can meet their parents and adult
children face to face without much effort. Nearly two-thirds live a maximum
of 25 kilometres away from a parent. Only a fifth report distances of more than
100 kilometres. Geographical proximity to children is even closer. Four in ten
parents live in the same building as a child, seven in ten only 5 kilometres
away – at the most. If desired or necessary, most family generations can quite
easily meet each other personally. However, there are pronounced differences
between population groups. Migrants naturally live considerably farther away
from their parents and academics are separated by greater distances, both from
their parents and offspring. 
Besides existence and distance, norms of obligation are likely to be prerequi­
sites of intergenerational cohesion and, again, we find substantial potentials. The
results indicate a strong sense of obligation to exercise intergenerational solidarity.
Close to three-quarters (strongly) agree that ‘[p]arents’ duty is to do their best 
for their children even at the expense of their own well-being’. Nevertheless, it is
not only the family that is seen to be responsible for intergenerational support. In 
fact, many claim that the state should at least partly bear responsibility for older 
persons in need. In general, one finds a response pattern that indicates a demand 
for a mixed responsibility of family and state. In this respect, higher-educated 
classes and better-off income groups report a somewhat lower sense of obligation 
towards parents and children. 
Last but not least, a typology is proposed that draws on the solidarity-conflict
scheme in the previous chapter (Figure 2.1), consisting of consensual and con­
flictual solidarity as well as consensual and conflictual autonomy. Each of these
four patterns is further differentiated into two relationship types (see Table 3.1),
which may be called tight, close, strained, entangled, obligatory, divided, cus­
tomary and separate. The empirical results indicate that most intergenerational
relationships belong to the category of consensual solidarity, showing strong
cohesion and few conflicts. Nearly a third of the relationships with parents and
over half of the connections with adult children can be classified as being ‘tight’,
involving frequent contact, support and only few disagreements. However, the
degree of separation between generations should not be neglected. Nearly every
fifth respondent reports a relationship of consensual autonomy with regard to
his or her parents; most of these relationships can be characterised as being
‘separate’. The corresponding share for the respondents’ relationships with their 
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adult children is much lower. In general, connections with adult children seem to
be even closer than those with parents. 
Overall, the results support the existence of substantial (potential for) intergen­
erational cohesion. At this point, however, these findings need to be confirmed or 













Staying in touch 
Introduction 
Is Talcott Parsons right? Is it really true that once adult children leave their parents’ 
home, intergenerational attachment is severely weakened, if not suspended
altogether? In other words, do we find only rare intergenerational contacts among 
non-coresident adult children and their parents according to the adage, ‘Out of 
sight, out of mind’? 
Of course, this general question leads to: Who is more frequently in contact 
with one another, and which generations rarely stay in touch? Can we observe 
distinct patterns, and do they correspond to what theoretical ideas would lead us 
to expect? Answering these questions requires complex (multivariate multilevel) 
empirical analyses based on corresponding theoretical reasoning. 
Contact is the most general form of intergenerational cohesion. It includes
many kinds of interpersonal connections, be it via meeting in person, talking on
the phone or writing to one another, with or without a special purpose. Thus,
this chapter, devoted to the topic of contact, is the first chapter of this book to
apply complex theoretical reasoning and empirical analyses. It is also the first
time in this book that the ONFC model is applied to empirical investigations. In
what way do individual, family and societal structures play a role in intergen­
erational cohesion? Can we find significant differences between the rich and
poor, women and men, migrants and natives, the healthy and the sick, married
and singles? Are there discrepancies between countries, and do welfare states
and social stratification matter? 
When investigating adult family generations, one of the first decisions concerns 
the issue of coresidence. Should we include parents and adult children who live 
together in the analyses, or should we concentrate on those who no longer live 
in the same household, that is, the ‘non-coresidents’? Of course, coresidence is 
an important form of intergenerational solidarity that must not be neglected. An 
entire chapter of this book is accordingly devoted to coresidence (Chapter 6). 
However, when it comes to contact, those relationships between family members 
who no longer share the same living space provide the acid test for intergenera­
tional bonding. Is it really ‘out of sight, out of mind’? When family members live 
together, it is inevitable that they will see one another regularly. But what about 
the generations that live in separate homes? 
 62 Contact: Staying in touch 
In fact, there are good reasons to consider both views. To gain a general impression, 
we would like to see both the overall contact rates including coresidence and, more 
specifically, the contact frequency of non-coresident adult children and parents. 
However, for a more refined analysis of intergenerational bonding, the latter case 
can be expected to be more informative. Therefore, Figure 4.1 gives an overview 
that provides information on both groups. The more specific focus of this chapter, 
however, addresses the question of why non-coresident adult children and parents 
stay in touch. Does there remain a steady bond between adult generations even if 
they no longer live together, and if so, what are significant reasons for intergen­
erational contact? In turn, we can also expect to find out more about the family 
generations who do not spend much time together. What are the typical differences 
between those with regular or sparing intergenerational contact? 
As in all of the following chapters, the first task is to point out what we are 
actually talking about when investigating a specific form of family solidarity; in 
this case, intergenerational contact. The next step is to review previous research 
and develop hypotheses on the basis of the ONFC model. With regard to the 
empirical analyses, it is documented how the corresponding questions are phrased 
in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, and what the possible 
answers are that respondents could give. The actual answers given are described 
in figures that differentiate between population groups with regard to education, 
income, gender and migration as well as country. The following analyses provide 
explanations of intergenerational solidarity on the basis of the previous theoretical 
considerations. Last but not least, the main results are summarised. 
Research and hypotheses 
What is contact? 
Interpersonal contact occurs in various general forms. It includes meeting in per­
son, talking with the help of tools such as telephones and computers, and writing 
on paper or using electronic devices. Meeting in person can be regarded as the 
closest form of contact. It involves direct interaction, handshakes, embracement, 
smell, unmediated eye-to-eye contact, facial expressions and gestures as well as 
those forms of personal help and care that depend on personal presence. Talking 
on the phone or via the Internet still provides an opportunity for instantaneous and 
spontaneous reaction, direct emphatic involvement, and can even lead to more 
intense personal exchange than meeting in person. This is also possible in writing, 
though in general it is a less direct form of interpersonal encounter. 
Contact may be totally spontaneous or planned well in advance. It may last 
seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years or even decades. Contact 
may involve a whole range of support, be it one-sided, reciprocal or mutual. It 
may involve personal help and care, advice and consolation, helping with house­
hold chores, gardening, repairing, planning and organising, and sharing local and 
family gossip. Contact may be totally voluntary or obligatory; it may follow social 
roles, rituals, customary practices and traditions, including family ceremonies 
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such as birthdays, weddings and funerals. Contact may be conflictual or entirely 
harmonious; it may come (and go) with love, hate or total indifference. One may 
like it or not. We may expect something from meeting another person, be it good 
advice, social bonding, companionship, avoidance of loneliness, emotional assis­
tance, present or future support. We may even pay directly or indirectly, or be 
paid to engage with the other, or we might just want to enjoy time with the other 
person and participate in each other’s lives. 
Since contact may involve many different forms, reasons and consequences, 
one should be careful not to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that more contact is 
always positive and less contact always negative in principle. Of course, daily 
contact with significant others reduces isolation and loneliness, and may come 
with many other very welcome benefits. However, there can also be too much 
contact, whether in emotionally strained relationships, because of burdensome 
situations or due to interpersonal abuse in one way or the other. 
Research 
Previous studies have shown that frequent contact persists among family gen­
erations, even after the children have grown up and left their parents’ home. For 
example, in Germany two out of five 40–85 year olds who have adult children 
living outside of their household report daily contact with their children. More 
than two-thirds meet, write or phone several times a week, and 85% at least once 
a week. Of course, contact rates would be even higher were one to include the 
coresident generations. Contact of 40–85 year olds with their parents is somewhat 
less frequent, but still quite impressive: one-quarter report daily contact, more 
than two-quarters speak of several times a week, and three-quarters stay in touch 
at least once a week. Only 1 and 2 per cent, respectively, state that there is no 
intergenerational contact at all (Szydlik 2000: 109ff.). 
Tomassini et al. (2004) document weekly contact between elderly parents and 
children in Finland, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Italy. They find frequent 
contact in all countries, with higher levels in Italy than in the Northern European 
countries. Hank (2007: 163) condenses the seven answer categories of the first 
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe into three catego­
ries, while concentrating on the most frequently contacted non-coresident child: 
two-fifths of these respondents speak of daily contacts with the child, half report 
having contact at least once a week, and only one in ten meets, talks or writes less 
than once a week. Even more frequent contact can be found in the Mediterranean 
countries, particularly in contrast to the Northern European states. 
Several studies provide further clues about the determinants of frequent inter-
generational contact. Obviously, distance is found to be crucial: the larger the
geographical distance, the less intergenerational contact (Frankel and DeWit 
1986; DeWit and Frankel 1988). A study in the United States (Sarkisian and 
Gerstel 2008) suggests that marriage of adult children leads to less intense 
relations with parents, implying that married adult children are more strongly 
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in the Netherlands also engage in less frequent face-to-face contact with their 
parents; yet having children of their own (i.e., grandchildren from their parents’
perspective) increases intergenerational contact with (grand)parents (Bucx et al. 
2008). In closing their paper, the authors nevertheless concede that ‘[i]t is not 
clear to what extent our results can be generalized to countries with different 
structural characteristics’. 
Divorce also seems to lead to less frequent intergenerational contact, especially 
for fathers. Studies show that marital dissolution has negative effects on intergen­
erational relations with adult children (Aquilino 1994a; Shapiro 2003; Tomassini 
et al. 2004; De Graaf and Fokkema 2007; Kalmijn 2015). Less research, though, 
has been conducted in the opposite direction, namely on whether the divorce of 
adult children affects the relationship with their parents. 
Further empirical analyses on contact amongst adult family generations, 
employing different data sets and analytical foci, have been conducted for several 
countries, for example: Grundy and Shelton (2001) for Great Britain; Bordone 
(2009) for Italy and Sweden; Treas and Gubernskaya (2012) for Australia, Aus­
tria, Germany (West), Great Britain, Hungary, Italy and the United States; Stein­
bach (2013) for Germany and Ward et al. (2014) for the United States. 
Hypotheses 
Throughout this book, the ONFC model (Figure 2.2) is applied to analyse
intergenerational relations. In this chapter, the aim is to explain (the frequency
of) contact between adult children and parents living in separate households.
Thus, the theoretical reasoning in this chapter aims to develop corresponding,
empirically testable hypotheses, differentiating opportunity, need, family and
society. 
First, contact is likely to depend on opportunity structures. The question
is not only whether generations would like to meet, but also whether condi­
tions are such that they can do so. In this respect, staying in touch may involve
costs in order to bridge geographical distances between households. A similar
thing applies when sharing common activities. The better-educated classes are
in a better position to cover these costs, and they are also more likely to use
modern communication technologies (Korupp and Szydlik 2005). Similarly,
higher income may be a relevant prerequisite of more frequent intergenera­
tional contact. Furthermore, financial resources not only facilitate the ability
to bear current contact costs, but may also serve as a ‘motivator’ for family
generations to stay in touch. In this perspective, it is another empirical question
whether adult children keep closer contact with their parents when they can
expect a larger inheritance. 
Health may play a role as well if poor health restricts opportunities for con­
tact. However, there is also reason to assume the opposite relationship when
family members help relatives in poor health. From this perspective, it would
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Although contact includes telephoning and writing, the obvious hypothesis in 
accordance with previous studies is that geographical proximity is one of the most 
crucial factors for staying in frequent touch. 
Need structures include financial needs. The demand for intergenerational 
monetary transfers may lead to more frequent contact. On the one hand, financial 
need may enhance the willingness of dependent relatives to stay in touch. On the 
other hand, awareness of a close family member in need may increase contact as 
a form of support. 
Age is another factor that may potentially influence contact behaviour. An 
obvious hypothesis here is that the elderly are in greater need of closer contact 
with their offspring, for example, to prevent loneliness in old age. Again, it is an 
empirical question whether adult children actually meet these contact needs of 
the elderly. 
The situation is similar for health. Having a frail parent who is in need of
support may lead to more frequent contact with this parent. However, as mentioned 
above, poor health may also restrict opportunities for common activities, and it is 
not only need that defines a relationship. 
Relationships between parents and their adult children are embedded in
family structures. First of all, gender combination is likely to play an important
role. A substantial body of research has shown that women are families’ kin-
keepers (e.g., Rossi and Rossi 1990), involving activities ranging from full-scale
care, through mutual practical help in many areas, and on many occasions all
the way to frequent telephone conversations and ‘enjoyable visits’ (Fingerman
2000). Although one should not neglect men’s role in this respect, they fall
behind when it comes to ensuring family cohesion. Thus, the most contact can
be expected amongst mothers and daughters, and the least frequent contact
between fathers and sons. The question here is whether it is the mother-son
(son-mother) or father-daughter (daughter-father) relationships that are marked
by more intergenerational contact. 
Apart from gender combination, previous research indicates that partnership 
status is another factor that plays a considerable role in accounting for differences 
in contact (see above). Marriage might strengthen family bonds overall, includ­
ing connections between parents and adult children. However, other arguments 
treat (married) couples and adult intergenerational relationships as more dis­
tinct spheres, implying that spouses have less frequent intergenerational contact 
(Parsons 1942: 615f.; Parsons and Bales 1956: 19f.; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2008: 
360f.). In other words, when adult children marry or enter a steady partnership, 
this may weaken the connections with their parents. 
In this respect, it makes sense to differentiate between relationships with
parents and adult children. The previous argument suggests that being single 
might result in more frequent contact with parents. However, this does not mean 
that separated or divorced parents show closer bonds to their offspring than parents 
who still live together. Previous research has shown that being an absent parent
(mostly fathers) in childhood and youth has long-lasting, even lifelong negative
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Bertogg and Szydlik 2016). This even applies to later-life divorce, for instance, 
due to the influences of parental conflict on parent-child relationships, the geo­
graphical mobility of a divorced parent, the division of time between separated 
parents and the discontinuation of common family activities. By contrast, a 
deceased parent (i.e., widowhood) is likely to have a different effect on inter-
generational contact, not least since common grief and need for support may 
even intensify bonding between the surviving family members (Pett et al. 1992; 
Aquilino 1994b: 909; Shapiro 2003: 266; De Graaf and Fokkema 2007). 
Further assumptions with regard to family structures refer to the number of 
children and siblings as well as to the existence of grandchildren. The presence of 
more relatives may, in general, lead to forming stronger family bonds. However, 
family members may also become ‘competitors’ with respect to time and atten­
tion. The empirical analyses will show which of the contrasting hypotheses is 
closer to reality. 
Last but not least, cultural-contextual structures are to be considered as well, 
including the effects of migration, the welfare state and social stratification. 
Naturally, migrants tend to live at greater geographical distances, particularly from 
their parents (Figure 3.3), and frequently command fewer financial resources, 
which should result in less intergenerational contact overall. However, according 
to the ‘safe haven’ hypothesis, migrants are likely to maintain stronger family 
bonds. Since living in a new country often comes with cultural discrepancies 
between home and host countries as well as huge challenges, insecurities and even 
discrimination, migrants may have a more pronounced need for a close family
circle as a ‘safe haven’ in an unfamiliar environment. This may well result in 
more frequent contact amongst family generations, at least net of geographical 
distance. Also, remittances, feelings of connectedness with the country and family 
of origin, and the need for emotional support due to the migration experience may 
foster bonds between relatives across country borders. 
According to the theoretical reasoning on welfare states discussed in Chapter 2,
we are again faced with contradictory assumptions. The crowding-out hypothesis 
would suggest that a well-developed welfare state is likely to result in quite loose 
intergenerational connections. Since the welfare state takes over, family members 
are thought to withdraw from one another. By contrast, the crowding-in hypoth­
esis would even assume more frequent contact between adult family generations. 
Since a strong welfare state relieves family members of obligations and burdens, 
they are believed to develop strong voluntary mutual bonds. If this is the case, 
more social and family expenditure should result in more frequent intergenera­
tional contact. 
Finally, influences of social stratification on intergenerational cohesion may 
play a relevant role. If considerable financial resources provide a basis for intense 
intergenerational bonds, living in a rich country should increase the frequency 
of contact. When it comes to poverty, the picture is less clear. There may be rea­
son to expect less contact owing to family members retreating from burdensome 
situations. However, more intense family solidarity in a difficult environment is 
conceivable as well. 





The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe asks about the frequency 
of contact in the following way: 
During the past twelve months, how often did you have contact with your 
[mother/father], either personally, by phone or mail? 
The interviewers were also instructed to remind the respondents to think about 
‘any kind of contact, including for example E-mail, SMS or MMS’. The corre­
sponding question with regard to children reads as follows: 
During the past twelve months, how often did you [or your husband/wife/ 
partner] have contact with [child name], either personally, by phone or mail? 
The survey gathered information on up to four children. However, respondents 
living with their parents or children were not asked these contact questions. In 
these cases, we assume daily contact (Tomassini al. 2004; Hank 2007: 161). The 
possible answers to both questions are as follows: 
1. Daily 
2. Several times a week 
3. About once a week 
4. About every two weeks 
5. About once a month 
6. Less than once a month 
7. Never. 
The multivariate analyses consist of multilevel ordered probit models. Since 
only a few dyads have monthly or even less contact, those cases are allocated to 
the fourth category. Additionally, the order of the values in the questionnaire is 
reversed so that the coefficients refer to increasing contact. Therefore, the four 
values of the dependent variable are ‘less often’, ‘about once a week’, ‘several 
times a week’ and ‘daily’ (see Table A2). As mentioned above, the multivariate 
analyses are based on dyads (the relation of a mother with the first child is one 
dyad, whereas the mother’s relationship with the second child represents another 
dyad and so on). The figures refer to a respondent’s most frequent contact in cases 
in which there is more than one relative of the other generation. 
Description 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, it makes a difference for contact 
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first step is to examine the frequency of contact with the other generation for all 
respondents with living parents or adult children, whether they coreside or not. 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview. The lower two bars refer ‘only’ to the adult genera­
tions who no longer share the same household. 
The contact rates are in fact very pronounced. If we include coresidence, three
in five of the respondents even have daily contact with at least one adult child. It
is striking that more than four out of five meet, talk or write at least several times
a week, and 93 per cent every week. The connections with parents are somewhat
looser, but still extraordinarily frequent: 27, 56, 78, 86 and 92 per cent report daily,
at least several times a week, weekly, fortnightly and monthly contact, respectively. 
Since these numbers include generations living together, the contact rates 
amongst non-coresident parents and adult children are somewhat smaller, albeit 
still very high. Although they no longer share the same household, 44 per cent still 
report daily contact with an adult child. Three-quarters meet, talk or write at least 
several times a week, and nine out of ten report at least weekly contact. Again, 
contact with parents is somewhat less frequent, but the relationships are still very 
intense (one-quarter daily, 56 per cent at least several times a week, 78 per cent 
weekly, 86 per cent at least every second week). 
Figure 4.2 documents the rates of daily and weekly contact of non-coresident
respondents with parents and adult children. Obviously, coresidence entails very 
frequent contact. Living together in the same household means seeing one another 
on a regular, usually a daily basis. Thus, the crucial question of this chapter is not 
whether coresident generations regularly stay in touch. Instead, when analysing 
reasons for more or less contact, it makes sense to concentrate on adult children 
and parents living separately (see also Hank 2007). In addition, coresidence is 
addressed in its own right in Chapter 6. 
The figure shows that daily contact is especially widespread in the lower 
classes. Nearly a third of the respondents with lower education have daily contact 
with a parent, and over half with an adult child. For academics, the rates are ‘only’ 
22 and 30 per cent, respectively. However, these considerable discrepancies dis­
appear by and large once we also include weekly contacts. 
Figure 4.1 Contact: Overview
 
Source: SHARE (n: 10,129/34,472/10,053/24,826).
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Figure 4.2 Contact: People
 
Source: SHARE (n: 10,053/24,826). No coresidence.
 
A similar picture emerges with regard to income groups. Over half of the 
respondents from the lowest income group report daily contact with an adult 
child; this applies to ‘only’ 36 per cent of the most affluent population. However, 
the survey results for weekly contact reverse the picture. This difference speaks 
of the strong effect of short geographical distance for the lower classes (Figure 
3.3) as well as a combination of monetary resources and needs, which will be 
addressed more specifically by the multivariate analyses. 
The hypotheses section of this chapter suggests more frequent intergenera­
tional contact of women. This assumption is supported by the empirical findings. 
Women are more likely to stay in touch with their parents and children. Yet one 
should not neglect the fact that close to a quarter of sons also report daily contact 
with parents, and this applies to two in five fathers with regard to a non-coresident 
adult child as well. 
It is also not surprising that migrants are considerably less able to be in daily 
contact with their parents. Migrants also show less daily contact with their adult 
children. However, if we consider at least weekly contact with offspring, the dis­
crepancy between migrants and the native population diminishes substantially. 
What about intergenerational contact in different countries? The results docu­
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Figure 4.3 Contact: Countries
 
Source: SHARE (n: 10,053/24,826). No coresidence.
 
weekly contact, one can identify roughly two groups of countries: the south and 
the other countries. The three Southern European countries display extraordinar­
ily high rates of respondents who stay in frequent touch with their parents and 
offspring. Nearly half of the Italian respondents report daily contact with their 
parents, whereas at the other end of Europe, this applies to only a sixth of the 
Swedes. Regarding adult children, the corresponding figure is twice as high in 
Italy and Greece as in Sweden (72% vs. 36%). To a lesser degree, but still exist­
ent, are country differences in at least weekly contact, which again point to more 
frequent intergenerational contact in the south of Europe. 
These findings are a first indication in support of the so-called ‘crowding­
out’ hypothesis, since strong welfare states seem to be associated with a lower 
frequency of contact. Conversely, private intergenerational contact is more wide­
spread in weak welfare states, which suggests more family coherence in countries 
where public services provide less support. 
If we include coresident generations, the frequency of contact with parents still
remains much the same (this result is not reported in a figure). Since only a few
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in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. As shown in Figure 4.1, daily contact increases from 44
to 61 per cent if we include coresident adult children. Nevertheless, the propor­
tions between the population groups and countries in general stay the same. Greater
increases in contact rates are observed for population groups and countries with
particularly high coresidence rates (Chapter 6). The highest shares by far of daily
contact including coresidence with adult children can be found in the Southern
European countries Italy (85%), Greece (84%) and Spain (81%), whereas Sweden
(43%) and Denmark (37%) display particularly low rates. However, gender differ­
ences in daily contact disappear owing to the higher rate of coresidence among sons. 
At this point, one must bear in mind that the figures represent simple descriptions
and not a thorough analysis of the possible factors for intergenerational contact.
For example, we do not know whether descriptive country differences are really
due to country characteristics, or rather to different shares of population groups
in those countries. To really get to the bottom of the various factors that explain
greater or lesser intergenerational cohesion, we have to conduct multivariate analy­
ses. Moreover, in the next step, the focus will no longer be limited to the parents and
adult children who have the most frequent contact. Instead, the analyses will explore
all non-coresident child-parent and parent-child relationships in much more detail. 
Explanation 
Why do family generations stay in touch? Figure 4.4 refers to the net coefficients 
of Table A4.2 (see Appendix for more information): ‘’ signifies more contact, 
‘’ indicates fewer contacts with regard to the corresponding factor. 
The first factors represent opportunity structures. With regard to contact with 
their adult children, the multivariate analysis shows no class differences. Yet the 
higher-educated respondents seem to have more frequent contact with elderly par­
ents, indicating the relevance of resources (see also Chapter 8). At first glance, 
income increases the frequency of contact, at least according to the corresponding 
gross models in Table A4.2 (see Appendix). However, when one takes a future 
inheritance into consideration, the current income situation no longer seems to 
have an impact, which points to the special relevance of family wealth and the 
prospects of receiving it. 
Indeed, when the respondents expect an inheritance, they are much more 
likely to stay in touch with their parents. Since bequests stem largely from parents 
(Chapter 9), one may presume that wealth is an opportunity for elderly parents for 
closer contact with their offspring. This effect is not restricted only to the respond­
ents’ relationship with their parents, but also applies to their connection with their 
adult children. If the respondent or his or her partner is likely to leave an inherit­
ance, this increases the frequency of contact with the adult child significantly. The 
smaller bequest effect that contact with children has in comparison to contact with 
parents might be due to less immediate expectations of receiving wealth. 
The respondents’ health does not seem to have a particular influence on inter-
generational contacts, be it with parents or adult children. However, it might also 
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The most important factor is geographical distance: the greater the distance, 
the less intergenerational contact. This attests to the fact that even modern com­
munication technologies do not compensate for remoteness. Additionally, this is 
an indication that many adult children and parents would like to spend more time 
together – if they could. However, some adult children are more inclined to move 
farther away from their parents’ home. In this case, looser intergenerational ties 
may play a part in greater spatial distance. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that this 
alternative relation of distance and cohesion is much less prevalent (see Greenwell 
and Bengtson 1997; Engstler and Huxhold 2010; Isengard 2015). 
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When considering individual characteristics, one must not neglect differences 
in need structures. First of all, there is a connection between economic support 
and staying in touch: the giving and taking of money is associated with more 
frequent contact. This is an indication that meeting financial needs, in fact, con­
tributes to family generations spending more time together. It is the actual transfer 
of money rather than the availability of resources via a higher income that plays a 
crucial role. The findings support Simmel’s (1908) assumption that gifts and the 
resulting feelings of gratitude stabilise interpersonal relationships (see Chapter 7). 
This applies in both directions of the intergenerational lineage. 
The age of the respondents shows opposite effects in terms of contact with 
their parents and their adult children. When it comes to parents, age increases 
intergenerational cohesion. This is in accordance with the assumption that elderly 
people – both the respondents and their older parents – are in greater need of 
interpersonal attention in later life. However, when it comes to the relationship 
with their adult children, it is the younger respondents who report more frequent 
contact. This again speaks to the relevance of needs. When younger adult children 
have just moved out of their parents’ home, they still have a greater need for inter-
generational advice and support. The older the children become, the more they are 
able to stand on their own feet. 
Needs are not always met by intergenerational solidarity. For example, the 
health-related needs of elderly parents do not necessarily lead to a higher intensity 
of contact with their adult children. This does not at all mean that adult children 
would refrain from providing help and care to their frail elderly parents (Chapter 8).
However, the overall frequency of contact seems to be reduced in these cases, be 
it due to physical impairments restricting common activities and interpersonal 
exchange, or due to emotional strain. At the same time, contact with the middle 
generation’s adult children is not affected when those middle-generation respond­
ents have parents with poor health. 
Family structures include a number of relevant contact factors. As expected, 
gender plays a crucial role. The results prove that women are indeed families’ kin-
keepers; it is the women who maintain close contact with their parents. Daughters 
and mothers report the most frequent contact with one another. In second place 
are daughters and fathers. By contrast, son-mother and especially son-father 
relationships are definitely weaker. The parent-adult child relationship mostly 
corresponds to the same pattern. Again, it is the mothers and daughters who meet, 
talk or write most frequently, followed by contact between fathers and daughters. 
The connections with sons are generally less intense, at least in terms of frequency 
of contact. 
Married parents have the closest bonds with their adult children. The strongest 
effects can be observed for divorced and single parents. Further analyses show 
that this applies especially to fathers. This is again evidence of the long-term con­
sequences of parental separation, particularly on father-child relationships. Rare 
contact is a phenomenon that is associated with parents – mostly fathers – who 
are absent after family break-ups. By contrast, the widowhood of a parent results 
in only a modest overall decrease in contact with adult children (less parent-child 
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It makes sense to distinguish between the family status of the parent and that of 
the adult child. In general, being married is less significant when it comes to the 
relationship of the respondents with their parents. Yet there still is a weakly sig­
nificant divorce effect inasmuch as divorced children seem to report less contact 
with their parents. Most interestingly, single children meet or talk to their parents 
more frequently, which is an indication that the children’s marriage in fact directs 
their focus away from their parents to some extent, whereas children (especially 
sons) remaining single may result in more opportunities (e.g., time) and a greater 
need for close contact with parents. 
This interpretation is also supported by the findings for partnerships of the
corresponding parent or adult child. If a parent or adult child has a partner,
the frequency of contact between the family generations is significantly lower. The
situation is similar as the number of children increases. The more offspring
the respondents have, the less often they stay in touch with their parents. Having 
more children decreases the frequency of contact with each child even more, 
which is an indication of parents splitting time between their offspring. The existence 
of grandchildren does not show a significant effect, yet having more siblings leads 
to considerably less contact with parents. This again indicates that parents divide 
their time between their offspring. Moreover, if there are more siblings, each child 
is less likely to help elderly parents, as other siblings are also potential support 
providers (Chapter 8). With regard to contact with adult children, the number of 
siblings shows a rather weak positive effect, suggesting somewhat stronger bonds 
within larger families, including more occasions for contact such as birthdays and 
family events. 
Cultural-contextual structures have a strong impact, too. The previous figures 
and gross results of Table A4.2 (see Appendix) indicate that migrants have less 
frequent contact with their parents. This is not surprising since migration often 
results in leaving parents – and sometimes even children – behind in their home 
countries, which results in particularly large geographical distances, and thus 
reduces opportunities for frequent personal contact. However, when we control 
for geographical distance, migrants show even more intergenerational contact. 
This is an empirical indication of the ‘safe haven’ hypothesis, suggesting that the 
migrant population turns to the close family circle in response to cultural differ­
ences and the challenges faced in an often unfamiliar environment. 
Furthermore, considerable country effects emerge. The figures and the country 
analyses (see Appendix, Table A4.1) show especially high contact rates in the 
Southern European countries. The macro indicators also attest to this: the higher 
the social and family expenditure in a country, the fewer intergenerational con­
tacts. Conversely, adult family generations in weaker welfare states meet, talk or 
write to each other more often. These results support the assumption that welfare 
states actually ‘crowd out’ family solidarity. The effect is even stronger for the 
relationship of the respondents with their parents than for their relationship with 
their adult children. 
More wealth per capita is associated with more frequent contact, which testi­
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Additionally, high poverty in a society goes hand in hand with generations staying
in closer contact as well. In the latter case, a difficult environment may lead
family members to stand together. These results make it particularly interesting to 
see the more detailed analyses of the different forms of contact, especially those 
distinguishing between help and care (Chapter 8). 
Summary 
Individuals can count on close intergenerational bonds. Staying in touch is
definitely not always an easy task. Sometimes one might prefer more privacy, and 
some encounters or telephone conversations might even be discomforting. With 
this in mind, one should refrain from automatically painting too positive a picture 
when observing intergenerational contact. Nevertheless, the empirical results defi­
nitely contradict the idea of the prevalence of isolated adults without any contact 
with significant others, including family members. If one defines ‘individualisa­
tion’ as a process geared towards autonomous individuals without close human 
bonds, then the empirical results come to the opposite conclusion. Moreover, fre­
quent contact supports the conclusion of the previous chapter, contradicting the 
idea of families in permanent and unsolvable crisis. This applies particularly to 
adult family generations who no longer live in the same household. ‘Out of sight, 
out of mind’ in no way reflects the reality of contemporary family generations. 
Nearly 80 per cent of the respondents have at least weekly contact with a par­
ent, and over 90 per cent stay in touch with an adult child on a weekly basis at the 
least. The corresponding shares for having even daily contact are 27 and 61 per 
cent, respectively. These numbers include coresident generations, who naturally 
meet on a daily basis. When excluding those cases, the percentages for contact 
with parents stay the same, whereas the rate of daily and at least weekly contact 
with non-coresident adult children is still 44 and 91 per cent, respectively. These 
are impressive numbers. Even in adulthood, family generations stay in close 
touch; even when living apart, adult children and parents do not lose contact; and 
even in modern times, family bonds persist over a lifetime. 
Apart from these global figures, we find considerable differences between 
population groups and countries. Moreover, opportunities and needs, family and 
cultural structures all play a prominent role. When it comes to money, it is the 
actual transfers that increase the frequency of contact, and less the current income 
situation. Expected wealth in the form of a future inheritance is also associated 
with staying in touch more frequently. Obviously, money appears to be a binding 
agent for human bonding. However, respondents reporting poor health of parents 
speak of less frequent contact. Reduced opportunities for common activities could 
play a relevant role here. In this context, geographical distance between house­
holds proves to be the most important factor of all. 
In general, as expected, the analyses demonstrate much closer bonds of women, 
who can rightly be called the families’ ‘kinkeepers’. The relationships between 
sons and fathers are considerably looser. Moreover, parental divorce and separa­
tion reduces parents’ contact with adult children, whereas further analyses show 
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that this result goes back to fathers in particular, indicating the long-term, even 
lifelong effects of absent fathers in childhood and youth. Additionally, having 
more close family members seems to reduce the time spent with each parent and 
adult child overall. 
At first glance, migrants have fewer close relationships with their parents, 
which is not surprising considering that migration from one country to another 
often leaves parents behind. However, if we consider geographical distance, 
migrants report even closer intergenerational bonds, supporting the hypothesis 
that the close family circle acts as a ‘safe haven’ in an unfamiliar environment. 
Regarding the consequences of welfare states, the findings support the
crowding-out hypothesis. More social and family expenditure is associated with 
less intergenerational family contact. The most frequent contact between adult 
family generations is found in Southern Europe. 
Last but not least, social stratification plays a crucial role as well. Interestingly, 
both wealth and poverty seem to enhance cohesion between adult family genera­
tions. Affluent societies are likely to offer a basis for intense bonds, whereas living 




Quarrels and fights? 
Introduction 
Intergenerational conflict comes in many forms. First of all, the specifics and 
patterns of controversies depend on the corresponding concept of ‘generations’ 
(Chapter 2). Different concepts make different assumptions about the causes and 
patterns of conflict. Political generations clash in political arenas, for example, 
via political parties, media or civic engagement in various forms. Cultural genera­
tions, as vague as they may be, quarrel about the interpretational sovereignty
over cultural norms and values, orientations and lifestyles. Economic genera­
tions can be in dispute over economic opportunities and risks, whether they are 
related to the labour market, economy or welfare state regulations, for instance, 
(dis)advan tages of cohorts concerning contributions to and the receipt of welfare 
state benefits, such as public pensions and health support. ‘Generations’ in the 
sense of age groups are placed in a conflict setting when a ‘young generation’ 
is assumed to quarrel with an ‘old generation’ over political influence, cultural 
expressions and economic opportunities. 
These and other conflict scenarios are not surprising given that societal and 
colloquial ‘generations’ are, in general, defined or implicitly assumed as being social
entities with specific abilities, opportunities, behaviours and outcomes – which are 
set against other social entities of a similar kind. One can hardly think of the spe­
cifics of one social generation without at least contrasting them implicitly with the 
corresponding features of another generation or cohort. Often these ‘generations’ 
are even defined in essence by clashes with another ‘generation’ of the same kind. 
This is not the case with family generations. Of course, when referring to par­
ents and children, conflict is, in principle, not out of the question. However, at the 
same time controversies are not an integral part of being a parent or a child per 
se. (Adult) children and parents can get along with one another quite well, and 
the advantage of one family generation does not have to come at the expense of 
the other. Instead, from a family perspective, one generation supporting the other 
may be a win-win situation for both, whether this involves parents and children, 
or grandparents and grandchildren. 
In any case, conflict between family generations is quite specific since, in 
contrast to other generation concepts that are based on cohorts or age groups, 
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there is not necessarily a direct encounter of specific individuals, including persons 
who have known each other for a very long time. Of course, this is precisely the 
case when referring to discord between family generations, especially in the case 
of adults. Whereas clashes of cohorts and age groups are structural in general, 
family strife is personal. Over 100 years ago, Georg Simmel stated: 
[. . .] just the closeness of life together, the social and economic compatibility, 
the rather monumental presumption of unity – all this directly brings about 
friction, tension, and opposition especially easily; indeed, family conflict is 
a form of conflict sui generis. Its cause, its intensity, its expansion to those 
uninvolved, the form of the fight as that of the reconciliation is, by its course 
on the basis of an organic unity matured by thousands of internal and external 
ties, fully idiosyncratic, comparable to no other conflict.
(Simmel 2009: 266; 1908) 
Recent research has produced a number of studies on the extent of intergenera­
tional cohesion and the factors that have an impact on solidarity between adult 
family generations. In comparison, the investigation of intergenerational conflicts 
still lags behind. This is all the more surprising given that the mass media often 
report on – alleged – substantial conflict between generations from young to old. 
From this perspective, daily conflicts are a regular feature of the relationships 
between adult children and their parents, and conflict is seen as an indicator of a 
crisis of the family and the dissolution of family bonds. It may be argued further 
that permanent conflict prevents generations from helping and taking care of each 
other, which may ultimately lead to isolation and deprivation not only in old age. 
These assumptions and arguments give rise to a number of important research 
questions: To what extent are intergenerational relations between parents and adult 
children characterised by conflicts? What are the reasons for, and the consequences 
of intergenerational controversy? What is the relation between conflict and solidar­
ity on the one hand, and family conflict and societal context on the other? 
The present chapter will address these questions. First, drawing on Figure 2.1,
conflict and solidarity will not be treated as opposites in principle. Second, inter-
generational conflicts will be compared with controversies with other people, 
such as partners, other relatives and friends. Additionally, it will be investigated 
whether people are more likely to report conflict with their children or parents. 
Third, the chapter will explore reasons for and consequences of conflict. It will 
examine individual and family factors as well as connections between intergen­
erational conflicts within families and societal contexts, including welfare state 
characteristics and social stratification. 
Research and hypotheses 
What is conflict? 
Conflicts can range from minor, brief differences regarding trivial details, through 
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violence. Controversies can arise once, sporadically, episodically or constantly; 
they can be destructive or constructive (see Canary et al. 1995; Segrin and Flora 
2011: 87). 
According to interaction theory, conflict means: 
[. . .] dual enforcement of independence and autonomy of action in the mutual 
dealing of two subjects. (. . .) Conflict is, therefore, dual or reciprocal action 
against the will of the other when two people deal with each other; it is 
interaction in the sense of a series of alternating ‘acts of contravention’ and 
therefore ‘estrangement’. 
(Tyrell 1976: 258f.). 
In fact, there has to be some kind of bond between people in order to ignite 
controversies, and the dispute itself ties one person to the other. ‘[C]onflict is a 
mutual activity’ (Hocker and Wilmot 2014: 15; see also Braiker and Kelley 1979: 
137) – unless the consequences of conflict, including emotional strain, appear 
unbearable. Controversies may destroy a relationship. Severe conflicts can be so 
pronounced and irreconcilable that the relationship ultimately comes to an end. 
However, respectful arguments between individuals may, in turn, offer a chance 
to clarify different opinions and wishes. People who argue with each other at 
least show some interest in the other person and possibly the wish to continue the 
relationship. Stierlin (1974: 181) even speaks of a ‘loving fight’ that can lead to 
‘mutual liberation (. . .) in the context of this conflict of generations’. 
In general, intergenerational family conflict can be seen as a form of inter­
active behaviour of family generations based on different interests, feelings or 
opinions (see Sev’er and Trost 2011: 9). Conflict can contradict solidarity, while 
both can also occur at the same time (Figure 2.1). Discord may even be associated 
with support, for example, when parents give money and, implicitly or explicitly, 
expect something in return (e.g., specific behaviour or attention). With regard to 
relationships with parents, care for frail elderly may also come with controversy. 
Whatever the case may be, family members have conflicts of a special kind. To 
quote Simmel once again: ‘It is [. . .] presumed, without more ado, as a reality of 
experience that a stronger antagonism is found on grounds of familial commonalities 
than among strangers’ (2009: 248; 1908). 
Research 
In comparison to solidarity, research on intergenerational conflict in adulthood is
relatively rare (e.g., Suitor and Pillemer 1991; Clarke et al. 1999; Van Gaalen and
Dykstra 2006; Lowenstein 2007; Szydlik 2008a; Buhl 2009; Schwarz 2013; for a
number of case studies on family conflict, see also Sev’er and Trost 2011). This
applies especially to conflict in middle age. The lack of conflict research regarding
adult children and parents may not least be due to the lack of corresponding data.
Conflict is a sensitive topic, which is not easily addressed in (representative) surveys. 
Existing empirical studies do not find much notable intergenerational discord 
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by Lowenstein (2007) for the urban population aged 75 years and older in England, 
Germany, Israel, Norway and Spain. Van Gaalen and Dykstra (2006) find low 
rates among 18–79 year olds in the Netherlands. Furthermore, in a qualitative 
study for the United States, Clarke et al. (1999) identify six themes of conflict 
between older parents and adult children. In order of appearance they are: habits 
and lifestyles; communication and interaction style; child-rearing practices and 
values; politics, religion and ideology; work orientation; and household mainte­
nance (see also Usita 2001; Usita and Du Bois 2005; Gapp 2007). 
The German Ageing Survey, which observes 40–85 year olds, focuses on 
pronounced conflicts that clearly go beyond differences on topics of little signifi­
cance and minor episodic quarrelling. The respondents are asked: 
There are, time and again, situations in life in which one’s view of impor­
tant issues is completely different from that of people one is close to, which 
causes conflicts. Does this apply to you? Is there a person or are there people 
in your life with whom you are in conflict? 
Almost one-quarter agree with this statement, a fifth state that they have conflict 
with family members, a good tenth report intergenerational family conflict, and 
only 8 per cent talk about conflict with considerably older or younger members of 
the family, i.e., parents and children (Szydlik 2008a). 
The German Ageing Survey also asks about the consequences of conflict, allow­
ing for multiple responses. Of those 8 per cent who experience intergenerational
family discord, only 14 per cent claim to be working on a solution. Over 40 per cent
of them see no end to the controversy. These generations quarrel a great deal, and
they fail to resolve their differences. A little over 30 per cent avoid the topic of con­
troversy, and almost half of the 8 per cent who experience conflict between family
generations avoid the other person or break off contact altogether. 
Further multivariate analyses on the basis of this study indicate that discord 
between adult family generations is associated particularly with less frequent 
contact and weaker emotional closeness. Additionally, adult children who have 
health problems, financial debts or receive transfers from their parents clash with 
them more often; so do respondents with higher education, and women. Divorced 
or separated parents as well as West Germans are also more likely to be in conflict 
with their descendants. 
Hypotheses 
In view of previous studies (and Figure 3.5), it would be a big surprise to find 
huge numbers of family generations in fierce conflict. Nevertheless, controversies 
between adult children and parents should not be downplayed, or even neglected. 
They are evidence of the complex interactions of family generations as well as 
their multifaceted causes and consequences. 
Although the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 2.2 focuses on family 
solidarity, it can also be applied to intergenerational conflict. Therefore, besides 
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developing hypotheses for the empirical analyses, the following theoretical
discussion also aims to expand the ONFC model. 
First, controversies require opportunities to engage in this type of interaction. 
Education, income and the prospects of inheriting may have an influence on inter-
generational dispute. Education can be seen as a valuable resource that provides 
considerable opportunities. With regard to conflict, one might assume that people 
with a higher education are in a better position to risk discord with other family 
generations since they can rely on their own ‘human capital’ in potentially dif­
ficult situations. By contrast, owing to their more vulnerable position, the lower 
educational classes might be more inclined to refrain from risking discord and 
thus current and future family solidarity. If dependence restricts (open) contro­
versy, the lower classes can be expected to show less intergenerational conflict. 
These class-specific resources may also be associated with different communica­
tion, discussion and thus conflict styles. 
It will be especially interesting to see whether current income and prospective 
wealth transfers have an influence on disputes between adult generations. Several 
effects are conceivable here: people with more monetary resources may face less 
opposition from other family members; relatives expecting financial contribu­
tions or even wealth may be more likely to refrain from quarrelling with potential 
transfer givers; financial difficulties may give reason for dispute, whereas affluent 
family members are also in a better position to risk controversy. 
Without so much as minimal contact, personal disputes are quite unlikely. In 
turn, more frequent contact may be associated with more conflict on the one hand. 
This is in accordance with the assumption that especially close relationships are 
likely to involve more discord. Thus, family generations who see each other on 
a daily basis may be more likely to display some degree of dispute. On the other 
hand, the previous analyses indicate that bitter controversies can result in less 
contact and even in the termination of the relationship. Following both strands, 
there seems to be a paradox involved in the contact-conflict relation: more contact 
may come with more conflict, but more conflict may also result in less contact. In 
other words, personal controversies may be associated with close bonds, yet fierce 
disputes are also likely to put the relationship at risk. 
Needs may cause conflict as well. If parents or adult children are in finan­
cial need, the corresponding ‘negotiations’ about transfers as well as the difficult 
situation itself may lead to controversies. This situation may involve accusations 
about the reasons for needing monetary support, and there may be conflicting 
ideas about ‘payback’, be it financial, or in terms of attention, compliant behav­
iour or subordination. 
It can be assumed that intergenerational family conflicts decrease over time.
In young adulthood, children have greater need to distance themselves from their 
parents, whereas this need may play a lesser role in later years, leading to less 
conflict. However, poor health is likely to create stressful situations, which bear 
the potential for discord between generations. As well as reducing life satisfac­
tion and thus increasing the potential for dispute amongst close family members, 
poor health can involve experiences of stress and strain, and also divergent 
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expectations as to how to handle the difficult situation. In this regard, help and 
care may also be a source of intergenerational discord in adulthood. The needs of 
the frail elderly may come up against the needs of adult children for autonomy. 
Role reversals of parent and child, new dependencies, contrasting definitions of 
the situation, its causes and consequences may all lead to family conflict. 
Regarding family structures, gender, partnership, (grand)children and siblings 
can be assumed to have an effect on intergenerational conflict. In accordance 
with the German study on family conflict mentioned above, daughters in particu­
lar could be expected to have disputes with parents more often, owing to their 
stronger involvement in family duties. 
Previous analyses have also shown long-term effects of parental divorce on 
intergenerational relationships with children in adulthood (e.g., Aquilino 1994a; 
Szydlik 2000, 2008a; Ahrons and Tanner 2003; Frank 2007; Bertogg and Szydlik 
2016). Divorcees may experience more discord even with parents, not least since 
‘habits and lifestyles’ seem to be a prominent conflict theme (Clarke et al. 1999). 
It also cannot be ruled out that greater demands for support to or from singles 
might put more strain on intergenerational relations. 
Having more children may increase the likelihood of disputes with one of 
them. The existence of grandchildren leads to contrasting hypotheses. On the one 
hand, grandchildren may lessen discord between parents and adult children since 
the middle generation is a likely ‘gatekeeper’ who grants or bars grandparents 
from access to their grandchildren. This may reduce grandparents’ readiness to 
engage in conflict with their adult children. The alleviating effect of grandchil­
dren on conflict between parents and grandparents may even be enhanced by the 
adult children’s need for their parents to care for their children, especially in order 
to reconcile parenthood and employment (Igel and Szydlik 2011; Igel 2012). On 
the other hand, grandchildren may be a reason for dispute between parents and 
grandparents with regard to different educational styles or different wishes as 
to the length of time grandparents and grandchildren are allowed or required to 
spend together. 
More siblings may reduce stress and strain with elderly parents, thus lead­
ing to less intergenerational dispute. However, competition amongst siblings may 
also enhance conflict. Again, it is an empirical question which of these divergent 
hypotheses dominates in reality. 
Last but not least, cultural-contextual structures are likely to affect intergenera­
tional controversy. Here, the special situation of migrants should not be neglected, 
including cultural norms and different adaptation, integration, assimilation, lan­
guage skills, discrepancies in education and divergent lifestyles of migrant par­
ents and children as well as disputes over staying in the host country or returning 
to the country of origin. 
Considerable effects of different welfare states cannot be ruled out either. It 
is one of the main assumptions of this book that welfare state regulations have 
strong consequences for intergenerational family bonds. The hypothesis reads as 
follows: Stronger welfare states that support families in many ways relieve par­
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the Northern European countries should show less family conflict, and this should 
also hold true for higher public expenditure. 
What about social stratification? The contrasting hypotheses regarding the impact
of income and prospective wealth on conflict can be extended to the general situation,
in terms of wealth and poverty in a country. Rich societies can generally be expected
to offer more financial security and thus less reason for discord. However, greater
wealth might also trigger more dispute within society and families. This could be
particularly true in the case of widespread poverty (see Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). 
Explaining conflict 
Questions 
International investigations of intergenerational family conflict are particularly 
scarce. It is difficult, if not impossible, to compare the empirical results of research 
on conflict that have been collected using different samples, procedures and sur­
vey questions. It is fortunate that the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe asks the same questions in all countries participating in the survey. 
SHARE collects information about conflict via a self-administered questionnaire 
(drop-off). After the interview, respondents are asked to fill out a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire on their own. The two conflict questions read as follows: 
There are sometimes important questions about which we have a disagree­
ment with persons close to us, and which therefore may lead to conflicts. 
Please tell us how often, if at all, you experience conflict with each of the 
following persons. (Please tick one box in each row). 





e) Other family members 
f) Friends, coworkers, acquaintances. 
The boxes for each of these are: Often – Sometimes – Rarely – Never – Does not apply. 
The next question follows the same logic: 
How often do you experience conflicts with your children or children-in­
law over the education and bringing up of your grandchild(ren)? (Please tick 
one box). 
With regard to intergenerational conflict with parents, only respondents with at 
least one living parent are considered. Correspondingly, in order to assess controversy 
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with adult children, these analyses focus on SHARE participants whose youngest 
child is at least 18 years old. 
Description 
Figure 5.1 offers a first overview of the answers of the respondents. Overall, 11 per 
cent report frequent conflict, 43 per cent occasional and 34 per cent rare disputes 
with at least one of the six groups of people. This already shows that frequent 
conflicts with another person are actually not very frequent. When one compares 
the six groups of people, most controversies occur with partners. However, only 6 
per cent of couples report continual disagreements, even if only respondents with 
partners are considered. 
What about family generations? Only 5 per cent of the adult children and 
parents speak of frequent conflict (the percentages for all parents with adult or 
underage children are the same). This is one of the most important results of this 
chapter. It shows that substantial intergenerational controversies are exceptionally 
rare. On the whole, generations do not quarrel and fight extensively. This result 
on the basis of SHARE is also supported by the previously mentioned analyses 
for Germany, according to which only 8 per cent of the 40–85 year olds report 
frequent conflict with older or younger family members. 
Figure 5.1 documents that there are more disagreements with adult children 
than with parents, which corresponds with the findings for contact and coresidence 
(Chapters 4 and 6). Spending a lot of time together could provide more opportu­
nity for disagreements, and older age may generally come with less inclination to 
engage in controversy; these hypotheses will be tested by further analyses. 
Common belief as well as jokes about parents-in-law seem to have only a weak 
foundation in reality, at least when considering the very low rate of 5 per cent of
the respondents reporting frequent conflict (here, only SHARE participants with at 
Figure 5.1 Conflict: Overview 
Source: SHARE (n: 23,870). 
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least one parent-in-law are included). All in all, there is more discord with parents 
than with parents-in-law. 
Interpersonal conflicts seem to emerge especially between close family
members. This supports the abovementioned interconnectedness between close­
ness and conflict (closeness-conflict hypothesis). ‘Other relatives’ can be avoided 
more easily, and there are presumably fewer occasions for dispute. In particular, 
quarrels with friends, coworkers and acquaintances occur less often than conflicts 
with partners, children and parents, and this is even more the case if we consider 
the number of people with whom a person could have conflict. 
The degree of discord with children or children-in-law over the education and 
upbringing of grandchildren is assessed for respondents with at least one grand­
child. Obviously, these conflicts are especially rare. As mentioned above, the 
gatekeeper position of the middle generation may lead grandparents to refrain 
from open arguments about educational styles, and dependence on grandparents 
in order to reconcile parenthood and employment may play a role as well. 
Figure 5.2 documents conflict frequencies with regard to education, income, 
gender and migration. The bars suggest no class-specific differences regard­
ing frequent or occasional controversy with parents, whereas the results on rare 
conflict point to somewhat more disputes among the higher classes. The better 
Figure 5.2 Conflict: People 
Source: SHARE (n: 5,686/20,371). 
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educated also report more occasional and rare discord with their offspring. One 
cannot rule out that these response patterns might be a result of members of the 
higher classes being somewhat more at ease in admitting disputes. Nonetheless, 
the results support the abovementioned hypothesis. 
Income shows a different picture. When the household is able to make ends 
meet (fairly) easily, there is considerably less intergenerational conflict. Nine per 
cent of the parents with low income speak of frequent disagreements with their 
adult children; the corresponding share for affluent parents is only 3 per cent. 
These results support the hypothesis that money reduces family arguments, or 
correspondingly, financial shortage puts a strain on intergenerational relations. 
The results on quarrels with parents tend to support the assumed gender differ­
ences, not least due to the kinkeeper role of women. However, these differences 
are not substantial, and the figure shows no gender gap in frequent or occasional 
disputes between the respondents and their children. 
Migrants show more frequent conflict with parents and more occasional dis­
putes with adult children. These results indicate an influence of transnational 
mobility on intergenerational family conflicts. According to Figure 5.2, moving 
to another country may increase discord between generations. Some of the possi­
ble reasons are different norms and lifestyles, difficult integration processes, and 
divergent prospects and goals between the generations. 
Figure 5.3 documents frequent, occasional and rare discord with parents and 
children in Northern, Western, Eastern and Southern Europe. The figure shows 
substantial differences. Overall, most controversies seem to occur in Western 
Europe. Considerably less conflict can be found in the north and the east. Only 
13 per cent of the Swedish and Danish respondents experience frequent or occa­
sional disputes with their parents. This applies to nearly every third respondent in 
Germany, which is even exceeded by Austria, Switzerland and Italy. 
A similar pattern exists with regard to the relationship of the respondents with 
their adult children: Swedish and Danish parents again have the lead when it 
comes to ‘harmonious’ intergenerational relations, and at least occasional conflict 
is especially pronounced in Austria, Switzerland and Italy. 
It is also noteworthy that the Eastern European generations seem to be excep­
tional in terms of intergenerational discord. This finding could be a consequence 
of close private relationships in former ‘socialist’ countries, where there was a 
comparatively large discrepancy between trusted family members and a suspect 
outside environment. The rapid changes in Eastern Europe may have also empha­
sised the importance of conflict-free family bonds. 
Furthermore, the results suggest influences of welfare states. Northern European 
countries with stronger welfare states seem to successfully unburden family mem­
bers of conflict-provoking stresses and strains. It is quite impressive that in those 
countries that offer relatively generous social benefits, clashes between parents 
and children are kept within even closer bounds. There may also be considerable 
effects associated with social stratification. 
However, it is quite a risky endeavour to engage in extensive interpretations 
on the basis of the descriptive results considered so far. It has to be assessed 
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Figure 5.3 Conflict: Countries 
Source: SHARE (n: 5,686/20,371). 
whether a whole number of possible factors, reflecting individual opportunities 
and needs as well as family and cultural structures, have a significant impact on 
intergenerational controversy. This also applies to the question of whether edu­
cation, income, gender and migration differences still hold under simultaneous 
consideration of other relevant factors. Moreover, we need to conduct further 
examinations employing suitable macro indicators. 
Explanation 
Figure 5.4, which draws on Table A5.2 (see Appendix), provides a summary of 
the corresponding multilevel multivariate analyses: ‘’ signifies higher conflict 
rates, whereas the ‘–’ sign indicates fewer controversies between adult family 
generations. As in the other chapters of this book, the signs refer to the net effects 
including the first macro indicator. 
Clearly, opportunity structures play a relevant role when it comes to family 
conflict. The higher-educated classes report more intergenerational controversy 
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income, contact and financial support. These results support the hypothesis that 
a better education, which is associated with less dependence on intergenerational 
solidarity, offers more opportunity to risk discord. This may also lead to divergent 
discussion and conflict styles between educational classes. 
In comparison with educational class, the current income situation shows a 
different pattern. Here it is not affluent parents who report more conflict with 
children, but the other way around: a difficult financial situation leads to more 
dispute, indicating the impact of stresses and strains. If the household has dif­
ficulty in making ends meet, we observe more intergenerational controversy. A 
favourable financial situation gives less reason for quarrels and fights, and parents 
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Interestingly, income- and education-related differences in intergenerational 
controversy pertain to relationships with (younger) adult children and not to
relationships with (elderly) parents. 
Respondents who are more likely to receive a future inheritance report more 
quarrels with their parents. The situation is similar with regard to controversy 
with their children if the respondents perceive a good chance of leaving an inherit­
ance, including property and other valuables. This result is again more in line with 
the effect of education, indicating that people with more resources are rather more 
likely to risk dispute and engage in controversy. 
The contact-conflict hypothesis is confirmed by the multivariate analyses. The 
empirical results suggest a twofold picture. Daily contact leads to more discord. 
However, frequent strife diminishes intergenerational cohesion. On the one hand, 
especially close relationships, which are marked by daily contact, are associated 
with a significantly higher degree of controversy. On the other hand, being in 
significant conflict with one another often leads to less contact. The conflicting 
parties seem to reduce their time together. In fact, this is one of the most notable 
effects found by the empirical investigation. 
Regarding need structures, four potential factors are investigated: money, age, 
health and time. There are no significant conflicts in cases in which the respond­
ents have given their parents financial support of at least 250 € during the previous 
year. However, when their children are the recipients, intergenerational tension 
increases considerably. This finding underlines the argument that monetary inde­
pendence is a prerequisite of less conflict-laden relationships. When children are 
in lesser need of money, there is less discord with parents. 
Conversely, age decreases clashes with other generations. This is an indica­
tion that people have less desire to engage in controversy as they become older. 
The results suggest that younger people are more conflict-prone. However, poor 
health increases intergenerational controversy. Respondents with good or excellent
health report less conflict with parents and children. This finding suggests that the 
greater needs of family members who are in poor health often inflict stress and 
strain on intergenerational relationships. This becomes especially apparent when 
the respondents provide help or care to their elderly parents. There is a wide range 
of possible conflict themes, including ensuring that the elderly take medication, 
elderly parents who do not want to accept support or demand attention day and 
night, intimate care, the needs of the helpers and carers, overstressing and reversal 
of roles (i.e., when children have to take responsibility for their parents). 
The results regarding family structures also support this interpretation. The fre­
quency of quarrelling with adult children does not seem to be different for mothers 
and fathers. However, when we turn to the relationships with elderly parents, it is 
daughters in particular who talk of controversies. Women’s greater involvement 
in family tasks, including serving as kinkeeper and caregiver, is understandably 
associated with somewhat more frequent conflict. 
In contrast to married couples, singles are more often in dispute with their 
parents (the corresponding effect for singles with regard to their children is only 
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disapproval of their child’s lifestyle and adult children’s or parents’ greater 
demands towards the other generation. This may also apply to some divorcees, 
at least according to a weakly significant effect for conflict with parents (see 
Appendix, Table A5.2). 
Furthermore, the number of children, grandchildren and siblings plays a 
significant role in the level of intergenerational discord. The more children the 
respondents have, the more likely they are to be in conflict with at least one of 
them. In contrast, the existence of grandchildren significantly decreases quarrels 
between family generations. Having a grandchild (and thus living in a four-
generation family) seems to reduce disputes between respondents and their parents, 
possibly via focusing on the (great-)grandchild. This applies even more so to the 
respondents’ relationship with their adult children. It is possible that grandparents 
refrain from starting arguments with their adult children in view of the gatekeeper 
position of the middle generation. Conversely, potential dependence on (grand) 
parents caring for grandchildren in order to help their children reconcile parent­
hood and employment might reduce the middle generation’s willingness to argue 
with their parents as well. Beyond that, having more siblings also reduces the 
probability of discord with parents. One possible reason is a less stressful indi­
vidual adult child-parent relationship due to the shared responsibility of siblings 
for their elderly parents. 
Of further importance are cultural-contextual structures. Migrants do not seem 
to differ from the native population with regard to controversies with parents. 
However, there are considerable discrepancies when it comes to their relationship 
with their adult children. The analyses show that migrants report discord with 
their offspring relatively often. The conflict themes may be different norms, life­
styles and integration into the host society, which may separate migrant parents 
from the ‘second generation’. Moreover, disadvantages in education, the labour 
market and societal participation, including discrimination, may also put stresses 
and strains on intergenerational family relationships. 
Last but not least, the investigation addresses influences of the four macro indi­
cators (Figure 2.3), considering differences in welfare state regulation and social
stratification. On the whole, the analyses support the hypothesis that stronger welfare
states lead to less intergenerational controversy. This is not the case when observing
the respondents’ relationships with their adult children in the light of social expendi­
ture. However, this macro indicator only provides a rather general view of welfare
states that comprises many different forms of social support (see Appendix, Table
A3), and it also shows considerably less discord with regard to parents. More impor­
tantly, both for parents and children, the more specific indicator of family expenditure
is clearly associated with fewer disputes. Higher public expenditure on families 
corresponds with less intergenerational quarrel. This is an empirical indication of
strong welfare states relieving families of the intense burdens that fuel conflict. 
Most interestingly, both macro indicators of social stratification point to more 
conflict. Greater wealth per capita is associated with more intergenerational dis­
cord, with regard to both parents and children. This result supports the assumption 
that rich societies offer more reason for intergenerational dispute. This line of 
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reasoning could lead us to expect that a huge poverty rate would result in less 
conflict between family members. Yet the opposite is the case. More poverty is 
associated with more discord. An obvious explanation is that living in difficult 
circumstances puts more stress and strain on family members, which again leads 
to more intergenerational conflict. 
Summary 
Audiences – and thus the media, publishing houses and the film industry – prefer 
stories involving conflict. It is therefore not surprising to find a wealth of news­
paper articles, books and films that paint a picture of discord and dispute. The 
general topic of generations is no exception in this respect. In fact, some generation 
concepts are actually based on controversy among age groups, cohorts or social 
generations – even to the point of propagating a ‘battle’ or a ‘war of generations’. 
Against this background, one of the main findings of this chapter might be 
disappointing. In fact, all over Europe only a fraction of adult family generations 
mention frequent struggle with one another. Five per cent speak of frequent con­
flict with their parents or adult children, whereas 95 per cent do not. Obviously, 
pronounced conflicts are rare. Only if we add occasional discord do we find that 
a little more than one-third of the respondents are often or sometimes in dispute 
with an adult child, and nearly three in ten frequently or occasionally quarrel 
with a parent. Moreover, when it comes to considerable controversy, it is mainly 
amongst close family members. After disputes with partners, conflict with chil­
dren and parents comes in second and third place. 
Figure 2.1 and Table 3.1 have already indicated that solidarity and conflict are 
not necessarily opposites. In fact, particularly strong solidarity amongst adult fam­
ily generations is also associated with relatively frequent discord: generations with 
daily contact experience more conflict. Also, disputes within (intergenerational) 
relationships are not necessarily negative. It is possible that candid discussions 
contribute more to sustaining than destroying the relationship. However, it also 
has to be noted that more discord often results in less cohesion. More contact may 
mean more conflict, but more conflict may also lead to less contact. 
What are reasons for disputes and fights? Again, opportunities and needs 
as well as family and cultural-contextual structures play a crucial role. On the 
one hand, more resources come with more disputes. This applies especially to 
education and wealth. Better-educated parents and those who expect to leave 
an inheritance report more frequent controversy with their offspring. Economic 
power, via the independence it offers, seems to increase the readiness to risk dis­
cord. On the other hand, intergenerational conflict is often based on stresses and 
strains. Low income leads to more dispute. Financial transfers to adult children 
are likely to come with more controversy, too. This also applies to help and care 
for elderly parents. In other words, when adult children need money and parents 
need time, intergenerational conflict is much more likely to occur. 
Poor health also tends to increase the frequency of discord with both parents 
and children. Singles mention having more frequent arguments with parents.
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One explanation for this is greater strain due to heightened demands for intergen­
erational support. Migrants experience more conflict with their adult children, 
suggesting some degree of ‘drifting apart’ between migrant parents and their chil­
dren due to different contexts in the home and host countries as well as the impact 
of the strains that come with migration. 
Consistent with these results is that intergenerational family discord is
especially prominent in weak welfare states. The more public expenditure is spent 
on families, the less frequent are quarrels and fights between family generations. 
This leads to the conclusion that welfare states relieve families of excessive burdens, 
which in turn reduces intergenerational conflict. 
Wealth and poverty in a society have a huge influence, too. More wealth per 
capita is associated with more family discord. Apparently, richer societies offer 
more reason for intergenerational controversy. A greater abundance of material 
resources in a country does not generally lead to more harmony between family 
members. However, poverty also increases discord. Stresses and strains on indi­
viduals, families and societies at large contribute to more conflict between adult 




Living within the same four walls is an especially intense form of relationship for 
adult family generations. Living together means seeing and talking to one another 
every day, sharing the same bathroom and kitchen, negotiating basic tasks such 
as shopping for groceries, cooking, doing the laundry or repair work and possibly 
paying bills. Adult children and parents living together ultimately also means that 
it is adult individuals who are living together. These individuals typically have 
a (life)long history with one another – a history that is characterised by a for­
merly great responsibility and dominance on one side of this relationship and total 
dependency on the other. In the present, the adult children encounter parents who 
once cared for them in infancy, whose authority they were subject to whilst they 
were young, and with whom they probably have not only shared many pleasur­
able moments but also less harmonious times, for instance, during puberty. 
This special situation of still living in the same household as adults is embedded 
in a societal context that harbours other expectations. At some point in life, adult 
children are supposed to move out of their parents’ home (‘Hotel Mum’) and find 
their own space. This general norm is also accompanied by the desire of grown-
ups to stand on their own feet and no longer live in their old children’s room in 
adulthood. Moreover, as we have just seen in the previous chapter, daily contact 
of adult family generations tends to increase intergenerational conflict. Living in 
the same household, sharing space and hence being in a situation that contradicts 
general norms might fuel dispute and motivate both parties to consider changing 
the situation. At least with a twinkle in the eye, authors of guidebooks aim at this 
potential target audience by offering titles such as Still in Their Children’s Room 
at Thirty – How to Get Rid of Nestlings Before It Is Too Late (Meinert 1996). 
Considering people’s preferences and social norms, one might expect very low 
numbers of adult children and parents to be sharing the same household. However, 
coresidence also has its advantages. It helps with pooling resources and saving costs; 
it provides opportunities for (mutual) intergenerational help and contact within 
close reach and without having to spend time bridging spatial distances; it offers 
young adult children the opportunity to continue to receive attention and support 
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It is therefore, first and foremost, an empirical question whether generations 
live together or run separate households instead. Another question that needs to 
be addressed is the reasons for coresidence and whether there are significant dif­
ferences in the individual opportunities and needs, family contexts and societal 
conditions that account for sharing space. Why do adult generations live together? 
Who does and who does not? In the event that parents and adult children do live 
together, do they typically live in the parental home, or is it the other way around? 
Do adult children and parents really choose to coreside, or is it out of necessity? 
From an international perspective it is furthermore crucial to learn more about 
country-specific differences in terms of welfare states and social stratification. 
In addition, there is good reason to also consider ‘near coresidence’. This per­
tains to generations who do not live in the same household but in the same house. 
Here the question is whether these adult children and parents are similar to coresi­
dent generations, or whether they resemble those who live in separate places. 
This chapter is structured in the same way as the other empirical chapters
comprising multivariate analyses. First, different forms of (near) coresidence
are discussed, arguing additionally for the benefits of distinguishing between
individuals and dyads. The next step is to briefly review previous research. In
order to link theoretical reasoning, previous research and the empirical inves­
tigations presented below, a number of hypotheses will be developed. After
documenting the wording of the corresponding questions in the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, the chapter goes on to give descrip­
tive information on (near) coresidence. Since this is the first chapter to address
functional solidarity, it provides some additional comparative information on
space, money and time. A differentiation is made between population groups and
countries, coresidence and near coresidence as well as between individuals and 
dyads. The analyses performed to explain (near) coresidence are presented, and the
main results summarised. 
Research and hypotheses 
What is (near) coresidence? 
Coresidence of parents and adult children comprises various forms according to
whether the generations have stayed or moved. There are adult children who have
never left their parents’ home, and who might be called ‘stay-at-homes’ or ‘nest­
lings’. ‘Boomerang kids’, for example, return to their parents’ home after job loss
or divorce. Elderly parents, for instance, may move into their adult children’s home
when caring for grandchildren or when needing care due to old age. After living in
separate places, offspring and parents may both decide to move into a shared home. 
Furthermore, it is helpful to distinguish between coresidence in the strict sense, 
meaning sharing the same household, and near coresidence, which refers to liv­
ing in separate apartments in the same house (Kohli et al. 2000b: 186; Isengard 
and Szydlik 2012). Near coresidence provides an additional perspective to con­
sider family generations who live under the same roof without sharing the same 
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rooms. Such an arrangement can take a number of different forms within a fam­
ily-, owner-occupied or tenant-occupied house, which to a greater or lesser extent 
reflect a similar situation as the case of strict coresidence. For example, adult 
children can just move from their former children’s room into a small flat in 
their parents’ house (e.g., in the attic), or into a rented apartment of their own 
within the same tenant-occupied house. An adult child can also return to a sepa­
rate apartment in the parents’ house after having lived independently somewhere 
else for a period of time. Conversely, elderly parents might move into a child’s 
house, including cases in which an adult child has built a new family home with 
a ‘granny flat’. Near coresidence can also occur when adult children and parents 
move into separate rental or owner-occupied units within the same building. 
Whatever the case may be, for empirical investigations it is necessary to clearly 
define what is meant by (near) coresidence. The coresidence rates observed will 
depend on this definition. Including near coresidence will obviously result in 
higher rates. At the same time, one might not necessarily find the same patterns 
when looking at parents and adult children living within the same four walls ver­
sus living in separate apartments under the same roof. 
It also makes sense to clearly distinguish coresidence rates for respondents 
and dyads since parents might have both coresident and non-coresident children. 
Asking how many parents live together with at least one adult child results in 
higher rates than asking how many parent-adult child relationships are marked by 
coresidence. Having one child at home and another child elsewhere amounts to a 
coresidence rate of 100 per cent at the individual level but only to a 50 per cent 
rate if we refer to parent-child dyads. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 consider both perspec­
tives, whereas the multivariate analyses are based on dyads. 
Research 
The first public release of SHARE data (the first wave in ten countries) shows 
42 per cent of parents with at least one child living in the same building (Hank 
2007). The highest rates (around 60%) are found in Italy, Greece and Spain, the 
lowest shares in Denmark and Sweden (17%). In a study on living distances in 
Europe, Isengard (2013: 249) documents, on the basis of the second SHARE 
wave, that around a fifth of parent-adult child relationships (dyads) are marked 
by coresidence in the sense of living in the same household – with large discrep­
ancies between countries. Coresidence is much more prevalent in Southern and 
Eastern Europe, whereas relatively few adult generations live together in the north 
(for similar results on the basis of the first SHARE wave, see also Isengard and 
Szydlik 2012). 
In regard to resources, Fingerman et al. (2015) find for Philadelphia (United 
States) that adult children of higher-educated parents are less likely to coreside 
with them. This is in line with Goldscheider and DaVanzo (1989), who document 
that a high family income is more likely to lead to young adult children moving 
out of the parental home, suggesting that the financial resources of parents might 
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Nevertheless, Angelini and Laferrère (2013: 417) also show that ‘[a] more com­
fortable, less crowded home or which provides more privacy is left later.’ 
Previous investigations indicate that in many cases adult children and parents 
sharing the same space is the result of the economic needs of the child, for exam­
ple, a difficult income or employment situation (e.g., Norris and Tindale 1994; 
Aassve et al. 2002; Blanc and Wolff 2006; Sandberg-Thoma et al. 2015). Ward 
et al. (1992) find for the United States that the needs of adult children are primar­
ily crucial here. This is in line with the finding that coresidence applies to young 
adult children in particular, which speaks in favour of adopting a life course per­
spective with regard to crucial transitions such as moving out of the parents’ home 
(e.g., White 1994; König 2016). Research also suggests that not only the needs 
of children, but also those of parents, such as needs related to health issues, can 
motivate intergenerational coresidence (e.g., Lee and Dwyer 1996; Choi 2003; 
Smits et al. 2010; Seltzer and Friedman 2014). 
In contrast to daughters, sons tend to stay longer in their parents’ home (e.g., 
Billari et al. 2001: 345), indicating more frequent intergenerational coresidence 
among parents with male offspring. Aquilino (1990) points out that most coresi­
dent adult generations live in the parents’ home and the marital status of children 
is the most important factor to account for this. Similarly, White and Peterson 
(1995) report that divorced and, in particular, never-married children are much 
more likely to live with their parents. 
The aforementioned differences between European regions are also found
in other studies. Cordón (1997) documents that young adults in Southern
European countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) are considerably more likely to
still live with their parents than their counterparts in France, Germany and the
United Kingdom. This is in accordance with Billari et al. (2001), who report a
substantial share of early move-outs among young adults in Northern Europe,
in contrast to the rather late leavers of the parental home in the south (for a thor­
ough analysis on home-leaving patterns of young adults in West Germany and
Italy, see Rusconi 2006 and Rossi 1997). In a qualitative study of Italian and
German university students and their parents (43 participants), Luetzelberger
(2014) finds divergent normative patterns: Italians seem to adhere to interde­
pendence of family members, whereas the German participants in this study
favour independence of young adults (for a qualitative study on delayed home-
leaving in Spain, see Holdsworth 2005). 
Further investigations (Isengard and Szydlik 2012) indicate that country-
specific characteristics play a crucial role: greater public expenditure is associated 
with fewer adult generations sharing the same space. By contrast, the higher the 
poverty rate in a country, the more coresidence. 
Hypotheses 
Again, the hypotheses are developed on the basis of the ONFC model, which
differentiates between characteristics of individuals, families and societies
(Figure 2.2). 
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Regarding opportunity structures, education is likely to be a relevant factor, 
even though there might be opposite influences at work here. On the one hand, 
upper-class parents are likely to have adult children with longer educational 
phases – not least due to university studies – which postpones moving out and 
thus increases intergenerational coresidence. On the other hand, the higher edu­
cational classes have better opportunities in the labour and housing market (for 
example, better-off parents can grant a guarantee for their children) and display 
greater geographical mobility, both of which favour less coresidence. Here again, 
empirical investigations need to establish which of the hypotheses is a more accu­
rate account of reality. 
Income can be a crucial resource for fulfilling people’s wishes and desires. If 
parents would like to keep their children at home as long as possible, they might 
provide financial support to prevent their offspring from moving out. However, 
if parents and adult children would prefer to live in their own places, we might 
observe the opposite resource effect. In this case, more money could lead to less 
coresidence, for instance, when parents use their money to find – and pay for –
a separate place for their adult children. According to the results on conflict 
in the case of daily contact and in line with notions of ‘intimacy at a distance’ 
(Rosenmayr and Köckeis 1961, 1963) and ‘inner closeness through outer dis­
tance’ (Tartler 1961), one can assume that adult generations rather prefer to live 
within their own four walls, which in turn would mean that money offers the 
opportunity to fulfil that wish. 
Parents living in a large home have more available space that they can offer to 
an adult child. At the very least, there is less pressure to find space elsewhere, be 
it within the same or in a different house. 
In line with the abovementioned studies, one can expect the following investi­
gations to attest to the (great) relevance of need structures. This applies particu­
larly to the needs of the adult children with regard to their vocational situation. 
Still being in education is likely to be associated with a higher rate of young adults 
still living in their parents’ home. Unemployment might be another factor imply­
ing the need for parental support in terms of providing living space. Also, age of 
the child could play a role inasmuch as younger adult children, in general, are still 
in greater need of functional solidarity from their parents. 
However, when observing needs, we should not direct our attention to children 
only. Parents may also find themselves in situations where they need support from 
their offspring. This applies particularly to health problems. Thus, it should be 
especially interesting to see whether parents reporting poor health are more likely 
to live together – or at least within the same house – with an adult child. 
Family structures are likely to influence intergenerational (near) coresidence 
as well. On the one hand, one might assume that mothers and daughters are more 
inclined to live together, since they show the closest intergenerational bonds. On 
the other hand, the research cited above suggests that it is sons in particular who 
tend to be stay-at-homes. If gender differences in coresidence reflect certain time 
patterns of moving out of the parental home, one can in fact expect later home-
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in partnership. Since women tend to enter into a partnership at a younger age, 
they are likely to move out of the parental home at an earlier point in time, which 
should reduce the rate of daughters still living with their parents in comparison 
to sons. 
The aforementioned research further suggests that single children are more 
likely to live with their parents. Conversely, living with a partner, and especially 
marriage, should entail a higher rate of moving out of the parental home. Another 
interesting case is divorced children. Do divorced children really tend to become 
boomerang kids once their marriage is over? 
From the point of view of parents, the number of children may have an influ­
ence too. The obvious hypothesis is that having more children tends to reduce 
the likelihood of intergenerational coresidence with each child. Their children 
having children could be another significant factor. Here we could expect to find 
two opposite influences. On the one hand, starting a family of their own should 
increase the willingness of adult children to leave their parents’ home. On the 
other hand, adult children who are parents themselves might be interested in hav­
ing their own parents around, especially to provide grandchild care and thereby 
ease the burden of raising a child, not least in order to reconcile parenthood and 
employment (Igel and Szydlik 2011; Igel 2012). Once more, it should be interest­
ing to compare coresidence and near coresidence. 
When considering cultural-contextual structures, migration is likely to play a rel­
evant role (e.g., Smits et al. 2010; Isengard and Szydlik 2012). Cultural background
may lead to more intergenerational (near) coresidence among migrant parents and
their adult children. Discrepancies between home and host countries as well as dif­
ficult integration processes – according to the ‘safe haven’ hypothesis – also suggest
that migrant families show more (near) coresidence (see Chapter 4). 
In accordance with previous results, the following analyses are likely to attest 
to considerably higher rates of coresidence in the south and east of Europe. If 
adult generations prefer to live close by, albeit in different homes, a stronger wel­
fare state could result in fewer parents and adult children living together. In this 
perspective, lower social and family expenditure is likely to be associated with 
more intergenerational coresidence. 
What impact does social stratification have here? If the general hypothesis 
turns out to be true, namely that the generations would prefer not to share the same 
four walls, more wealth should be associated with less coresidence – and more 
poverty should result in more adult children living with their parents. 
Explaining space 
Questions 
SHARE asks the respondents a considerable number of questions about their off­
spring, including the number of children, whether they are natural/step/adopted/ 
foster children, their gender, year of birth, geographical distance, marital and part­
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out of the parental household, their employment status, education and the exist­
ence of grandchildren. This set of questions begins by asking the following: 
Now I will ask some questions about your children. How many children do 
you have that are still alive? (. . .) 
We would like to know more about [this child/these children]. Let us begin 
with the oldest child. What is the first name of your [1st/2nd/3rd . . .] child? 
Later on, the survey enquires about geographical proximity in the following way: 
Where does [{child name}] live? 
1. 	 In the same household 
2. 	 In the same building
 
 (. . .)
 
Since this chapter investigates (near) coresidence, the focus is on the first two cate­
gories of this latter SHARE question, differentiating between parents (respondents) 
with adult children in the same household, or in different units within the same 
building. The other categories of this question refer to the distance of children living 
further away (1, 5, 25, 100 and 500 kilometres), ranging from ‘Less than 1 kilometre 
away’ to ‘More than 500 kilometres away in another country’. More information on 
geographical distance can be found in Figure 3.3 as well as in Isengard 2013. 
Description 
First, one needs to bear in mind that coresidence of the respondents with their 
parents is very rare. Less than 1 per cent of those aged 50 with at least one living 
parent share the same household, and no more than 6 per cent reside in the same 
building (Figure 3.3). Were we to take all SHARE participants as the baseline, 
including those with deceased parents, we would arrive at even much smaller 
numbers. Instead, the following analyses refer to respondents living with adult 
children. Among this group, one finds impressively high rates of sharing the same 
household or building. 
Since this is the first chapter investigating factors of functional solidarity, 
Figure 6.1 provides a first summarised comparison of space, money and time. 
The figure documents how many parent-adult child relationships are marked by 
sharing the same household, transferring money or providing help or care during 
the last twelve months – in reference to the age of the adult child. 
The figure suggests that the needs of adult children play a prominent role,
and this applies particularly to intergenerational coresidence. From age 33
onwards, the space curve approximates the curves for money and time, and
shows no distinct amplitudes thereafter. However, when the child is between
the ages of 18 and 25, no other form of functional solidarity is as frequent as the




Figure 6.1 Space: Overview 
Source: SHARE (n: 76,847). Parent (respondent)-adult child dyads. Space: coresidence. Money and 
time: no coresidence. 
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in fact primarily adult children living with their parents and not vice versa. The
older the young adults become, the more likely they are to leave their parents’
home and move into their own places. 
The money curve shows a somewhat similar pattern – however, on a much 
lower scale. Nevertheless, looking ahead to the chapter on money, we can expect 
monetary transfers from parents to adult children to reflect the children’s economic 
needs, at least to a considerable extent. As offspring grow older, intergenerational 
transfers stabilise at a lower, although still relevant, level. According to the figure, 
time transfers between parents and non-coresident adult children do not seem to 
follow a pattern related to the age of the offspring. 
As mentioned above, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 distinguish between two perspec­
tives. The first perspective centres on parents (respondents) who have at least 
one adult child living in the same house(hold). Such a focus leads to fewer cases 
but higher shares of (near) coresidence, since siblings of (near) coresident adult 
children who have left their parents’ house(hold) are not considered. The second 
perspective takes all adult children into account, which leads to more observations 
but relatively fewer (near) coresident parent-adult child dyads. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates that nearly a third of the parents live with at least one 
adult child. If we include near coresidence, 39 per cent have a daughter or a son in 
the same building (see Figure 3.3). These percentages attest to the great relevance 
of intergenerational coresidence in Europe. In fact, the rates are impressively 
high, especially considering the general norm that adult children should move out 
of their parents’ home sooner rather than later. 
The figure also provides first insights into reasons for sharing the same living 
space, which are related to differences in terms of education, income, gender 
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Figure 6.2 Space: People 
Source: SHARE (n: 34,483/76,909). 
and migration. Better-educated parents show somewhat lower rates of (near) 
coresidence with adult children, indicating higher mobility rates of the upper-
educational classes. Larger discrepancies exist between income groups, suggesting 
that economic necessity is a crucial reason for adult family generations to share 
the same household. Less than a fifth of well-to-do parents live with an adult 
child, whereas this applies to more than twice as many of those whose house­
hold has great difficulty in making ends meet. As opposed to income, differences 
related to parents’ gender or to parents having migrated, or not, are rather small. 
As expected, the percentages in the right part of Figure 6.2 are lower than those 
considering (near) coresidence with at least one adult child. Nevertheless, they are 
still impressive: 18 per cent of adult generations share a household, and 23 per 
cent live under the same roof. All in all, the differences between population groups 
point in the same direction as in the left part of the figure. This applies especially to 
the relation between financial resources and space, which is reflected in the coresi­
dence patterns of income groups. If the parental household is able to make ends 
meet (fairly) easily, adult children seem to move out considerably earlier. Poorer 
parents have more stay-at-homes. The descriptive results also suggest that sons 
tend to move out later than daughters, and there seems to be a somewhat higher rate 
of coresidence among the native population. 
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Figure 6.3 Space: Countries 
Source: SHARE (n: 34,483/76,909). 
Figure 6.3 gives information on countries. The discrepancies are even more 
pronounced than those between the population groups. The focus on parents 
living with at least one adult child produces the following results: in Northern 
Europe the coresidence rate is about one in ten; whereas in Poland, Italy and Spain 
it nearly reaches an extraordinary 50 per cent. Adult generations living together 
varies extremely according to country and region. 
Focusing on the relationships of the respondents with all their adult children 
confirms that the most striking differences are observed when comparing coun­
tries. In Northern Europe, (near) coresidence is extremely rare, but it is very 
frequent in the south and in Poland. The share of adult generations living within 
the same four walls in Italy, Spain and Greece is around 30 per cent. This applies 
only to one in twenty dyads in Sweden and Denmark. 
Furthermore, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate that sharing the same household 
is much more widespread than living in different units in the same building. Near 
coresidence is considerably more pronounced in Central and Southern Europe. 
In the north, by contrast, it is nearly non-existent. There, adult children not only 
seem to leave the parental household quite early, but are also less likely to live in 
very close proximity to their parents. 
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children. 
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Explanation 
Figure 6.4 summarises the net coefficients of Table A6.2 (see Appendix), where 
‘’ signifies higher probabilities of (near) coresidence and ‘’ indicates fewer 
adult generations living in the same household or house. All three alternatives will 
be considered, namely coresidence, near coresidence and living in separate build­
ings, of which the latter category represents the reference group. 
With regard to opportunity structures, the higher educational classes show less 
(near) coresidence when the children’s age is taken into account. This supports the 
hypothesis that adult generations prefer to live in separate households, if resources 
permit. Since more education generally leads to better opportunities in the labour 
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and housing market, these resources are used to support the preferred way of liv­
ing; this includes parents helping their adult children to live in a place of their 
own. Furthermore, higher education is often associated with greater geographical 
mobility, which in turn significantly increases spatial separation of family genera­
tions, and thus entails less opportunity for living in the same building, let alone the 
same household (see Figure 3.3). 
The negative income effect is another sign that adult family generations do not 
really prefer to coreside. When the household is able to make ends meet (fairly) 
easily, parents and adult children are less likely to live within the same four walls. 
This is a further indication that resourceful parents support their children in mov­
ing out and finding their own place. In any case, since separate housing is more 
expensive than living together, parents’ financial resources can play an important 
role when it comes to securing the means for adult offspring to live in a place of 
their own. Accordingly, financial transfers from parents to non-coresident children
will be addressed in the next chapter. 
The number of rooms in the parental household offers more or less opportunity 
for parents and adult children to live in the same residence: the more rooms, the 
more coresidence. Restricted space naturally reduces the opportunity for adult 
generations to share the same four walls. With regard to near coresidence, the 
results point in the opposite direction. There are a number of possible reasons 
for this. If there is sufficient room, parents and adult children might choose to 
live together in order to minimise costs. Another factor could be that a larger 
household might leave less available space for a second apartment in the same 
(single-family) house, which reduces the opportunity for near coresidence. Living 
in a spacious home might also be an indication of parental wealth, which provides 
the opportunity for adult children to live in a place of their own outside the paren­
tal house. Conversely, near coresidence is more likely when the parents’ residence 
is too small to house both generations. 
When assessing need structures, it is of the utmost importance to address the 
employment situation and age of the adult child. In accordance with previous 
research, the analyses show that still being in education leads many adult children 
to live with their parent(s). This applies to both coresidence and near coresidence. 
Obviously, the children’s needs are especially relevant here. Once the adult child 
has gained employment, that child is likely to move out of the parental home. 
The discrepancy between being in education and being unemployed or not in the 
workforce is much less pronounced. An explanation for this is that once adult 
children have moved out upon entering full-time or part-time employment, a 
return to the parental home in the case of no employment is not the rule but is still 
possible, which indicates some support for ‘boomerang kids’. 
At the same time, the adult child’s age is of great significance too. Interge­
nerational coresidence is mostly a matter for young adults, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Once children grow older, they tend to find their own place. 
Of course, the need for solidarity is not limited to children. Parents in poor 
health are frequently in need of support as well. The analyses show that these parents 
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it in the form of coresidence (controlling for children’s age) or near coresidence. 
Either the children of parents in poor health refrain from moving away, or the 
child takes in (or moves to) the frail elderly parent. 
Family structures: Although the women in the family tend to have the
closest bonds, this does not extend to intergenerational coresidence. More fre­
quently, nestlings are male. When observing family generations still living in
the same house(hold), we are more often looking at sons. A reason for this is the
different age of women and men when entering a partnership and thus leaving
the parental home. 
This explanation corresponds with the finding that the child’s family status is 
even more important in explaining intergenerational coresidence than employ­
ment. Again, we observe that intergenerational coresidence is mainly due to 
the situation of the adult child. Being single increases the likelihood of living 
with one’s parents immensely, whereas living with a partner or spouse decreases 
intergenerational coresidence dramatically. Most interestingly, the discrepancies 
between singles on the one hand, and divorced or widowed children on the other, 
are rather less pronounced, though still very clear. Once an adult child has left the 
parental home in the wake of marriage, returning does not seem to be the general 
rule. However, the smaller effect does support the notion that after the dissolution 
of marriage – be it due to divorce or widowhood – some children indeed become 
boomerang kids. The results for near coresidence are again less pronounced, but 
clearly point in the same direction. 
From the parent’s perspective, the number of children (i.e., siblings from their 
adult children’s standpoint) plays a significant role, too. Parents with more chil­
dren reduces the likelihood for each child of living with their parents, especially 
considering the general trend and cultural norm to leave the parental home at 
some point in time, and also taking into account that once children have become 
adults, they are likely to need more space. 
Coresidence is also less likely once the adult child has become a parent (i.e., 
grandparent from the respondent’s perspective). That said, it is an interesting 
observation that this does not apply to living in separate apartments within the 
same building. The presence of a third generation even leads to more instances 
of the first and second generations living under the same roof, after the child’s 
family status is taken into consideration. Living in close proximity enhances the 
opportunity for frequent contact, which benefits grandparents who are drawn to 
their grandchildren, and vice versa. The middle generation may also profit from 
grandparents living close by and looking after their (grand)children, not least 
in order to successfully reconcile the demands of parenthood and employment. 
Possibly, the existence of grandchildren initially motivates grandparents to move 
into the close vicinity of their adult children, and later on, some of these (grand) 
parents will be cared for by their offspring as their health deteriorates. 
Cultural-contextual structures are of great significance as well. Migrants 
show more (near) coresidence, which underlines the importance of cultural back­
ground and of facing an often difficult situation in the host country, including in 
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hypothesis insofar as close family members serve as a refuge in the face of a
difficult environment. 
The macro indicators assess the importance of welfare states and social stratifi­
cation. The stronger the welfare state, the less coresidence. Higher social and family
expenditure is associated with considerably fewer parents and adult children living
in the same household. When the child’s family status is taken into consideration,
the result for social expenditure with regard to near coresidence does not support
this same relationship. However, near coresidence is a less intense form of living
together, and ‘social expenditure’ reflects total public spending over a whole range
of social policy areas, for example, support in old age, for survivors, disability,
families, active labour market programmes and housing (see Appendix, Table A3).
By contrast, the expenditure that specifically addresses families is associated with
considerably less (near) coresidence. 
This result supports the so-called ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis, which predicts 
that more public expenditure will lead to a ‘retreat’ of the family. However, the 
empirical evidence also confirms the necessity hypothesis: given that adult family 
members would generally prefer to live in their own households, a weak welfare 
state leads people to forgo or at least delay their wish for spatial independence. 
This interpretation is also supported by the two following results. The more 
wealth in a country, the less (near) coresidence. When considerable resources 
are available, fewer parents and adult children need to share the same place. By 
contrast, a huge poverty rate significantly increases the rates of adult family gen­
erations living in the same household or building. 
Additional analyses with a further macro indicator also show that high youth 
unemployment rates are associated with more adult children and parents living 
together, which again underlines that (a) in societies characterised by difficult 
economic situations, family solidarity steps in, and (b) that, for a majority of the 
population, permanent coresidence of adult family generations is a living arrange­
ment born out of necessity rather than preference. 
Summary 
Living together in the same home is a special form of family life. Parents and chil­
dren sleeping next door, using the same bathroom and kitchen, sharing the same 
dining room, seeing and talking to one another several times every day – all this 
is a scenario that tends to represent a living arrangement of families with young 
children and adolescents. This setting, however, is no longer the norm once the 
children have grown up and become adults. The relationship with their parents 
changes, and staying in one’s former children’s room becomes increasingly obso­
lete. At some point in time, adult children are generally expected to move out of 
their parents’ home and stand on their own feet. 
In the light of this general rule, the empirical findings are indeed remark­
able. Over 30 per cent of the parents share a household with at least one adult
child. Nearly 40 per cent live in the same building. In some countries, the
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peaks at 60 per cent. Of course, when we consider all parent-adult child rela­
tionships, these four rates are lower, but still impressive, namely 18, 23, 30 and
40 per cent, respectively. 
Coresidence of adult family generations is mostly a matter of adult children 
not (yet) having left the parental home. Beyond the age of 33, coresidence rates 
resemble those of exercising solidarity via money and time. Up to the age of 25, 
sharing space is the most frequent form of functional intergenerational solidar­
ity. There is a sharp decrease in joint living with parents as their adult children 
become older, and only very few of those aged 50 have a parent in the same 
household. 
Again, individual and family characteristics have proven to be very impor­
tant for intergenerational relations. In the short run, prolonged education leads
adult children to become nestlings. In the long run, the better educated display
greater spatial distance between the generations’ homes, including much less
(near) coresidence. One cause for this is greater geographical mobility in the
pursuit of vocational careers. Another reason is resources. Higher education is
more likely to provide the necessary means to establish the preferred independ­
ent household. Correspondingly, a better income situation is associated with
fewer parents and adult children living together. Having more resources obviously
reduces coresidence. 
Adult family generations sharing the same home can be attributed to the needs 
of offspring in particular. Being in education is a major factor in adult children 
still living with their parents. Conversely, poor health of parents increases the 
likelihood of living with an adult child. In comparison with daughters, who enter 
a partnership at a younger age, sons are more likely to be stay-at-homes. Singles 
also (still) live with their parents much more often. When parents have more chil­
dren, they are less likely to live with any one child. Having a grandchild reduces 
coresidence with the adult child, but increases the likelihood of grandparents
staying in the same house, hence facilitating grandchild care and, in so doing, 
helping the middle generation reconcile parenthood and employment. 
Migrants have higher rates of (near) coresidence with adult children, indicating 
the significance of cultural background. This is also another finding in support of 
the ‘safe haven’ hypothesis, according to which a difficult environment can con­
tribute to family members staying together. 
In comparison with other forms of intergenerational cohesion, the disparities 
in coresidence between countries are especially pronounced. In Northern Europe, 
it is unusual for adult family generations to share the same household, whereas 
this form of living is widespread in the south. In the north, every tenth parent lives 
with an adult child. In Southern Europe, it is nearly every second parent. Cultural-
contextual structures are of great significance. Here, the extent of welfare state 
provision is a major factor. In countries where it is primarily the family that is 
expected to provide support, coresidence of adult generations is very common. 
By contrast, countries that spend much more money on public family expenditure 
have relatively low rates of parents and adult children sharing the same household 
or building. 
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This finding can be read in different ways. Strong welfare states can be perceived 
to ‘crowd out’ functional solidarity. By the same token, we can view more generous 
public support as helping adults pursue their preferred living arrangement, namely 
living close but not too close to the other adult family generations. This latter 
interpretation is also supported by the results for social stratification: the wealthier 
a country, the less coresidence. In the same vein, greater poverty is associated 
with many more adult generations sharing space. Although living together may 
bring benefits to all generations, the empirical evidence suggests that in many 






Financial transfers can have a number of forms, motives and functions. This chapter
addresses inter vivos transfers, which is to say that the focus is on monetary 
transmissions from living parents, be it in form of a one-time gift or providing 
financial means on a regular basis. These transfers can be cash or transferrals, 
meaning money in the strict sense of the word. However, quasi-monetary gifts in 
the form of objects are included, too. These can range from small occasional presents,
through more or less sizeable birthday and Christmas gifts, on to temporary or 
regular support for basic needs, all the way to the transmission of large property. 
Family members giving money or quasi-monetary items can involve various 
motives. Altruism implies that transfer givers have no other motive than doing 
something good for the other person. In the case of exchange or reciprocity, 
however, some kind of return is expected (e.g., Cox 1987). This ‘return’ may 
be appreciation and attention, it may involve exchanges of money and time, and 
it may even come with implicit or explicit conditions that the potential transfer 
receiver is not ready to accept – for example, when a financial transfer from par­
ents to adult children is seen as a form of ‘payment’ or even ‘bribe’ to receive 
attention (Kotlikoff and Morris 1989). Reciprocity can also be of indirect nature, 
for example, when parents provide financial support to adult children pursuing 
higher education as a form of ‘investment’ in status reproduction (e.g., Albertini 
and Radl 2012). Another indirect form is also described by the so-called ‘dem­
onstration effect’, which refers to the middle generation supporting their elderly 
parents in order to show the young generation how they themselves would like to 
be treated once they become old (Stark 1995; Cox and Stark 2005). 
Further motives are affection and obligation. Affection may play a role 
when transfer givers (e.g., parents) prefer one recipient (e.g., one adult child) 
over another on the basis of emotional fondness. However, parents may also be 
inclined to give a present to one child because of supporting another child who 
is in financial need, in order to show equal affection to both children. Last but 
not least, some monetary transmissions go back to obligations, whether they are 
rooted in law or common norms. Alimony is one example of a legally binding 
transfer, statutory support for adult children in education is another. Also, general 
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norms and traditions that define ‘customary’ presents (e.g., for birthdays, celebrating 
an educational degree or marriage, birth of a grandchild etc.) or a call for support 
for family members in need, may enhance the willingness to give money to
significant others. Whatever the case may be, research suggests that it is not only 
one specific motive that triggers financial transfers, but rather a combination of 
altruism, exchange, affection and obligation (Künemund and Motel 2000). 
The various motives are intertwined with the various functions of transfers. 
From the giver’s point of view, transfers can be investments – in attention, time 
transfers, status attainment etc. Being on the receiving end of financial transfers 
often represents a most welcome position in times of need (although this may 
not apply if this money comes with excessive implicit or explicit demands, or 
dependence). 
From a family point of view, money can serve as a form of glue for human 
bonding. This applies particularly to adult children and parents who live in 
separate households. Giving and receiving presents shows connectedness and 
belonging (e.g., Cheal 1987). Gifts are signs of thinking of one another, of feel­
ing close, and they even give a signal of assurance of mutual support in difficult 
times. Blau (1964: 88ff.) argued early on that an essential function of social 
exchange is the creation of obligations that stabilise human relations. Even ear­
lier, Simmel (2009, 1908) considered feelings of gratitude as being a binding 
force between people (see also the results on intergenerational contact in Chapter 
4). In his seminal work, Mauss (1950) showed for archaic societies that presents 
are an important factor in strengthening social relations. In this sense, mone­
tary transfers enhance cohesion and intergenerational solidarity (see Motel and 
Szydlik 1999; Szydlik 2000: 123ff.). 
This chapter addresses a number of relevant questions. In what way are adult 
generations connected by money? Who gives, who receives? Can we detect link­
ages between private and public transfers? Do monetary transmissions between 
family generations follow the same or a different route as in the so-called public 
‘intergenerational contract’, in which young and middle-aged employees support 
elderly pensioners? Are there connections between financial support and other 
forms of intergenerational solidarity? In what ways do individual, familial and 
societal factors influence private flows of money? 
Research and hypotheses 
What is money? 
First, financial transfers between family generations can be differentiated in inter 
vivos and mortis causa transfers. Inter vivos means that both parties, transfer giv­
ers and recipients, are alive at the time of the transaction. This is not the case with 
mortis causa transfers, i.e., bequests or inheritances. The current chapter addresses 
inter vivos transfers, whereas Chapter 9 explores inheritances. 
Monetary transfers are not restricted to money, let alone cash. In fact, there is a 
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presents to large endowments. Examples of such quasi-monetary transfers are 
goods such as books, clothes, tools and kitchen appliances – as well as a car, an 
apartment or a house. Others are gift vouchers, loans and securities. When parents 
lend money to their offspring, this generally amounts to receipt of a monetary 
advantage. Providing security for a bank loan may enable adult children to buy 
their own home. Coresidence can also be seen as a financial gift or support when 
family members are not required to pay (market-based) rent. Helping another per­
son in various ways (i.e., giving time) may represent a quasi-monetary transfer as 
well, especially when such a time transfer means saving money (e.g., since the 
recipient does not have to pay someone else for the same service). 
This variety of (quasi-)monetary transfers also makes it necessary to be cautious
when interpreting empirical results from different sources. Various studies may
include or exclude different forms of monetary transfers. Also, divergent time
frames, varying lower or upper limits as well as different survey groups are likely
to have a notable effect on empirical outcomes. For instance, asking about large
payments from an individual child to an individual parent during the previous week
would register very few transfers – but considering the smallest present from all par­
ents to all children within the last decade would yield an extraordinarily high transfer
rate. Therefore, it is crucial to employ the same survey strategy, including the same
wording of the questions about transfers, when conducting comparative studies. 
In the following, monetary transfers are defined as financial or material gifts or
support of at least 250 euros per person and year, excluding benefits derived from
coresidence or time transfers. Thus, first, the definition does not only refer to cash
but also includes quasi-monetary transfers. Second, the focus is not only on support
in the strict sense of the word, but also on gifts without immediate support character,
to avoid a too narrow definition – and empirical investigation – of private intergen­
erational transfers. Third, a lower boundary is set: concentrating on 250 euros or
more per year neglects smaller gifts of only minor material benefit. Fourth, neither
shared housing nor personal help and care are addressed here, so as not to confound
various forms of functional solidarity. Instead, coresidence is investigated in the
previous chapter and time transfers are examined in the next chapter. 
Research 
As mentioned above, transfer rates greatly depend on the empirical setting
(e.g., form of transfer, time frame, limits, survey groups). Thus, disparate findings 
generally reflect different perspectives on intergenerational transfers. 
On the basis of the second SHARE wave, Deindl and Brandt (2011) report 
that in Europe 4 per cent of children aged 50 years or older received at least 
250 euros from a parent within the last twelve months, or since the last inter­
view. Alt (1994: 205f.) conducted a non-representative multigenerational study 
in Germany, according to which 9 per cent of parents supported their children 
financially on a regular or sporadic basis within a one-year period. With regard 
to personal payments and support, the German Socio-Economic Panel states that 
11 per cent of parents gave money to a child living outside their household in 
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the past twelve months. The German Ageing Survey finds that 30 per cent of 
the 40–85-year-old parents gave money, larger non-cash gifts or regular financial 
support to a non-coresident adult child in the last year (Szydlik 2000: 215, 130; 
Motel and Szydlik 1999: 12). 
On the basis of the first SHARE wave, Deindl (2011) finds that 24 per cent 
of parents provided financial transfers to a child in the last twelve months before 
the interview. Drawing on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the United 
States, McGarry and Schoeni (1995; see also Soldo and Hill 1995) determine a 
rate of 29 per cent for annual financial transfers of at least $500 from 51–61-year­
old parents to non-coresident children. The rate for transfers of at least $100 is of 
course higher, namely 40 per cent (Berry 2008). 
Last but not least, Attias-Donfut (1995) reports a transfer rate of nearly two-
thirds. This quite impressive result is based on a French three-generational study 
that surveyed 49–53-year-old respondents who have both adult children and liv­
ing parents. A third of this middle generation received money or non-cash gifts 
from their parents, and 64 per cent gave something to their adult children – within 
a five-year period. Obviously, a longer time frame leads to considerably higher 
percentages. 
In addition to transfer rates, previous studies also offer a variety of informa­
tion on transfer patterns. A number of studies point out that parents’ resources 
and their children’s needs are crucial factors for monetary transfers from parents 
to children (e.g., Motel and Szydlik 1999; Szydlik 2000; Fritzell and Lennartsson 
2005; Schenk et al. 2010; König 2016). Albertini and Radl’s (2012) analyses of 
the first SHARE wave (eleven countries) show that parents of higher social classes 
are more likely to give money to their children, even when considering income 
and wealth discrepancies. Majamaa (2013) finds for Finland that especially par­
ents with a higher education provide money to adult children who are studying. 
Berry (2008) suggests that parents favour children who are in particular need; this 
finding is also supported by McGarry (1999). Hartnett et al. (2012) document that 
parents are more likely to give money to younger adult children. 
Emery (2013) points out that the number of siblings is a crucial factor for 
financial transfers from parents. The multilevel analyses on the basis of the sec­
ond SHARE wave show that the existence of siblings considerably decreases the 
chances of receiving monetary means from one’s parents. 
Previous studies based on the first SHARE wave suggest an overall trend 
reflecting a north-south gradient, visible in more frequent financial support from 
parents to adult children in Northern Europe and fewer transfers in the south. 
However, this pattern is not confirmed when looking at transfer sums (Albertini 
et al. 2007; Deindl 2011; Zissimopoulos and Smith 2011). 
Hypotheses 
With the help of the ONFC model, a number of theoretical arguments and 
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The first hypothesis, referring to opportunity structures, is quite obvious:
higher-class parents have more opportunities and can be seen as a resource for
adult children to receive money. Inter vivos transfers from parents to children
can serve as a means of status reproduction (e.g., Albertini and Radl 2012).
From this perspective, higher-class parents will provide more intergenera­
tional transfers in order to help their children become members of the higher
classes, too; at the very least, the parents’ aim is to avoid downward inter-
generational mobility of their offspring (Attias-Donfut and Wolff 2000: 43;
Majamaa 2013). By doing so, parental financial support can be seen as a direct
‘investment’ in their children and an indirect one in their own social prestige
via the successful child. Additionally, parents with an academic background
are more inclined to accept higher and longer education costs for their chil­
dren than parents with a lower education level. Therefore, it is likely that the
higher classes have higher rates of financial transfers than population groups
with a lower educational background. 
Moreover, giving money or material gifts presupposes that the giver has suf­
ficient material resources to do so. For the empirical analyses, one can expect 
that having parents with better income and more money in the bank enhances the 
opportunities of their children receiving monetary transfers. Financial resources 
may also play a role when it comes to assessing the ‘appropriate’ value of gifts. 
A higher transfer rate of better-off parents is also in line with the idea of showing 
affection via money. How should an adult child interpret a birthday gift of ten 
euros from a millionaire parent? Thus, better-off parents are expected to spend 
more money in order to show their affection, and should thus be more likely to 
report giving items or sums that surpass the threshold of 250 euros per year. 
Parents who know the financial situation of their offspring quite well might 
be more inclined to support them. More intergenerational contact may also give 
adult children a better opportunity to ‘persuade’ their parents to pass on resources. 
Furthermore, according to the ‘intergenerational stake’ hypothesis (Bengtson and 
Kuypers 1971; Giarrusso et al. 1995), parents are somewhat more interested in 
spending time with their children than vice versa, leading to parents providing 
‘rewards’ for intergenerational contact. This idea is put forward by Lennartsson 
et al. (2010), who find in Sweden that intergenerational transfers are linked to 
more frequent contact. From this viewpoint, adult children who receive financial 
means are more likely to stay in close contact with their parents. In any case, the 
analyses of intergenerational contact (Chapter 4) show that the prospects of a 
future inheritance as well as current financial transfers are associated with closer 
bonds between parents and adult children. 
Need structures are likely to play an important role as well. When it comes to 
potential monetary transfers from parents to adult children, it is especially promis­
ing to investigate the employment situation of the child. This applies in particular 
to education, which involves a need situation that requires ‘investments’ in order 
to permanently improve the child’s life situation (Table 2.1). Here, the needs of 
adult children may correspond with the needs or wishes of their parents. Also, 
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further assume that younger adult children in general are still in more financial 
need and are thus more likely to receive support from their parents. 
However, needs are not only a matter of children. Parents may find themselves 
in a situation in which their needs call for time support from their adult children, 
which may be ‘induced’ or ‘reimbursed’ via monetary ‘incentives’ or ‘rewards’. 
Thus, it will be relevant to find out empirically whether help or care from their 
adult children is associated with (reciprocal) financial flows to their offspring. 
Family structures are likely to be of importance, too. If resources – in the sense 
of providing opportunities and the lack thereof constituting need – are the major 
factor, mothers could be expected to give less and daughters to receive more. 
However, closer connections may come with more transfers, in particular gifts, 
not least in order to show affection, appreciation and caring. In this case, mothers 
might give more, especially to their daughters. 
The potential transfer giver having a partner may also have various influences. 
Being single may lead a parent to seek closer intergenerational connectedness 
via gifts. However, it is also quite possible that spouses and partners ‘remind’ 
one another to think of their offspring when it comes to presents and monetary 
support. Again, it is an empirical question as to which of these alternative assump­
tions is more in line with reality. 
What about the impact of an adult child living in a partnership? On the one 
hand, parents might be inclined to give special attention to children in partner­
ships in order to show affection and the wish to stay in close contact with a child 
who could turn to the partner instead. On the other hand, less contact with adult 
children in a partnership (Chapter 4) as well as a different (perception of their) 
need situation might be associated with fewer monetary transfers to that child. 
According to previous research (see above), family size is likely to be of rel­
evance. In general, one can argue that more family members on the receiving end
means that fewer resources are available for each individual child. In the case of
transfers that take the form of giving presents (e.g., for birthdays), having more chil­
dren may lead to each child receiving a relatively smaller amount. In cases of money
as a means of support, siblings may become transfer ‘competitors’, and parents have
to decide whether and, if so, which adult child should receive more considering
their current need situation. Another potential factor reflecting family structures is
the existence of grandchildren. Adult children who have kept the family line going
might be ‘rewarded’ by their parents, and being the gatekeeper for access to grand­
children may point in the same direction. However, having a grandchild may lead to
skipping the middle generation to the direct benefit of the grandchild. 
Last but not least, cultural-contextual structures should not be neglected. Net 
of individual opportunities and needs, parents who migrated might give more to 
their adult children due to closer family bonds, which is supported by the results 
for contact and space in Chapters 4 and 6. However, growing up in different coun­
tries as well as migration experiences may also lead to some degree of ‘drifting 
apart’ of parents and their offspring, suggesting fewer transfers. 
With regard to welfare states, there are the contrasting hypotheses of crowding-
out versus crowding-in (Chapter 2): Does the welfare state reduce or enhance 
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family solidarity? In view of the following analyses for money, crowding-out 
would imply lower transfer rates in countries with well-developed welfare states, 
whereas crowding-in would suggest even more private support in these countries. 
Wealth and poverty in a society are also likely factors. Aside from resources, 
cultural contexts might additionally influence the general extent of monetary 
flows between family generations. In this respect, differentiating between gifts 
as glue for human bonding and support for family members in need is helpful 
for theoretical reasoning. Respondents living in a rich country can be expected 
to give more and higher-value gifts owing to the general cultural norm governing 
how much one ought to give to show affection, appreciation and connectedness. 
However, more wealth may also mean that less financial support is necessary, 
which would have the opposite effect. Correspondingly, the general availability
of fewer resources may limit the frequency and value of expected gifts. At the 
same time, more support would be highly appreciated in such circumstances. 
Again, multivariate empirical investigations are necessary to assess the validity 
of the various assumptions. 
Explaining money 
Questions 
Fortunately, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe provides 
information for all countries included, employing the same survey strategy and 
the same wording of the same questions for the same population. SHARE asks: 
Many people provide financial or material gifts, or support to others such as 
parents, children, grandchildren, some other kin, or friends or neighbours. 
Now please think of the last twelve months. Not counting any shared housing 
or shared food, have you [or your husband/wife/partner] given any financial 
or material gift or support to any person inside or outside this household 
amounting to 250 euro (in local currency) or more? 
Additionally, the interviewers are told: 
By financial gift we mean giving money, or covering specific types of costs 
such as those for medical care or insurance, schooling, down payment for a 
home. Do not include loans, only gifts and support. 
The following questions are: 
To whom [else] did you [or your husband/wife/partner] provide such financial 
assistance or gift in the last twelve months? 
About how much did you [or your husband/wife/partner] give to this person 
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Furthermore, SHARE enquires about the main reason for financial assistance or 
gifts. In the same manner, respondents are asked about the receipt of monetary 
means, again with regard to the giver, the amount and the reason. 
In the following, as in the next chapter on time, the focus is on family generations
who no longer live in the same household. Coresidence is another form of func­
tional solidarity that also includes monetary transfers. However, it cannot always be
assessed without doubt who the transfer giver is and who is the receiver, whether the
coresident generations share rent and living expenses and which amount of money is
actually transferred from one generation to the other. Therefore, this book addresses
coresidence in a chapter of its own. Also, since SHARE focuses on transfers of at
least 250 euros per year, sums below this threshold are not considered here. 
Description 
Who gives, who receives? Europeans aged 50 years and older report giving con­
siderably more transfers than they receive. One in four gave a gift or financial 
assistance of at least 250 euros in the last twelve months. Only one in twenty 
received such monetary means. 
The other shares in Figure 7.1 refer to those respondents who stated that they 
have given or received money. For example, 4 per cent of the total of 26 per cent 
gave money to their parents. The figure shows that nearly all transfers stay within 
the family, and the great majority follow the generational line. Two-thirds of the 
monetary gifts or support from respondents go to adult children, and a sixth go to 
grandchildren. In turn, it is rare that parents are the beneficiaries. The intergenera­
tional flow of money is reflected by the shares of transfers received. Most of these 
stem from adult children and parents. However, the low overall share shows that 
only a small fraction of the respondents actually receive such financial means. 
Figure 7.1 Money: Overview 
Source: SHARE (n: 39,023/39,352). 
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The figure confirms the ‘cascade model’ of intergenerational monetary trans­
fers: money flows downwards from one family generation to the next, from par­
ents to children. Parents do not only support their offspring when they are very 
young and live in their parents’ homes. What we find instead is lifelong functional 
solidarity that involves supporting adult children by way of gifts and payments 
even in adulthood and even when living in separate households. By contrast, 
upward financial transfers are rarely to be found. 
Further investigations, not documented in detail here, refer to reasons for trans­
fers stated by the respondents. A fifth of parents provide monetary means to adult 
children in order ‘to meet basic needs’, whereas another fifth give ‘no specific 
reason’. Other noteworthy reasons are ‘to buy or furnish a house or apartment’, 
‘to help with a large item of expenditure (other than buying a house)’ and ‘for a 
major family event (birth, marriage, other celebration)’. By contrast, reasons such 
as ‘to help with a divorce’, ‘to help following a bereavement or illness’, ‘to help 
with unemployment’ or ‘to meet a legal obligation (e.g., alimony or compulsory 
payments for parents’ care)’ do not seem to be of particular relevance. As far as 
money from adult children is concerned, basic needs and family events play the 
major role. 
Since most intergenerational monetary presents and payments are passed on 
from parents (respondents) to adult children, Figures 7.2 and 7.3 focus on these 
transfers to at least one non-coresident adult child. The left parts of the figures 
document sums of at least 250 euros, whereas the right parts refer to at least 2,000 
euros per year. A fifth of the parents give at least 250 euros to an adult child out­
side the household, and close to a tenth transfer at least 2,000 euros within one 
year. 
Figure 7.2 Money: People
 
Source: SHARE (n: 24,751/24,285). Transfers to adult children, no coresidence.
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Parents’ education and income play an extraordinary role. The more financial 
resources are available, the better the opportunities for giving money. The dis­
crepancies are impressive. The likelihood of monetary transfers is three times as 
high for academics as for the lower educational class. A better education results 
in higher earnings, but it is also more likely that parents with an academic back­
ground have children who attend institutions of higher education and therefore 
need financial help during their studies. 
Moreover, only one in ten members of the lowest income group gave money 
or material gifts of at least 250 euros to an adult child in the last twelve months. 
The same applies to one in three members of the highest income group. Besides 
resources, different living standards may also play a role, which leads higher-class 
parents to support their higher-class children with higher sums, thus exceeding the 
250-euro threshold of the SHARE survey. Another factor that may be of relevance 
is implicit norms about the size of a present. A gift can also serve as a vehicle by 
which parents show their affection for their child and demonstrate how important 
the daughter or son is to them. It is fair to assume that this importance is also 
estimated in relation to the wealth of the giver. A sum of 100 euros from a mil­
lionaire carries quite a different weight than 100 euros from a parent living below 
the poverty line. 
In contrast, the differences between women and men (the latter have more 
resources) are much less impressive, and no notable migration effects are observed. 
The major relevance of education and income becomes even more apparent 
when considering sums of at least 2,000 euros per year. The likelihood of large 
monetary transfers to adult children is more than five times higher for upper-class 
parents than for their lower-class counterparts. 
Furthermore, Figure 7.3 documents striking international differences: Sweden, 
Denmark and Germany show the highest rates of parental transfers to adult 
children outside the household, whereas the rate for Germany roughly matches 
previous results on the basis of the German Ageing Survey (Szydlik 2000). The 
lowest shares are found in Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy and Spain, which 
applies to both parts of the figure, comprising transfers of at least 250 euros and 
2,000 euros per year, respectively. This is a further indication of the importance 
of financial resources, but is also in line with the assumption that family-oriented 
countries with high coresidence rates in turn show less support for offspring who 
have left the parental home. 
Further investigations refer to the amounts of money transferred (not shown in 
the figures). A little over half of the transfers to adult children are between 250 
and 2,000 euros within one year, including most helpful support to meet basic 
needs (in times of financial difficulties, even ‘merely’ filling the fridge or helping 
with the electricity bill can be of invaluable importance). Moreover, a tenth of the 
parents gave even more than 10,000 euros to their adult children in the past twelve 
months. A longer time span would of course have resulted in much larger amounts 
of money exchanging hands. 
Differentiating between population groups and countries confirms the previous 
results on transfer shares. The lower classes do not only give less often, they also 
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Figure 7.3 Money: Countries
 
Source: SHARE (n: 24,751/24,285). Transfers to adult children, no coresidence.
 
give smaller sums. The better-educated and higher-income groups show espe­
cially low shares of smaller gifts and assistance. In turn, nearly a third of transfers 
by academics amount to at least 5,000 euros per year, whereas this applies to less 
than a fifth of parents with a lower education. Gender differences appear to be 
quite small, although men report somewhat higher amounts, whereas the native 
population is in a much better position to give very large sums than migrants. It 
is also noteworthy that the great majority of transfers in Poland and the Czech 
Republic fall below the threshold of 2,000 euros. 
Explanation 
Figure 7.4 summarises the net results of Table A7.2 (see Appendix). The left 
column of the table lists the findings for all transfers of at least 250 euros per year 
from parents (respondents) to their non-coresident adult children. The right col­
umn refers ‘only’ to more sizeable financial means, starting at 2,000 euros in the 
last year. The symbol ‘’ stands for higher transfer rates, and ‘–’ indicates fewer 
respondents giving money to adult children outside their household. 
First, opportunity structures play an extraordinary role. Higher-class parents 
are indeed a valuable resource to adult children. Parents with higher education can 
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be expected to give more to their offspring because they have more resources at 
their disposal. However, there are still impressive differences between the educa­
tional classes even when considering income and savings. These results suggest a 
proclivity of higher-class parents to ‘invest’ in higher education for their offspring 
as a means of status reproduction, and a willingness to accept the longer period of 
time that this involves. 
If parents have (more than) enough money, it is much easier for them to give 
some of it to their children. The empirical results clearly support this presumption. 
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If the parental household is able to make ends meet (fairly) easily, intergenerational 
transfers are likely. This is not the case if the household only gets by with some 
or even great difficulty. Money in the bank is another important prerequisite. The 
more money parents have, the more likely they are to give gifts or support. Also, 
the results suggest that parents choose ‘appropriate’ presents on the basis of their 
financial background as a sign of affection and to strengthen family bonds. 
A closer relationship with one’s parents seems to enhance monetary gifts and 
support. Parents who have contact with their child at least several times a week 
are much more likely to give compared to those who have less contact. If parents 
and their adult child meet, talk or write less than once a month, financial transfers 
are particularly unlikely. More contact provides better opportunity to give and 
receive, whereas one cannot rule out that some offspring maintain close contact 
with parents who give gifts and assistance. 
Second, need structures are relevant for receiving financial support from par­
ents. Here, the employment status of their adult children is a crucial factor. Most 
importantly, adult children who are in education (e.g., university students) are 
much more likely to receive money from their parents. If the child is employed, 
he or she is distinctly in lesser need of financial assistance. At the same time, 
parents may consider support for children in (higher) education as an ‘invest­
ment’ in future benefits, whether such benefits involve an improved job situation 
of the child, or the enhanced satisfaction of the parents when their child acquires 
the qualifications for a successful career. Financial support for adult children in 
education seems to be considerable since its effect is even more pronounced for 
higher transfers of at least 2,000 euros per year. Apart from education, the results 
indicate that parents are somewhat more likely to support their adult children 
financially in the case of unemployment; at least, one finds smaller discrepancies 
between assistance provided to children in education and those who are unem­
ployed compared to employed children. 
Parents are more likely to help their children when they are in need – even if 
those children are adults and do not live in the parental home anymore. This obser­
vation is also supported by the finding that older children receive less. Younger 
adults generally tend to be in greater financial need, which leads parents to give 
them more money. 
However, it is not only the needs of children that count. Upward support for par­
ents in need via help or care is often accompanied by a downward flow of money 
from one generation to the next. This does not mean that practical support by adult 
children is generally reimbursed by huge financial rewards: the lack of a signifi­
cant relationship between time spent to support parents and a larger sum of money 
indicates the importance of relatively smaller presents for showing gratitude. 
Third, family structures comprise a range of determinants. The least important 
one is gender. Sons seem to receive fewer transfers from parents, which suggests 
the relevance of greater financial needs of female offspring and closer intergen­
erational connections of parents with daughters. Yet, when it comes to larger 
sums of money, no significant gender effects can be found. This is an indication 
that daughters receiving more monetary transfers is rather a reflection of more 
frequent smaller gifts as a means of showing affection, appreciation and caring. 
 
 
122 Money: Financial support 
If the parent has a partner, adult children are more likely to receive financial 
transfers. This might be due to parents encouraging and helping one another to 
give gifts to their offspring. However, if the child has a partner, monetary trans­
fers from parents are significantly less frequent. An explanation is the different 
(perception of the) need situation of children who are single in contrast to those 
with a partner. 
Family size matters. Having more children greatly reduces transfers to each 
child, and this also applies if there is a grandchild. Siblings (i.e., other children 
from the respondent’s point of view) and (grand)children represent potential com­
petitors for transfers from parents. Faced with limited resources, parents may have 
to decide to give money to a specific child or grandchild at the expense of another. 
However, supporting a grandchild often also benefits the middle generation. 
Fourth, cultural-contextual structures are investigated by considering migra­
tion and the four macro indicators. The empirical results do not show significant 
differences between migrants and the native population when it comes to inter-
generational transfers to adult children. Either the divergent patterns suggested 
in the hypotheses section of this chapter offset one another, or neither of these 
assumptions are an appropriate account of reality. 
What about influences related to welfare states and social stratification? The 
analyses indicate that more social and family expenditure is associated with 
higher incidences of monetary transfers from parents to non-coresident adult 
children. Welfare state expenditure seems to increase the likelihood of private 
intergenerational transfers. The more money a state spends, the more parents give 
money to their adult children. Again, this is a sign of crowding-in: strong welfare 
states relieve potential transfer givers from having to provide intense support to 
relatives in need, which leaves more resources for gifts and financial help to more 
offspring. When the number of children is taken into consideration, the analysis 
shows that social expenditure is associated with fewer transfers of at least 2,000 
euros per year, indicating fewer particularly large payments to adult children in 
countries with more public spending. In this respect, the results for money resem­
ble those for time in the next chapter. 
When the child’s partner and employment status, respectively, are taken into 
account, societal wealth and poverty do not have a general effect on material trans­
fers from parents to adult children. However, when investigating higher transfers, 
we find considerably more frequent transfers in rich countries and fewer inter-
generational transmissions in countries with a high poverty rate. This is another 
indication of the immense importance of resources: more wealth offers more 
opportunity to give money, and living in a wealthy country might also involve a 
general norm about the appropriate value of personal gifts in order to show affec­
tion, appreciation and connectedness. The opposite applies in the case of poverty. 
Summary 
Generations are connected in many ways. It is not ‘only’ contact and space that 
link adult family generations, as shown in the previous chapters, but also
Money: Financial support 123 
money. On the one hand, even small presents connect family members. Giving 
something shows affection, caring and belonging. Gifts act as bonding glue for 
family cohesion, quite in the way Georg Simmel (2009, 1908) suggested over a 
hundred years ago. On the other hand, monetary assistance represents invaluable 
support for relatives in times of financial need. 
Private transfers follow a cascade model along the generational line. It is 
mainly the older generations who give and the younger ones who receive. This 
stands in contrast to both the typical flow of time within families and money 
within society. Giving money is a form of intergenerational solidarity from par­
ents to children, whereas time tends to take the opposite route – as does money 
in the realm of the so-called public ‘intergenerational contract’ with its transfers 
from the working population to pensioners. 
How should one interpret a transfer rate of 20 per cent? Previous research has 
shown that this number depends heavily on the empirical setting. For example, a 
French study (Attias-Donfut 1995) arrives at 64 per cent of 49–53-year-old parents 
giving financial transfers to their adult children over a five-year span. The study 
at hand counts transfers by parents of at least 50 years of age over a period of 
one year and observes a rate of 20 per cent for France, which matches the overall 
European percentage. The same applies to the monetary value of the transmis­
sions. Were we to count transfers across the entire joint lifetime of parents and 
(adult) children, this would add up to immensely higher rates and sums. 
Family solidarity is distributed unequally between population groups. There 
are huge discrepancies between educational classes: 12 per cent of the lower class 
has given at least 250 euros to an adult child in the last year – the corresponding 
share of parents with an academic background is three times as high. The situ­
ation is even more pronounced in the case of income groups and, in particular, 
when focusing on higher transfers of at least 2,000 euros per year. Some parents 
give much more than others. The main reason is opportunity. The more resources 
parents have, the more money they are able to pass on to their children. 
Needs play an important role as well. Adult children in education are much 
more likely to receive financial support. Situations of obvious need trigger inter-
generational solidarity – especially when linked to an ‘investment’ in higher 
education. An argument can be made that this reduces inequality in the children’s 
generation. At least in the short run, such transfers lessen current income dis­
crepancies to employed children. However, investments in education are likely to 
result in a better economic situation later on, and some of their offspring’s success 
may even reflect positively on the parents, for example, in the form of prestige 
via status reproduction. Seen from this perspective, current financial help to adult 
children in education does not lead to lower, but ultimately even to greater social 
inequality. 
Giving money from one generation to the next does not depend on individual 
factors only. At the meso level, family structures are important, too. Partners, 
children and grandchildren all have a significant influence on financial transfers 
from parents to adult children. Parents having a partner seems to enhance financial 
intergenerational solidarity, whereas other children (siblings) and grandchildren 
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seem to be transfer competitors, potentially leaving less money for the single 
relative, particularly in large families. 
Societal structures must not be ignored either. International comparisons are 
especially helpful to identify the respective influences. A particularly relevant 
macro factor is the welfare state. A strong welfare state does not crowd out all 
family solidarity. On the contrary, more social and family expenditure even comes 
with more overall private transfers. Another factor is general wealth and poverty 
in a country. Greater wealth leads to more larger transmissions, whereas poverty 
reduces sizeable gifts and assistance. 
8 Time 
Who helps, who cares? 
Introduction 
Demographic change asserts mounting pressure on welfare states. Increasing life 
expectancy of the elderly and decreasing fertility shifts the relation of younger 
contributors and older pensioners. At the same time, expenses for pensions and 
health already account for a considerable part of public spending. This constella­
tion poses substantial challenges to welfare states – with likely consequences for 
family relations: ‘The state may have a direct influence on the quality of inter-
generational relations within the family by the sorts of welfare policies it adopts’ 
(Pfau-Effinger 2005: 28; see also Walker 1996; Kaufmann 2003). 
The situation is especially dramatic for the elderly. Being in need of help or care 
is becoming a widespread phenomenon: the number of frail elderly is increasing 
considerably (Schulz et al. 2001; Colombo et al. 2011; Lipszyc et al. 2012), while 
the greater need for support faces fewer available resources. One reason is the so-
called flexibilisation of labour and employment (Szydlik 2008b). In fact, we find 
a conflicting situation: the demands for flexibility in the workplace stand in con­
trast to the demands of the family for stability and reliability. This contradiction 
not only affects the compatibility of work and care for children, but increasing 
flexibility demands in working life can also have negative consequences on sup­
port for parents in need. Giving care often involves shouldering a huge burden, 
at times even too much of a burden (e.g., Perrig-Chiello and Hutchison 2010; 
Colombo et al. 2011: 85ff.). When working life demands ever-greater flexibility, 
this reduces the ability of adult children to provide sufficient care for their parents, 
which again threatens the compatibility of family and employment. 
This situation is aggravated further by the fact that work-related demands 
for flexibility frequently come with increasing pressure for geographical mobil­
ity. However, personal help and care depend greatly on proximity. The contact 
chapter (Chapter 4) shows that closer distance is associated with much stronger 
intergenerational cohesion, and we would obviously expect the following analyses 
to show that adult children living far away are substantially less likely to provide 
personal help and care for their parents. Furthermore, demographic change also 
implies having fewer children, which will eventually lead to fewer siblings to 
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fewer middle-aged adult children as potential caregivers and more frail elderly as 
care recipients. Again, increasing demands face decreasing resources. 
In this perspective, connections between family solidarity and welfare state 
regulations are especially important. This suggests that one should examine sup­
port for older parents in different welfare state contexts, not least for best-practice 
examples. Are family members likely to step in when welfare states retreat, or 
does less public spending also reduce private support? The first alternative is con­
sistent with the crowding-out hypothesis, suggesting a displacement of the family 
by the state. In this case, a retreat of the welfare state owing to tight public budgets 
would result in more family solidarity, which in sum would not reduce the quan­
tity and quality of support for persons in need. The second alternative – namely 
the crowding-in hypothesis – suggests that more welfare state would lead to more 
family solidarity. Less public spending in times of demographic change could 
thus be expected to reduce family support even further, with corresponding nega­
tive consequences for people in need (Chapter 2). 
Which of these hypotheses – or even a specific combination thereof – is more 
in line with reality is an empirical question. The aim of this chapter is to investi­
gate the extent to which adult children give time to their elderly parents and the 
factors that account for this, including the determinants at individual, family and 
societal level. As usual, the chapter begins by providing information on the issue 
at stake and goes on to review previous research and discuss hypotheses before 
documenting the empirical results and closing with a summary. 
Research and hypotheses 
What is help, what is care? 
There are many ways of helping and caring. Help and care may be sporadic
or regular, spontaneous or organised, voluntary or mandatory, reciprocal or
unilateral, quite easy or extremely demanding. Furthermore, it is important to
note that the term ‘help’ has both a general and a more specific meaning. At
a more general level, ‘help’ includes all kinds of support, ranging from very
small favours, such as opening a door for a stranger or giving a small amount of
money, all the way to permanent long-term care, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year. From this perspective, ‘help’ is an umbrella term, covering the
whole range of functional solidarity: space, money and time, and referring to
any kind of support. 
However, in order to engage in theoretical reasoning about and to conduct 
empirical studies on time transfers, it is essential to have a closer look at vari­
ous kinds of support. Lumping together diverse aspects of functional solidarity 
is likely to ignore relevant, possibly diverse patterns. This is no less so when it 
comes to practical support that spans from small occasional favours to long-term 
intense care. It makes a huge difference whether someone helps another person 
with shopping for groceries from time to time, or provides intense care around 
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it makes a difference whether this time is spent on mowing the lawn or helping a 
parent with eating and bathing. 
In this book, ‘help’ is therefore defined in a more narrow sense, albeit still 
encompassing a range of activities. ‘Help’ means practical support below the 
threshold of intense care. More specifically, and in accordance with SHARE 
(see below), ‘help’ refers to practical support with household chores, repairs, 
gardening, transportation and shopping etc. as well as providing assistance with 
bureaucratic matters including filling out forms or addressing financial or legal 
issues. By contrast, ‘care’ will refer to personal care; meaning dressing, bathing
and assisting someone with eating, getting in or out of bed and using the toilet 
etc. Both kinds of support are of great importance to the recipients, yet ‘care’ 
comprises more intense and demanding tasks. 
Research 
Previous research has shown considerable time transfers between family generations 
in many countries and identified a number of factors for practical support, including
characteristics of individuals, families and societies (e.g., Attias-Donfut et al. 2005;
Albertini et al. 2007; Haberkern and Szydlik 2008, 2010; Brandt et al. 2009; Igel 
et al. 2009; Schmid et al. 2012). 
For example, studies have shown that practical support is particularly provided 
to close relatives, and that geographical distance between the households of car­
egivers and care recipients is a key factor in this respect (e.g., Qureshi and Walker 
1989; Gruber and Heady 2010). This points to the importance of opportunities 
for personal support. In this regard, the financial resources of receivers seem to 
play a role as well, indicating that relatives are more willing to help and provide 
care if they can expect something in return. In fact, inheritance research suggests 
the relevance of reciprocity. People are more likely to anticipate the receipt of 
a future inheritance when they provide household help and care (Szydlik 2004: 
39). Previous research has also observed the existence of short-term reciprocity in 
parent-adult child relationships in terms of the exchange of time and money. Help 
and care of adult children for parents is often associated with financial transfers 
from those parents to their helping offspring (Leopold and Raab 2011). On the 
basis of a pre-study for Germany, Klaus documents that ‘the amount of resources 
and support flowing from parents to adult children is the most decisive predictor 
of the help they gain in return’ (2009: 238). 
With regard to family structures, gender is of special importance. The previous 
studies consistently find women to be the primary providers of time support. It 
would be a great surprise if the present study were to come to a different conclu­
sion. There is also evidence that adults in late mid-life or early old age are inclined 
to reduce their help to parents if they have several children (Grundy and Henretta 
2006), which indicates that time support for parents at least partly depends on 
further obligations of the middle generation to their own offspring. 
Several international studies do not confirm the crowding-out hypothesis
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seems to be more evidence of crowding-in (Künemund and Rein 1999; Kohli 
et al. 2000a; Daatland and Herlofson 2003b). Empirical studies that differentiate 
between help and care tend to observe both: crowding-in for help and crowding-
out for care (Brandt et al. 2009). This would imply that public support offers 
families the chance to specialise in domains for which they are especially capable. 
If the following study were to come to a similar conclusion, this would provide 
further empirical evidence in support of the task-specificity model (Litwak 1985; 
Litwak et al. 2003), of mixed responsibility (Daatland and Lowenstein 2005; 
Motel-Klinge biel and Tesch-Römer 2006), and of the specialisation hypothesis 
(see Brandt et al. 2009; Igel et al. 2009). 
Hypotheses 
It is assumed that intergenerational solidarity – in this case help and care – is 
determined by factors at the individual, family and societal level (Figure 2.2). 
As concerns opportunity structures, higher education can be a resource, for 
instance, in coming to terms with demanding bureaucratic tasks. In the same vein, 
helping another person may also cost money, and a favourable financial situation 
is likely to facilitate covering such costs and tolerating forgone income whilst 
supporting a relative. Conversely, higher income provides more opportunities to 
hand over demanding care tasks to professionals. 
However, the issue at stake here is not only the opportunities for helpers and 
carers but also those of the recipients. Reciprocity suggests that if dependent 
family members possess financial resources, this can lead to enhanced efforts 
on the part of their support providers. For the following empirical analyses, it is 
important to investigate the prospects of financial gain. In other words, are adult 
children who have reason to expect a considerable inheritance in the future more 
likely to provide help and care to their parents in the present? 
Additionally, one can expect the health situation of the potential support pro­
vider to be relevant. The assumption is that good health is another prerequisite for 
giving personal assistance, whereas poor health of the adult child would lead to 
less support for parents. 
When it comes to personal help and care, geographical distance is very likely 
to be an especially important opportunity structure. Living far apart from each 
other should diminish help and care considerably. 
With regard to need structures, monetary transfers, age and health of parents 
are likely to be crucial factors. According to previous studies, it will be impor­
tant to find out whether current intergenerational monetary transfers play a role. 
On the one hand, parental resources can be used to encourage the giving of help 
and care. On the other hand, financial transfers can be assessed from the adult 
child’s perspective inasmuch as accepting money when giving time – and espe­
cially when providing strenuous care – might also indicate some dependence of 
children on receiving monetary support from parents. 
The assumption concerning parents’ age is obvious: older parents are
more likely to be in need of support in the form of time from their children.
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Furthermore, it would be very surprising if the health status of the recipients 
would not play a crucial role, especially in the need for care. 
Empirical studies prove that women are families’ kinkeepers (e.g., Rossi and 
Rossi 1990; Szydlik 2000; Haberkern et al. 2015). Since gender roles play an 
essential part in family structures, it is safe to predict that women are the main 
providers of help and care. The question is therefore not whether but to what 
extent there are gender discrepancies in this respect. 
Children without a partner might be more likely to support an elderly parent 
owing to more available time resources. Conversely, in the light of the hypoth­
esis that partners are the first ones responsible for helping and caring, one might 
expect parents who have a partner to receive less practical assistance from their 
adult children. 
The existence of children, grandchildren and siblings might play a role as 
well. Having both parents and (grand)children is of special interest here. It can be 
assumed that the middle generation is less involved in helping and caring for their 
parents if (grand)children need attention too. From the point of view of potential 
support providers, siblings may serve as alternative sources that can limit one’s 
own obligations and efforts. 
Regarding cultural-contextual structures, migrants can be expected to show 
closer family bonds (Chapters 4 and 6). However, adult children who left their 
home country are less likely to be able to help or care for their parents personally. 
Another factor that may come into play here is some form of generations ‘drifting 
apart’ owing to exposure to different cultural contexts. Once again, multivariate 
analyses that control for geographical distance should be especially instructive in 
addressing these questions. 
What about country differences in help and care? As a starting point, it is 
helpful to assign countries to a care typology that differentiates between (a) legal 
obligations to care for parents (no/minor or yes) and (b) the level of professional 
ambulant care in a country (high, medium or low), which indicates opportuni­
ties to leave demanding and stressful care to professional services. On this basis, 
the countries under investigation can be assigned to five groups (the typology is 
an extension of Haberkern and Szydlik 2008; Haberkern 2009: 34 and includes 
information from Millar and Warman 1996; Daatland 2001; Pinelli 2001; Huber 
et al. 2009; Saraceno and Keck 2010): (a) no or a minor legal obligation and a 
high level of professional care (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland); 
(b) no or a minor legal obligation and a medium level of professional care (Czech 
Republic); (c) no or a minor legal obligation and a low level of professional care 
(Ireland); (d) a legal obligation and a medium level of professional care (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany) and (e) a legal obligation and a low level of profes­
sional care (Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain). 
Accordingly, adult children in Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland are expected to take over personal care to a much lesser degree (e.g., 
Howse 2007: 6), since this legal situation is accompanied by greater opportuni­
ties for professional services. In contrast, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain should 
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a low level of professional ambulant care. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
France and Germany are likely to be in between, indicating a medium position in 
country-specific intergenerational care. 
Of special interest is the Irish case. Ireland shows low legal obligation and a 
low level of public care as well. Since one could argue that even in cases of lower 
legal obligation it is quite unlikely that children will really leave their dependent 
parents alone, one might assume higher private care levels in Ireland, too. In any 
case, the results for Ireland will indicate whether it is legal obligation or ambulant 
care that is of greater importance. 
However, this typology focuses on care. Again, it is argued that it makes sense 
not to lump help and care together. This can be exemplified in particular when 
discussing possible links between private intergenerational relations in families 
and public policies. In fact, one can identify four contrasting hypotheses, which 
empirical research needs to address: 
a) The crowding-out hypothesis would lead us to expect less help and care in 
well-developed welfare states such as the Northern European countries and 
more family support in the south. 
b) Following a general crowding-in approach, the reverse pattern should emerge. 
c) The mixed-responsibility or specialisation hypothesis would claim that an 
easing of the intense care burden through public services would release 
(time) resources of relatives for other tasks. This implies a divergent ranking 
of countries in terms of help on the one hand and care on the other: less care 
in strong welfare states, more care in the south – accompanied by less help in 
Southern European countries and more help in the north. 
d) Welfare states do not affect intergenerational practical support at all. 
Last but not least, as in the corresponding chapters of this book, the analyses 
will refer to social stratification in the form of wealth and poverty. Since help 
often requires financial means (see above), greater wealth may result in more 
help, and it may also serve as an incentive to provide care. However, wealth also 
offers the means for engaging professional services, which in turn may reduce 
intergenerational family care. As poverty implies considerably fewer resources 




Since help and care include many aspects and types, it is crucial for comparative
research to ask about them in the same manner. SHARE does precisely that and
thus provides an ideal basis for this empirical investigation. The respondents
are asked: 
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We are interested in how people support one another. The next set of questions 
are about the help that you may have given to people you know or that you 
may have received from people you know. 
After first addressing received help, the following question is raised: 
Now I would like to ask you about the help you have given to others. In the 
last twelve months, have you personally given any kind of help [. . .] to a 
family member from outside the household, a friend or neighbor? 
Subsequent to enquiring about whom the support was given to, the respondents 
are offered response options referring to three different types of assistance: 
Which types of help have you given to this person in the last twelve months? 
1. 	 personal care, e.g. dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or 
out of bed, using the toilet 
2. 	 practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gardening, transportation, 
shopping, household chores 
3. 	 help with paperwork, such as filling out forms, settling financial or legal 
matters 
In the following analyses, the first type reflects ‘care’, the second and third types 
are together defined as ‘help’, meaning help in the more narrow sense of time 
transfers below the threshold of emotionally and physically intense personal care. 
A number of respondents report both help and care. People who care often also 
provide help to the person in need. However, when reflecting on help, one would 
prefer to concentrate on people providing help only, focusing on time support 
below the threshold of intense care. In the following, ‘help’ therefore only refers 
to cases without care. 
Further SHARE questions gather information on the frequency of and time 
spent providing support: 
In the last twelve months, how often altogether have you given such help to 
this person? Was it . . . 
1. 	Almost daily 
2. 	 Almost every week 
3. 	 Almost every month 
4. 	Less often 
About how many hours altogether did you give such help [on a typical day/in 
a typical week/in a typical month/in the last twelve months]? 
These SHARE questions refer to help and care in separate homes, and accordingly, 
the following analyses focus on intergenerational relations between households. 
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In addition, coresidence of respondents with their parents is extremely rare 
(below 1 per cent). 
Description 
Figure 8.1 documents givers and receivers of help (upper part) and care (lower 
part). All in all, 16 per cent of the respondents have given practical household 
help or assistance with paperwork to somebody outside the household during the 
last twelve months (for a comparison of household and bureaucratic help, see 
Brandt and Szydlik 2008: 311; most help is household help, and the second group 
provides both household and bureaucratic help). In comparison, 14 per cent have 
received help during that time. The care rates show that 6 and 3 per cent, respec­
tively, of those aged 50 provide and receive care. An argument might be made 
that these are quite low shares. However, focusing on a longer time period would 
Figure 8.1 Time: Overview
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have yielded higher percentages (e.g., Attias-Donfut 1995). Furthermore, help 
and care are generally a response to corresponding needs, and if those needs are 
non-existent during the period under observation, there will likely be no such sup­
port (Figure 8.4 below; Table A8.2 in Appendix). 
The figure also gives the shares of persons who received support or spent time 
providing support. For example, 27 per cent of the helpers provide support to a 
parent. It is mostly family members who are responsible for help and care. (A 
little) help – and especially care – from non-relatives is relatively rare. In most 
cases, both help and care are, furthermore, a matter of family generations; more 
specifically of adult children and parents. When it comes to providing help, the 
respondents support their children in particular, while they also help their parents. 
When it comes to receiving help, it is foremost from their adult children that the 
respondents benefit, although one should not forget other relatives such as sib­
lings, cousins, uncles and aunts. 
More strenuous and time-consuming care is often carried out by partners,
but this occurs within the same home (Haberkern 2009; Haberkern and Szydlik
2010). Care between households is mostly a matter of family generations. In
contrast to help, it is the respondents’ parents in particular who benefit, indicat­
ing corresponding age-related needs. Similar to help, received care is mainly in
the hands of adult children. In other words, personal support for older relatives
across households is typically the responsibility of their offspring. There is an
upward flow of time transfers along the generational line, which testifies to the
benefits of lifelong intergenerational solidarity to parents that are in need of
help or care. 
Since help and care between households is mostly a matter of adult children 
supporting their parents, from here on this chapter will concentrate on these rela­
tionships. Figure 8.2 documents that 16 per cent of adult children aged 50 have 
given help to a parent in the last twelve months. Nearly a tenth have provided 
care – with this lower rate not least due to the fact that intense personal care pre­
supposes corresponding needs of parents. The figure further illustrates that the 
higher educational classes and income groups give more help. This corresponds 
with the assumptions that providing personal help quite often involves financial 
costs, and that the better-educated classes are generally in a better position to help 
with bureaucratic matters. 
Daughters are more likely to provide help – and particularly care – than sons. 
Obviously, traditional patterns still persist. According to the figure, no difference 
is as pronounced as the one between daughters and sons with regard to intense 
personal care. Nevertheless, one should not neglect support by sons. As far as help 
is concerned, the difference is relatively small. 
Migrants are less likely to provide help or care to their parents than the native 
population. Household help and care depend on personal attendance, which is 
even more difficult in cases of large geographical distances owing to migration. 
Although parents of children who migrated may benefit from financial remit­
tances, they are disadvantaged in terms of receiving personal intergenerational 
help and care from those children. 
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Figure 8.2 Time: People 

Source: SHARE (n: 10,041/10,041). No coresidence.
 
Figure 8.3 shows the country shares. Most interestingly, more help is provided 
in countries with strong welfare states. By contrast, weaker welfare states are 
associated with less private intergenerational help. This is an indication of the 
‘crowding-in’ hypothesis. Strong welfare states do not seem to diminish private 
support: quite the contrary. Three in ten adult children in Sweden and Denmark 
have given practical household help or assistance with paperwork in the last 
twelve months. By comparison, this applies, at the most, to only one in ten adult 
children in Italy, Spain and Greece. 
The results for care show a different picture. In Sweden and Denmark remark­
ably few adult children provide personal care, whereas Italy and Spain exhibit 
especially large percentages. This also applies to the Irish case, which indicates 
that it is the level of professional ambulant care in a country, rather than the legal 
obligation of children to care for their parents, that plays the major role. Overall, 
these results exhibit fewer differences between countries compared to the pattern 
observed for help. However, there is some indication of crowding-out. 
Further investigations (not presented in a figure) show that care is much more 
time-consuming than help. Adult children who support their elderly parents in 
dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, using the toilet etc. 
spend much more time on these tasks than those daughters and sons who ‘only’ 
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Figure 8.3 Time: Countries 

Source: SHARE (n: 10,041/10,041). No coresidence.
 
provide practical household support or help with paperwork. More adult children 
help their parents for a shorter period of time. However, fewer carers spend many 
more hours. 
Carers with a better education and higher household income spend less time on 
these tasks, indicating the relevance of resources (opportunities) to draw on addi­
tional outside sources, such as paid professional support. Daughters are not only 
more likely to provide care in the first place, but also give much more time when 
doing so. Migrants are less able to care for their parents (see above). However, 
when they do become carers they spend considerably more time than the native 
population. Besides cultural differences, migrants in general have fewer discre­
tionary resources to draw on external support. 
The occurrence of help follows a north-south gradient, whereas the occurrence 
of care, and the intensity of support in particular, reflect the opposite pattern, with 
carers spending many more hours in Eastern and Southern Europe, and Czech 
and Italian carers and helpers being much more involved than their Swedish and 
Danish counterparts. This is a further indication of a specific mixture of crowd­
ing-in (referring to less intense and less time-consuming help) and crowding-out 
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Figure 8.4 Explaining time 
Source: SHARE, Table A8.2, see Appendix (net). ‘+’: more, ‘-’: less help/care to parents. No 
coresidence. 
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Explanation 
How can one explain differences in time transfers between adult family genera­
tions? Figure 8.4 summarises the net results of Table A8.2 (see Appendix), where
‘+’ signifies higher probabilities of help and care and ‘-’ indicates fewer adult
children spending time on support for their parents. The analyses largely employ
the same independent variables as the contact models (Chapter 4), which facilitates
the comparison between time spent together in general and actual time transfers. 
Opportunity structures are described in terms of education, income, bequests, 
health and distance. The higher educational classes are in a better position to 
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cover help costs and to offer assistance with bureaucratic affairs, such as filling 
out forms and settling financial or legal matters. Since better-educated children 
spend considerably less time on care (see above), one can also presume that the 
higher classes are, in general, more inclined to organise external support and thus 
share the care burden for their elderly parents with professional services (the 
increased education effect on care in Table A8.2, in the Appendix, is caused by 
health and distance). The higher classes are in a better position to occasionally 
offer ‘a bit’ of care across greater distances, whereas lower-class children more 
often find themselves in an ‘all-or-nothing’ situation. 
Income also seems to play a role, at least with regard to help. This is again an 
indication that help (between households) with home repairs, gardening, trans­
portation, shopping as well as spending time on providing support in financial 
matters often involves some monetary costs, which are easier to bear for those 
who are in a better financial situation. 
The prospects of a future inheritance indicate opportunities for parents to 
encourage their adult children to provide personal support. If the offspring antici­
pate future financial gains, they are much more likely to help and care for their 
parents. The health of the respondents plays a role as well, at least when it comes 
to help (the difference between the gross and the net effect with regard to care is 
due to the age and health of parents). Adult children with poor health are less able 
to help a parent. 
Geographical distance is extremely important for giving time. Of course, per­
sonal help and care depend on the opportunity to meet the other person without 
great effort. The closer generations live to each other, the more personal support 
is provided. This also shows that spatial distance has to be taken into account in 
assessing the influences of the other potential factors. 
Need structures of both parents and children are also essential. Giving help and 
care often involves financial returns. The results indicate reciprocity of upward 
time support and downward financial transfers along the generational line. It is 
not only the expectation of a future inheritance but also current monetary transfers 
that may encourage adult children to spend time supporting their elderly parents. 
The older the parents, the more likely the receipt of help, and especially of 
care. It goes without saying that the needs of parents are a crucial prerequisite 
of personal support, and age is a suitable indicator for assessing those needs. 
Moreover, the poor health of a parent increases the likelihood of receiving help 
from an adult child. The effect of parental health on care is even considerably 
more pronounced, indicating that adult children caring for their parents is indeed 
rooted in corresponding needs arising from deteriorating health. 
Family structures involve gender combinations as a key component. Daughters 
are much more likely than sons to help, and especially to care. As long as women in 
particular are made responsible for household and caring tasks, intergenerational 
time support for elderly parents will remain a matter especially for daughters. 
Compared with fathers, daughters in particular take over responsibilities of moth­
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The contact analysis in Chapter 4 shows that adult children who are sin­
gles have more contact with their parents. The situation is similar in the gross
models with regard to help and care (see Appendix, Table A8.2). However, the
multivariate analyses show no significant effects (owing to the number of chil­
dren and gender, respectively). In contrast, when the parent has a partner, time
support from children is less necessary and therefore less likely. Particularly
with regard to care, it is first partners and second children that are responsible
for personal support. 
As expected, the presence of children, grandchildren and siblings plays a role 
as well. The more children the respondents have, the less likely it is that they help 
their parents, indicating less remaining time and attention on the part of the mid­
dle generation. The same applies when the adult children have a grandchild. The 
number of siblings also decreases the likelihood that an adult child provides help 
to parents. From the elderly parents’ perspective, the more children they have, 
the less likely it is that each individual child is available to help. The multivariate 
analysis does not yield corresponding significant effects for care. This may be a 
result of the lower number of cases, but also of the fact that it is easier for an adult 
child to withhold less essential help than absolutely necessary care. 
The cultural-contextual structures considered here reveal considerably smaller 
migration effects when taking spatial distance into account. Regarding care, the 
difference is no longer significant. With respect of help, migrants still show a 
lower probability of support. This is an indication of at least some (cultural) 
differences between migrant children and their elderly parents, including some 
intergenerational ‘drifting apart’ due to residences in different countries as well 
as the new experiences of the migrating generation. 
Most importantly, welfare state conditions show stark effects on private inter-
generational help. Again, the crowding-in hypothesis is confirmed: the higher the 
social and family expenditure, the more adult children help their parents. Strong 
welfare states obviously do not crowd out family solidarity in principle. Higher 
public expenses are associated with more functional solidarity in terms of adult 
children’s help to parents. However, with regard to care, the results for social 
expenditure show a totally different pattern. Here, more public spending is asso­
ciated with less intergenerational support. Although the coefficients for family 
expenditure are not statistically significant, they point in the same direction (ordi­
nary logistic regressions result in significant effects, too). In any case, the findings 
for social expenditure indicate that adult children provide less care in contexts in 
which it is more common for professionals to take over those tasks. 
These results also provide empirical evidence of the interpretation that strong 
welfare states tend to relieve families of strenuous and demanding care tasks and, 
in so doing, open up possibilities and free resources for personal help. Sometimes, 
‘help with paperwork, such as filling out forms’ and ‘settling financial or legal 
matters’ (see the survey questions cited earlier in this chapter) may include help 
with dealing with public authorities and other relevant agencies that take over 
the care burden. At any rate, there is less strain on adult children in countries that 
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Further analyses indicate that social and family expenditure have a particularly
pronounced effect on adult children with a lower educational degree. A stronger 
welfare state increases help and decreases care among the lower classes in
particular. This is an indication that public policies have the greatest influence
on intergenerational time transfers among population groups with relatively
few resources. 
General wealth does not seem to have a significant effect on time support
provided by adult children to elderly parents, and this also holds for poverty with 
regard to the provision of care (the decrease from the gross to the net model is 
mainly due to distance and grandchildren). However, greater poverty does reduce 
help. This result again evidences the cost argument, considering that help with 
home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping and financial matters is often 
associated with expense, and thus requires sufficient monetary means. 
Summary 
Who helps, who cares? Above all, it is the family. Friends, neighbours, colleagues 
and acquaintances are seldom amongst those who give valuable support in the 
form of time. Most of those who help and care from household to household are 
adult children and parents. The respondents provide household help and assis­
tance with formalities to their children and parents, care for their parents and 
receive support from their offspring. Family generations do not leave one another 
to fend for themselves when they are in need of help and care. 
However, there are striking differences among individuals, families and coun­
tries. Education and money play a relevant role. Giving help is often associated 
with financial costs. Thus, population groups who are better off have greater 
means for helping with home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping and 
for providing support with financial matters. Conversely, parents who support 
their adult children financially – or hold out the prospect thereof – are much more 
likely to be helped and cared for. The exchange of time for money means that 
wealthy parents who have more resources have better chances of receiving per­
sonal time support from their offspring, and their adult children are more strongly 
motivated to provide help and care if they can expect something in return. In this 
way, the need (for time) and opportunities (of money) of one generation are met 
by the need (for money) and opportunities (of time) of the other generation. The 
findings indicate both short-term and long-term connections between time and 
money. Adult children who currently receive financial transfers from their parents 
provide considerably more help and care, and this also applies in the case of an 
expected future inheritance. 
Of course, geographical distance is a crucial factor for personal practical sup­
port. Moreover, poor health decreases the provision of help and greatly increases 
the likelihood of receiving support, in particular of care. Gender is of major 
importance as well; women remain the major helpers and carers. The existence 
of other family members such as parents’ partners, (grand)children and siblings 
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Theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence have underscored the importance 
of differentiating between help and care. Studies that do not distinguish between 
these different kinds of support forgo valuable theoretical and empirical insights. 
It makes a huge difference whether a person provides practical help – for instance, 
with home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, household chores and 
help with paperwork, such as filling out forms and settling financial or legal
matters – or personal care, involving support with dressing, bathing or showering, 
eating, getting in or out of bed and using the toilet. 
This differentiation is especially fruitful when it comes to international
comparisons. A crucial result is that help and care follow opposite patterns across 
countries. Help is provided much more often in strong welfare states, where
intergenerational care is considerably less pronounced. Personal family care is 
rather a feature of a weak welfare state, where help is quite rare. 
These empirical results give a strong indication of the significance of ‘crowding­
out’ and ‘crowding-in’. Crowding-out can be seen when it comes to personal 
care. Crowding-in is observed with regard to help. Therefore, general fears of 
a termination of private support in the wake of the welfare state ‘taking over’ 
are unfounded. When family members are relieved of particularly strenuous 
tasks such as caring for frail elderly 24 hours a day, seven days a week, they are 
more likely to help with household tasks and formalities. Nowhere do adult chil­
dren leave their parents on their own. However, when children live in a country
with more public solidarity, more offspring are inclined to provide private
support, albeit to a lesser degree. In strong welfare states, more children give less 
time. In weak welfare states, fewer children give more time. 
The findings point to a specialisation of family and state in terms of the tasks that
they are especially suited to perform. In this context, family members, including
adult generations, have the choice to take over less strenuous kinds of support such
as temporary household help and bureaucratic tasks. This help is more voluntary,
less burdensome in both emotional and physical terms, and less intense. Helping
elderly parents with household tasks and formalities still gives adult children the
chance to get on with their own lives without being caught up in the permanent
personal care of frail parents. At the same time, elderly parents receive profes­
sional support, and close family members can provide emotional attention and help,
















To him that hath 
Introduction 
One of the most dramatic events in life is the death of one’s parents. When a 
mother or father dies, what in most cases has been a lifelong relationship, comes 
to an end. Parents are not only the most significant others during childhood and 
adolescence, but also the relationship does not end upon leaving the parental 
home. The previous chapters have shown generally low distances between
residences, frequent contact over a whole lifetime and a wide range of support, be 
it via space, money or time. The death of one’s parents thus represents a tremendous
loss, which is reflected accordingly in a long mourning period (Archer 1999; 
Valentine 2008; Parkes and Prigerson 2010). 
For some, the loss also comes with significant financial gain. This is the case if
possessions are passed on from one generation to another. Bequests create a bond 
between the living and deceased generations of a family. Memories are evoked, 
family traditions continued, and an inheritance may involve responsibilities
and commitments. Oftentimes it is not a single event but a prolonged process. 
Before the inheritance, the parents’ possessions can constitute power relations 
within the family or motivate reciprocity, for instance, in the form of contact, 
help and care, which is then ‘reimbursed’ post mortem (Chapters 4, 5 and 8).
After receiving the inheritance, it may take some time until the heir actually
perceives him- or herself as the owner of the bequest. 
Transfers as a result of death thus also have a special emotional significance: who
gets more, who gets what, who is the keeper of the ‘family memory’ (Halbwachs
1925) – for instance, by receiving or appropriating relevant objects, such as the
family Bible, family jewellery, diaries and documents. Bequests can involve inter­
pretations regarding affection and the quality of the relationship with the deceased,
not least in a situation when the death of the parents requires readjusting the fam­
ily fabric. Here, even objects with little economic value may be vested with major
emotional significance. After all, passing belongings on to the next generation is,
in a way, the last ‘act of communication’ between the deceased and living family
members (Ariès 1977; Kosmann 1998; Lettke 2004; see Szydlik 2000: 146f.). 
However, bequests are not only of great relevance to individuals and families, 
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successfully or not can have far-reaching consequences for the future of the enterprise 
and the jobs involved. It may also affect economic competition, including prices 
for goods and services if, for instance, the transfer fails, a suitable successor is 
not available, or a local business is taken over by a larger enterprise. Moreover, 
bequests can have an impact on the property market, especially since a large share 
of bequeathed wealth is residential property (Szydlik and Schupp 2004: 619). If, 
in a wave of inheritances, large numbers of houses and apartments become available 
for sale, this can put considerable pressure on (local) property prices. 
Another issue is financial resources in old age. This is particularly true when 
social security benefits are subject to cutbacks so that some form of compensa­
tion would be welcome. The resulting situation might be described as a ‘pension­
inheritance paradox’ (Szydlik and Schupp 2004): on the one hand, reductions in 
welfare state transfers lead to smaller pensions; on the other, the image of a so-
called inheritance wave suggests that there is a significant increase in economic 
gain from bequests. In this case, lower public transfers would go hand in hand 
with greater private transfers, which in an ideal scenario could offset cuts in retire­
ment benefits in the wake of demographic change. 
Yet, although most people are forced to cope with the loss of their parents at 
some point in time, by far not all of them benefit economically. The aim of this 
chapter is thus to investigate who benefits most from inheritances, who hardly 
benefits at all, and what this implies for individuals, families and societies. Who 
has greater or smaller chances of receiving a bequest? What are the relevant 
causes and inheritance patterns? In what way do population groups and countries 
differ in this respect? The analyses refer to both past and expected inheritances in 
order to also find out whether the previous patterns are likely to hold in the future 
(see Szydlik 2011b). 
Research and hypotheses 
What is inheritance? 
Inheritances are mortis causa transfers, i.e., the gain is based on another person’s 
death. The possessions of a deceased person are transferred to a living person. In 
some cases, these transfers are the result of an explicit will of the testator. Often 
these transfers are governed entirely by legal rules, such as inheritance law with 
regard to surviving partners and children in the event that no individual will has 
been made. In other cases there is a combination of the two, for example, when 
an heir ‘just’ receives her or his legal share, and the other part of the bequeather’s 
wealth is distributed according to his or her will. 
As in the analysis of monetary transfers between living generations above,
the following investigation of inheritance also applies a threshold of finan­
cial value. Personal items such as letters, diaries or photo albums may be of
immense emotional relevance. However, many of these items are not very likely
to involve noteworthy financial value, and were we to consider all kinds of
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children with deceased parents would be counted as heirs. It makes sense to
neglect those items when economically relevant transfers are the issue, espe­
cially when conducting empirical analyses on questions such as who receives a
notable inheritance and why. 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe concentrates on 
inheritances that exceed a certain amount and, in this respect, resembles more 
the German Socio-economic Panel than the Ageing Survey. This results in lower 
inheritance rates as opposed to a survey that also includes small bequests. In the 
study presented here, only transfers of some financial significance will be consid­
ered. However, in doing so, we need to bear in mind that the chosen threshold may 
represent different economic value in different countries. 
A second issue refers to the time frame. Asking about inheritances received 
within a specific period of time – during the last ten or twenty years, for example –
would result in neglecting previous bequests. This procedure would only paint a 
fragmentary picture. Therefore, it makes sense to include notable inheritances that 
were received at any point in time. 
Thirdly, it is of great value not to limit the analyses only to past inheritances. 
In order to get the whole picture it would be preferable to address future bequests 
as well. Again, we need suitable data to conduct these thorough analyses, which 
are fortunately provided by the survey at hand (see below). 
Research 
In spite of their great relevance, inheritances were a long-neglected area of 
research. This may have been due to a lack of suitable data (see, for instance, 
Keister and Moller 2000: 75f.). Questions related to bequests were almost never 
asked in major representative surveys, also because this involves treading into 
sensitive territory in two areas (inquiring about wealth and the death of close rela­
tives), and thus the fear of high non-response rates. Although still unsatisfactory, 
the situation has improved somewhat in the meantime. 
There are two data sets especially worth mentioning that provide representative 
inheritance information: the German Ageing Survey and the German Socio-
Economic Panel. In 1996, the Ageing Survey asked 40–85-year-old Germans 
in the Federal Republic of Germany about all past and future inheritances; for 
the first time, this included inheritances of East Germans as well (Szydlik 2000, 
2004). In 1988, the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) collected information about 
inheritances in West Germany for the period from 1961 to the time of the sur­
vey, enquiring about residential property, stocks and shares, business ownership 
and other assets (Lauterbach and Lüscher 1996; see also Schlomann 1992). In 
2001, the SOEP focus issue was ‘social protection’. In this context, more compre­
hensive inheritance data was gathered, including information for a longer period 
of time as well as on East Germans and the immigrant population (Szydlik and 
Schupp 2004; Schupp and Szydlik 2004b). 
This previous research for Germany consistently finds that inheritances stem 
largely from parents, and that it is the higher educational classes in particular that
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benefit from bequests. West Germans are also much more likely to be amongst 
the heirs, whereas East Germans face considerably lower chances of receiving 
an inheritance. 
Although there are a few studies for some countries, the major problem is that 
these investigations lack comparability and in the end do not allow us to draw 
solid conclusions on similarities or discrepancies between inheritance in different 
countries. The differences in survey designs are indeed so substantial that even 
comparing the findings of inheritance studies within the same country is often 
hardly possible. The studies differ not only in terms of the time of the survey and 
the population groups included but also, above all, with regard to the questions 
asked. Some studies enquire about all inheritances, including small ones. Others 
place the emphasis on large transfers. One study probes the personal inheritances 
of the respondents, whereas others include those of spouses, partners and other 
household members. Some studies are concerned with inheritance during a cer­
tain period of time, others with transfers received at any point in time. Additional 
information collected also varies considerably, for instance, regarding the testa­
tors, kinds and values of inheritances as well as expected inheritances in the future 
(for more information on previous inheritance research, see also Szydlik 2000, 
2004, 2011b; for a scheme of bequest motives, see Szydlik 2011a). 
Hypotheses 
The ONFC model (Figure 2.2) also offers arguments and hypotheses with regard 
to inheritances. As in the other chapters of this book, education is treated as the 
first indicator of opportunity structures. The respondents’ educational back­
ground is viewed in a life course perspective. Lifelong solidarity between parents 
and their children from cradle to grave is a fundamental principle in intergenera­
tional relations (Table 2.1). During childhood and beyond, the greater resources 
available to higher-class parents have an impact on their children’s path of educa­
tional attainment, and this support from parents does not stop once their children 
have also reached a higher level of education. It can therefore be assumed that 
adult children who have benefited from parental resources in childhood, youth 
and early adulthood are also more likely to receive a higher inheritance after their 
parents have passed away. 
This applies in a similar fashion to the respondents’ income situation. On 
the one hand, having fewer financial resources can entail a greater need for an 
inheritance. On the other hand, lifelong parental solidarity is likely to contribute 
to a more favourable income situation for their adult children, which may even 
be further enhanced by bequests. From this perspective, those who have already 
received a bequest may well also have a better chance of receiving another one. 
A likely factor to affect both past and future inheritances is whether the parents 
are still alive or have already passed away. On the basis of the assumption that 
most inheritance comes from parents, a person is more likely to have received 
a bequest if that person’s parents have passed away. Conversely, expecting an 
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Need structures apply to both testators and heirs. There is a potential contradiction
between the needs of parents as prospective testators and children as future heirs. It is
in the interest of the latter to gain possession of the estate as soon as possible, which
implies receiving the legacy in the form of a gift instead of a bequest. However,
from the point of view of prospective testators, it makes sense to not part with their
possessions too early. For instance, parents may not want to end up living in what
would then be their children’s house after having spent much of their lifetime build­
ing or paying for it. Passing one’s property on to one’s children may also modify
power relations, and parents may not be totally sure that their children will still pro­
vide attention and care once they have already received it all (‘King Lear effect’). If
parents prefer to bequeath their property rather than to transfer it earlier inter vivos,
well-off adult children might acquire their own home early on, expecting a future
inheritance later. This pattern would also correspond with the general preference
of both adult children and parents to live in separate homes if possible (Chapter 6). 
Age may play a role, too. The elderly are likely to need more financial resources 
owing to deteriorating health and increasing health costs in old age. However, 
when considering age, one might also find a cohort effect in that especially younger 
cohorts are increasingly likely to benefit from their parents’ better economic 
situation after World War II. 
Chapter 8 has shown that adult children who expect a future inheritance are more
likely to help or care for a parent. This finding points to reciprocal bequests inasmuch
as adult children’s financial needs can correspond with the needs of elderly parents
for time transfers, which might then be ‘remunerated’ post mortem (Kotlikoff and
Spivak 1981; Bernheim et al. 1985; see Künemund and Motel 2000; Szydlik 2011a). 
What is the influence of family structures? Regarding gender, sons were tra­
ditionally favoured over daughters when family property was passed on (see
Rosenbaum 1982; Kosmann 1998). Yet gender roles, norms, laws and economic
structures have changed, which makes it quite unlikely that sons are still significantly
preferred over daughters when it comes to bequests. Succession law in modern soci­
ety makes it virtually impossible to disinherit a particular child, let alone daughters
in general. The decline in the number of farms and craft businesses to be passed on
may also have an impact. Moreover, differential treatment of children in the event
of an inheritance might also be interpreted as indicating different levels of parental
affection, so that parents generally can be expected to refrain from favouring one
child over the other when passing on their estate (Bernheim and Severinov 2003:
735). Although the empirical analyses may unearth some traditional remnants of
gender inequality in bequests, one may assume that they no longer play a major role,
especially compared to other factors such as social background or country. 
Chapter 7 has shown that adult children who have a partner are less likely to 
receive money from their parents, indicating (the perception of) less financial 
need. In this vein, one could expect a similar situation with regard to mortis causa 
transfers. Furthermore, bequests to an adult child are also likely to benefit the 
child’s partner. Thus, it will be interesting to see whether divorced or single chil­
dren are more likely to be considered, be it because of financial need or to ensure 
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On the one hand, testators might favour adult children who have children of 
their own (grandchildren in the view of the testator) and thus continue the family 
line. On the other hand, grandchildren also represent alternative options when 
dividing the estate. This would make children and grandchildren competitors for 
an inheritance. From the testator’s point of view, the number of children could be 
a significant factor, too. Higher expenses of large families can result in less wealth 
that can be bequeathed. Moreover, the remaining estate must be divided among 
a larger numbers of heirs. Thus, from the viewpoint of the prospective heirs, sib­
lings may be rivals for the parental estate. 
With regard to cultural-contextual structures, we can expect differences 
between migrants and natives. Migration is frequently triggered by a lack of 
opportunities and resources in one’s native country. These are conditions that 
make it quite unlikely that there will be much wealth to bequeath from one family 
generation to the next. 
In general, a strong welfare state can be associated with more inheritances. More
financial resources in a country can contribute to both more public spending and more
private bequests. Another possible reason for larger inheritances is that more public
spending leaves more means in the hands of the elderly, which can later be bequeathed. 
One can assume greater economic prosperity in a country to entail more 
bequests. Conversely, more poverty is likely to be associated with fewer inherit­
ances. People who own more can also pass on more to the next generation. From 
this perspective, political and economic regimes are likely to play an important 
role. Economies that offer vast opportunities for building wealth are also likely to 
be ahead in terms of inheritances. Assessing this requires taking long time spans 
into consideration, particularly the parents’ and grandparents’ chances of accu­
mulating private wealth. 
Therefore, the empirical analyses are also likely to show notable discrepan­
cies reflecting long-term consequences of planned versus market economies. The 
former socialist countries only allowed limited opportunities for accumulating 
private property and wealth, including homes, businesses, stocks and shares, so 
that there has been much less to bequeath. For Poland and the Czech Republic, 
we can therefore expect much lower inheritance rates. In the same vein, it should 
be promising to differentiate between West and East Germans when analysing 
inheritances. One can assume long-lasting effects of the specific conditions in the 
German Democratic Republic and the ‘former’ Federal Republic of Germany, 
including different opportunities for property acquisition owing to political regu­
lations and economic contexts. 
Explaining inheritance 
Questions 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe gathers information on 
(up to five) past transfers of wealth, including inheritances, on the basis of the 
following main question: 
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Not counting any large gift we have already talked about, have you or your 
[husband/wife/partner] ever received a gift or inherited money, goods, or 
property worth more than 5,000 euro (in local currency)? 
The next questions refer to the point in time, the giver and the value of the various 
transfers: 
In which year did you or your [husband/wife/partner] receive it? 
From whom did you or your [husband/wife/partner] receive this gift or inher­
itance? 
What was the value of this gift or inheritance at the time you or your [husband/ 
wife/partner] received it? 
When focusing on inheritances, the analyses only take wealth transfers from par­
ents into account, concentrating on respondents with deceased parents. This does 
not totally rule out that the respondents may have received previous gifts inter 
vivos from their since deceased parents. However, this can be expected to apply 
to only a few cases since (a) gifts are much rarer than inheritances (and thus more 
seldom reported in response to the corresponding question), (b) gifts are much 
smaller (and are thus more likely to not exceed the threshold of 5,000 euros), and 
(c) it is very likely that parents who gave a substantial gift inter vivos to an adult 
child will have additionally bequeathed even greater wealth later on. From this it 
follows that the information on received inheritances documented below provides 
an accurate picture even if these interviewees did also receive a large gift from 
their parents at an earlier point in time. 
The main question on future inheritances reads as follows: 
Thinking about the next ten years, what are the chances that you will receive 
any inheritance, including property and other valuables? 
The respondents are asked to assess the likelihood ranging from 0 to 100 per cent. 
This study assumes a prospective inheritance when the respondent states an at 
least 50 per cent chance of receiving one. Of course, these responses are predic­
tions that must be treated with caution. There are, however, a number of arguments 
in favour of this question. First, the prediction does not generally extrapolate past 
events into the future, as many general prognoses more or less implicitly tend to 
do. Instead, the survey participants are asked directly. Second, the question does 
not require the respondents to do much ‘guesswork’. Ultimately, an assessment 
of inheritances to come involves no more than knowing whether one’s parents 
are still alive, whether they have any relevant assets, and whether these assets can 
be expected to represent some financial value after being divided up among the 
respective number of siblings. Third, the fact that in the findings presented below, 
prospective inheritances are pretty much in line with patterns of past inheritances 
indicates that the respondents’ answers are mostly realistic. 
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Description 
Where do the transfers stem from, and when do they take place? Is it actually an 
intergenerational issue at all? In light of the pension-inheritance paradox, one 
might also raise the question of whether these gains are a potentially viable source 
of financial security in old age considering the time of occurrence. Figure 9.1 
answers the latter two questions in the affirmative. 
Most transfers follow the generational line, and most of them, by far, originate 
from parents (since multiple answers are possible, the total adds up to more than 
100%). This suggests that the financial gain is embedded in fundamental family 
processes and influences intergenerational relationships, be it implicitly or explic­
itly, long before the actual act of inheriting. Second come parents-in-law, which 
points to the significance of marriage homogamy. Since higher social classes fre­
quently choose partners of similar social background, they are often in line for 
several inheritances: directly from their own parents and indirectly from their 
in-laws. Although transfers from grandparents are relatively rare, the findings for 
parents and parents-in-law clearly underscore the significance of the generational 
line. Therefore, studying inheritances for the most part means studying intergen­
erational family relations. 
In this light, the findings for age groups come as no surprise. Since inheritances 
stem mainly from parents, the transfers occur mostly in the second half of life. 
As expected, parents make sure not to part with their possessions too early. This 
is also supported by my calculations for Germany based on the Socio-economic 
Panel. They show that gifts are not only received much less frequently than inher­
itances, but also at a much earlier point in time. Moreover, gifts tend to be of 
smaller value (see also Schupp and Szydlik 2004a). The age rates provide prelimi­
nary evidence regarding the pension-inheritance paradox. Bequests from parents 
could indeed play a role in providing security in old age – at least their children 
have little opportunity to consume the parental estate at an earlier point in time. 
However, for a sound assessment of the paradox, we must take a closer look at the 
opportunity and need structures of the heirs. 
Figure 9.1 Inheritance: Overview 




Inheritance: To him that hath 149 
Owing to the wording of the questionnaire, Figure 9.1 refers to all respondents
and includes inheritances and gifts. However, from Figure 9.2 onwards, the 
focus shifts to bequests from parents. Thus, the following analyses for previous 
inheritances refer to respondents with at least one deceased parent, while only a 
wealth transfer from a parent is counted as a previous inheritance. Conversely, 
with regard to future inheritances, only interviewees with at least one living
parent are included. 
As Figure 9.2 shows, 15 per cent of the respondents with at least one deceased 
parent received a transfer of more than 5,000 euros from that parent. This testifies 
to the fact that rather small proportions of the population are beneficiaries of
noteworthy inheritances. It is notably not the classes with lower levels of educa­
tion whose comparatively difficult situation is counterbalanced by transfers of 
wealth. Some people with lower education benefit from inheritances. However, 
the rate is much higher among classes with medium to higher education. The find­
ings thus support the existence and impact of lifelong intergenerational solidarity: 
higher-class parents are much more successful in ensuring that their children attain 
higher-level education as well, while the same parents also have more assets to 
pass on to their adult children decades later. Furthermore, this situation will not be 
reversed in the future – on the contrary, the better educated are also the ones that 
can expect to benefit most from future bequests. 
The highest income group reports the most inheritances. In cases where 
respondents have received a bequest in the past, one cannot entirely rule out that 
Figure 9.2 Inheritance: People 
Source: SHARE (n: 36,105/9,824). 
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the household’s current financial situation could also be the outcome of that previ­
ous transfer of assets. However, the same pattern exists with regard to expected 
inheritances: those experiencing difficulties in making ends meet are also less 
likely to expect financial gains from future bequests. The discrepancies between 
the income groups are very pronounced. 
Gender seems to have much less impact in this respect. The figure suggests 
that women are at a slight disadvantage in terms of past and future inheritances. 
It will be investigated whether this holds true in the context of the multivariate 
analyses. 
The differences between migrants and natives are also not as great as those 
related to education and income. However, they are still considerable and point 
in the expected direction: in contrast to the native population, migrants are and 
will continue to be less likely to receive an inheritance. The findings thus indicate 
that, compared to natives, migrants are less likely to have had or have parents with 
notable monetary resources. 
Figure 9.3 shows the share of respondents having received an inheritance or 
expecting to do so for 14 European countries while it also distinguishes between 
West and East Germany. The figure gives evidence of very pronounced differences 
between the countries and underscores the importance of comparative international 
analyses of inheritances. The incidence of past inheritances ranges from 6 to 32 per cent, 
Figure 9.3 Inheritance: Countries 
Source: SHARE (n: 36,105/9,824). 
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whereas the rates span from 11 to 66 per cent for ones to come. With regard to past 
inheritances, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden are the leaders. West 
Germany, France and the Netherlands represent the upper middle range. The lower 
middle range stretches from Greece, through Spain and Italy, to Austria. At the 
lower end are the Czech Republic, Ireland, East Germany and Poland. 
On the whole, the results for expected future legacies confirm the country 
ranking by past inheritances. Hence, there is no future compensation in sight to 
offset poorer chances of inheriting in the past. An interesting observation is that 
in Ireland and East Germany, somewhat counter to the trend, around a third of the 
respondents expect future inheritances. This relatively higher share than in the 
past could suggest a partial catching-up process. 
Further investigations (not shown in a figure) indicate that most bequests do 
not exceed a certain sum. Two-fifths amount to less than 20,000 euros, two-thirds 
are lower than 50,000 euros, and more than four-fifths of the transfers are below 
the threshold of 100,000 euros. Of course, these sums are considerable, and inher­
iting any sum is likely to be considered a welcome financial gain. Nevertheless, 
very high sums are very rare. 
The size of inheritances is unequally distributed amongst population groups 
and countries. The lower educational classes not only inherit less often, but also 
receive smaller sums if they do. Over half of the bequests for the least educated 
are below 20,000 euros, whereas this applies to only 30 per cent of the academ­
ics. There is no sign of gender inequality in this respect. The investigations show 
impressive country disparities; yet owing to the relatively low number of inherit­
ance cases in several countries, these results have to be treated with caution. The 
highest sums and the lowest share of relatively small inheritances can be found in 
Switzerland. By contrast, an especially large proportion of the bequests in Eastern 
and partly Southern Europe tend to be rather small. This is in line with the find­
ings on inheritance chances presented above. 
Explanation 
What factors account for better or poorer chances of receiving an inheritance? 
Figure 9.4 displays the summarised net results of the multilevel multivariate anal­
yses shown in Table A9.2 (‘’ stands for higher inheritance chances, ‘–’ indicates 
fewer respondents having received or expecting a bequest). 
The analyses confirm the extraordinary relevance of opportunity structures. 
First of all, testators have to own something that they can bequeath. From the 
point of view of the adult child as the prospective heir, having resourceful parents 
obviously increases the chances of an inheritance. The findings again confirm 
lifelong intergenerational solidarity, according to which higher-class parents fos­
ter the educational success and thus the income opportunities of their children 
while – apart from providing support in many other ways – they are also able to 
pass on legacies of some value in the end. Thus, already privileged children obtain 
further advantages through bequests. Conversely, those at a disadvantage because 
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Also, inheritances mostly benefit those who already belong to the highest 
income groups. Low household income rarely comes with high chances of inher­
iting, so bequests generally cannot be counted upon to meet this greater financial 
need. The empirical results also confirm that the favourable position of the higher 
classes regarding past inheritances extends into the future. The fact that previous 
heirs are even more likely to expect future inheritances completes the picture. 
If the mother or father is still alive, the likelihood of having received an
inheritance in the past is much lower compared to persons whose parents are
already deceased. In fact, inheritances originate primarily from parents. Since
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past transfers from parents are considered only for respondents with at least one 
deceased parent, the variable ‘parents alive’ is not included in this case. However, 
this group constitutes the reference group for inheritances expected in the future: 
the other constellations involve considerably lower chances of inheriting. As 
expected, this holds particularly for respondents whose mother and father are both 
deceased. Parents remain the main source of inheritances also in the future. 
The results with regard to education, income and a previous inheritance already 
indicate that the need structures of adult children play a minor role when it comes 
to bequests. This also applies to property. For someone who does not own prop­
erty, an inheritance would be especially handy. However, in this respect, too, the 
greater need is less likely to be met (since property can also be the result of a past 
inheritance, it is not considered in this context). This finding further indicates that 
parents who own property are rather inclined to bequeath their estate instead of 
transferring it to their offspring during their lifetime in the form of a gift, which 
testifies to the aforementioned ‘King Lear effect’. 
One can assume that the elderly are in greater financial need owing to deterio­
rating health and the corresponding costs that this involves. However, the fact is 
that older respondents report fewer inheritances. The findings thus rather point to 
a cohort effect. Amongst the SHARE respondents, the older cohorts more often 
had parents who had lost their possessions through war and hyperinflation. The 
younger cohorts, by contrast, are more likely to have parents who experienced 
considerably better chances to accumulate wealth after World War II. 
The provision of help or care from respondents to their parents is an indicator 
of parental needs, whereas the monetary needs of the adult child may play a role 
as well. The available data does not allow us to investigate whether support of 
this kind has actually been remunerated post mortem. Yet, those providing time 
transfers to parents are more likely to expect future inheritances. This result sug­
gests (the expectation of) intergenerational reciprocity, in that adult children give 
time today and parents provide monetary ‘rewards’ tomorrow. 
The present study includes analyses of the relevance of family structures with 
regard to gender, partnership, parenthood and siblings. The findings indicate that 
parents hardly distinguish between daughters and sons anymore in passing on 
their estate. The traditional favouritism of male heirs is no longer significant. This 
underscores the relevance of changes in gender roles, norms, inheritance laws and 
economic structures. 
In contrast to married children, living with a partner without being married 
seems to result in a somewhat lower chance of having received a larger inherit­
ance in the past. This is an indication that parents (previously) favoured married 
children, whereas such an effect cannot be observed regarding future bequests. 
Widowed children are less likely to expect an inheritance; at least, widowhood 
precludes inheritances from parents-in-law. Also, similar to the findings for cur­
rent transfers (Chapter 7), divorced and especially single children more often 
report a previous inheritance, be it due to their (perceived) more fragile financial 
situation, or because parents are inclined to favour children who are less likely to 
share the inheritance with someone outside the family of origin. Other possible 
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factors might be that a huge inheritance contributes to staying or becoming single 
as well as to singles having closer bonds with their parents (e.g., more contact and 
coresidence, as shown in Chapters 4 and 6). However, there is no corresponding 
effect with regard to expected bequests. 
The existence of children (or grandchildren from the viewpoint of the testator), 
in principle, can lead to being ‘rewarded’ for the continuation of the family line, 
but it can also result in skipping the middle generation. Here, the empirical analy­
ses do not come to a definite conclusion. Either none of the divergent hypotheses 
is true, or the two options offset one another. 
Siblings can be rivals for a parental estate, especially if there are three or more 
siblings. The costs of raising several children can result in fewer assets to be 
bequeathed, and those fewer assets amount to less for each individual child the 
greater the number of children among whom the estate must be divided. 
Cultural-contextual structures are represented by migration, welfare states, 
wealth and poverty. Migrants clearly have fewer chances of receiving an inherit­
ance compared to the native population. Migration frequently occurs for economic 
reasons, and the findings indicate that parents of migrants have fewer resources. 
Substantial inheritance-related disadvantages can be observed not only in the past 
but also extend into the future. 
As expected, a stronger welfare state is associated with more inheritances, both 
in the past and in the future. The more social and family expenditure in a country, 
the more bequests. On the one hand, more resources in general can lead to both 
more public expenditure and more private bequests. On the other hand, social and 
family expenditure relieve the elderly from having to spend money for offspring 
in financial need and for their own health costs, while higher pensions put them 
in a better position to cover their own expenses without having to spend their 
savings. All in all, a strong welfare state leaves more money in the hands of the 
elderly, resulting in more bequests. 
Countries with low wealth per capita are on the losing side in terms of inher­
itance. Where there is more wealth, there is more to bequeath and inherit. This 
means that historical circumstances, national political decisions and economic 
success or failure have a substantial impact on the financial gains to be obtained 
through intergenerational family solidarity. Countries offering greater opportuni­
ties for accumulating wealth also offer better chances of inheriting some. From 
this it follows that inheritance practices are most likely to influence intergenera­
tional family relations in wealthy countries. 
In contrast, a huge poverty rate is associated with considerably fewer bequests. 
If large segments of the population are poor, inheritances are generally less likely. 
Wealth and poverty play a tremendous part in mortis causa transfers, both in the 
past and in the future. 
Summary 
In many countries, an immense fortune has been accumulated that has not been 
wiped out either by an act of war or inflation. This fortune is now being transferred 
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from one generation to the next. However, only a fraction of the population actually 
benefits from such a legacy. It is a particular group of people that receives most of 
the possessions. Who are these heirs, and who has rather slim chances of receiving 
a substantial bequest? 
First of all, inheritance is an important form of intergenerational solidarity. 
Most legacies stem from parents. Heirs often have at least one deceased parent, 
and those who are most likely to expect a bequest in the future are those whose 
mother and father are still alive. This implies that the financial gain goes hand in 
hand with deep personal loss and is embedded in fundamental family processes.
Research concerned with bequests must therefore consider intergenerational 
family relations. Inheritance research is intergenerational research. 
The empirical analyses document the immense importance of resources for 
mortis causa transfers. Parents of the higher social classes have far greater means 
at their disposal for exercising lifelong intergenerational solidarity than their 
lower-class counterparts. Even after their death, their children are much more 
likely to receive considerable financial assets. The greater monetary needs of the 
lower classes, on the other hand, are barely met. Although some adult children 
from the lower and middle classes also inherit legacies of some value, which may 
even represent a proportionally larger gain in relation to their previous ‘wealth’, 
this occurs much less frequently. One in ten respondents with a lower education 
received an inheritance of more than 5,000 euros. This applies to one in four of 
the academics. Moreover, the better educated not only receive more bequests but 
also higher sums. 
The prevalence of the ‘Matthew principle’ – ‘To him that hath shall be given, 
and he shall have abundance’ (Matt. 13: 12) – is validated by a number of other 
findings. Those with a particularly high income are much more likely to be heirs. 
Those who already have inherited in the past are much more likely to expect a 
further legacy, and this also applies to owners of property. While there are no 
significant gender differences, the native population has much better chances of 
inheriting compared to migrants. 
The Matthew principle also solves the pension-inheritance paradox: those pop­
ulation groups that might need a substantial bequest the most are the ones that are 
least likely to receive it. Increasing inheritances do not offset a retreat of the wel­
fare state. Instead, stronger welfare states give and leave more monetary means 
in the hands of the elderly, ultimately leading to more bequests. This matches the 
finding that higher social and family expenditure in a country are associated with 
considerably more inheritances. From this perspective, lower pensions and higher 
costs of living owing to public cutbacks may diminish the estates to be passed on. 
A retreat of the welfare state could thus lead to fewer bequests. 
Wealth per capita and poverty in a country have also proven to be immensely 
important factors in explaining inheritances. In countries where people own more 
assets and the previous generation has experienced more favourable conditions 
for accumulating wealth, there are many more legacies available for descend­
ants. In fact, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden display the highest 
inheritance rates. West Germany, France and the Netherlands are in the upper 
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middle range, whereas Greece, Spain, Italy and Austria represent the lower mid­
dle range. The fewest estates are passed on in the Czech Republic, Ireland, East 
Germany and Poland. These findings also indicate that it makes sense to consider 
differences in bequests between West and East Germany. The distinct political 
and economic conditions in the ‘former’ Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic cast a long shadow. 
What future developments can be expected on the basis of the empirical 
results? The better-educated and more affluent population groups anticipate con­
siderably more future inheritances. At the same time, property is most frequently 
expected to be passed on from one generation to the next in countries that have the 
most heirs in the first place. Particularly high bequest rates in the past are associ­
ated with particularly high bequest rates in the future. The empirical findings thus 






Family generations indeed share their lives. (Adult) children and their parents not 
only have the longest possible joint time in the history of mankind, they also make 
intense use of it. Intergenerational relations span from infancy all the way to old 
age. They are generally stable, long-lasting and intense. Without exaggeration, 
we can conclude that there is indeed ‘lifelong solidarity’. Even the relationship 
between adult children and parents who no longer live in the same household is 
marked by strong bonds, ranging from frequent contact to impressive functional 
solidarity, including financial support, help with household chores and even long-
term care for frail elderly relatives. The adage, ‘Out of sight, out of mind’,
definitely does not apply to children and parents. This also shows that when 
looking at human bonding (Rossi and Rossi 1990), one has to consider intergen­
erational family relations. 
In the introduction to this book, three possible scenarios characterising family 
relationships were distinguished: autonomy, conflict and solidarity. The empirical
investigations come to a clear result: the most dominant pattern is solidarity. Thus, 
this study contradicts common myths. It is simply not true that generations live in 
permanent conflict, let alone in a ‘battle’ or even a ‘war’. The same applies to the 
notion of individualisation or autonomy in the sense of isolated individuals with 
no nameable connection to others. General break-ups are as disconnected from 
reality as are fierce conflicts. Instead, only 5 per cent of the respondents report 
frequent generational conflict, whereas more than four out of five adult genera­
tions are in at least weekly contact. Given notions of conflict, isolation and crisis 
of the family, these are indeed surprising and impressive results. 
Frequent contact and few conflicts are only one part of the typical intergen­
erational relationship. The other part is functional solidarity, that is, the giving 
and receiving of space, money and time. This support is manifold. It includes 
the provision of living space, for example, when young adult children do not 
yet have the means to stand on their own feet. It includes help with household 
chores, gardening and repair work, shopping for groceries, filling out forms and 
assistance with other bureaucratic tasks all the way to immensely intense per­





of regular payments, or special monetary support in times of emergency, right 
up to smaller or larger bequests. The empirical results prove the relevance of the 
so-called ‘cascade model’, according to which monetary transfers tend to flow 
from parents to their offspring rather than the other way around. While this is 
the case for money, the reverse is true for time. Time is more likely to run up the
generational line, that is, from adult children to parents. 
Yet despite this immense cohesion and solidarity, one should avoid the temp­
tation to idealise intergenerational relations. To only emphasise frequent contact, 
rare conflict and pronounced support between the generations is to paint an
incomplete picture. Noteworthy conflicts are relatively rare, but should not be 
neglected either, and they can often lead to generations drifting apart. Intense 
controversies are more of a risk to than an opportunity for intergenerational soli­
darity. They are destructive rather than constructive, and there is a danger of 
terminating the relationship (Szydlik 2008a). 
Also, intergenerational solidarity is not in principle and in general an indica­
tion of a ‘good’ family. Indeed, we would be mistaken to think of ‘solidarity’ as 
being necessarily ‘good’. Sharing lives means sharing bad times, too. Frequent 
contact includes sharing sorrow and pain, and not all contact is desired at all 
times. Staying in touch may be owing to a feeling of obligation. Some genera­
tions would like to have more contact, others would prefer less. Intergenerational 
relations may even be too close and symbiotic, such as when parents cling to their 
children or adult children have difficulty living their own lives. Moreover, coresi­
dence of adult generations is often not the preferred form of living, but stems 
rather from necessity. Giving money or time may lead to postponing or giving 
up one’s own wishes, and receiving support may come with undesired feelings of 
dependence and the obligation to give something in return. Personal care in old 
age is often accompanied by stresses and strains for both parties. In other words, 
there can be too much solidarity, and intergenerational cohesion may be ‘good’ or 
‘bad’, sometimes even at the same time. 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that empirical social research deals 
with social regularities and not natural laws that apply to every single case. General 
patterns do not reflect the situation of every individual, and one’s own personal 
situation may sometimes correspond to the general pattern, and sometimes not. 
Thus, when intergenerational relations are assessed as close and supportive, it 
should also be taken into account that there are those who do not fall into the 
general scheme. Some members of family generations do not help one another at 
all. There are adult children and parents who very rarely meet or talk, others have 
totally lost contact, and some who have deliberately ended the relationship. 
Education, income, gender, migration, country 
Although, in general, intergenerational solidarity is lifelong and intense, the 
empirical investigations also show striking discrepancies between population 
groups and countries. 
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Lower and higher education 
Academics report greater geographical distances both from their parents and adult 
children, and feel fewer family obligations both towards children and the elderly. 
Furthermore, the empirical analyses find more intergenerational conflict between 
better-educated parents and their adult children. These results speak of less inter-
generational cohesion among the higher educational classes. However, the picture 
is reversed when considering time and, most notably, money. The better educated 
more often provide support with household tasks and help with paperwork, such 
as filling out forms and settling financial or legal matters. This is an indication 
that educational resources enhance the ability to give time. Moreover, differences 
between educational classes are particularly pronounced in the case of current 
financial transfers and inheritances. The better educated give much more money 
to their adult children, and also have a much higher chance of receiving a notable 
inheritance from their parents. 
Rich and poor 
In many ways similar patterns to educational classes emerge when one observes 
income groups, with a notable exception: considerably less conflict with adult 
children occurs when the household is easily able to make ends meet. A favoura­
ble economic situation obviously reduces reasons for quarrels and fights. Well-off 
adult family generations are also forced to share the same four walls less often. 
The lower income groups are more likely to provide space, whereas the affluent 
give money. Financial transfers from parents to adult children are much more 
common when parents belong to the best-off income group. Here we find extraor­
dinary differences from parents who have great difficulty in making ends meet (9 
vs. 33 per cent). A great discrepancy is also found when observing inheritances. In 
the lowest income group, only 7 per cent have received a bequest. In the highest 
group, it is 25 per cent. A fifth of those with few resources see a chance of a future 
inheritance. In contrast, this applies to every second affluent person. 
Women and men 
Women hold families together. The expression ‘kinkeeper’ is certainly justified. 
In comparison to men, women maintain closer contact with children and parents 
across households. Adult daughters leave the parental home earlier, yet stay in 
touch with their parents more often than sons. By far, daughters and mothers 
have the closest relationship. The kinkeeper situation becomes especially obvious 
when one looks at support in the form of time. Help is more often provided by 
women, and this applies particularly to personal care. When parents are cared for 
by an adult child, it is mostly a daughter who shoulders the task. At the same time, 
the empirical investigations document slightly more frequent conflict between 
daughters and parents. However, the analyses find no gender differences with 







considerable transmissions of financial means from one generation to the next, 
parents nowadays generally do not distinguish between daughters and sons. 
Migrants and natives 
It comes as no surprise that moving to a different country increases the geographical
distance between migrants and their parents and thus reduces the frequency of 
contact with and help and care for older parents. However, when considering 
geographical distance, intergenerational contact of migrants is even more frequent, 
which supports the ‘safe haven’ hypothesis. Regarding the frequency of parents’ 
contact with their adult children, migrants seem to differ considerably less from 
the native population. Nevertheless, there is more conflict. Possible reasons are 
strains due to migration and the situation in the host country as well as a ‘drifting 
apart’ of migrant parents and their offspring owing to the different cultural 
contexts (‘drift’ hypothesis). Moreover, since migration is often triggered by 
economic circumstances, it is safe to assume that migrants are less likely to have 
rich parents, which in turn means that migrants represent a population group with 
substantially lower chances of receiving a notable inheritance. 
Region and country 
The country in which one lives is of great importance for intergenerational rela­
tions. From a global perspective, one might assume that European countries are
quite similar. However, this is far from true. Every country is unique, and it 
is important to have a close look at country-specific differences. Nevertheless, 
the patterns we do find are also associated with the wider regions of Northern, 
Western, Eastern and Southern Europe. In the north, (near) coresidence with 
adult children is relatively rare. At the same time, Sweden and Denmark show 
particularly low levels of conflict as well as high rates of help and inheritance. 
A generally different pattern can be found in the south, where there are particu­
larly high rates of contact, coresidence and care. However, help is less frequent 
and so are inheritances. Eastern European countries are marked by low rates of 
conflict, frequent instances of shared living space and rare bequests. The latter 
also applies to East Germany, reflecting the long-term effects of differing political
and economic regimes. 
Opportunity, need, family, society 
One of the main arguments of this book is that the relationships between adult 
children and parents are influenced by individual, familial and societal factors. 
From this it follows that three levels of analysis need to be addressed: micro 
(individual opportunities and needs), meso (family) and macro (society). This









Intergenerational relations are closely linked with resources. Education and 
income have already been mentioned as highly significant means of providing
support. Possession of greater financial resources gives ample opportunity to 
assist other generations. This is also true for property. Moreover, expected mon­
etary returns seem to encourage solidarity. For example, an expected future inher­
itance is clearly associated with more frequent contact and the willingness to pro­
vide help and care. This is an indication that the financial means of one generation 
are an opportunity to motivate attention and support from the other generation. 
Another crucial factor is geographical distance. The closer the generations live to 
one another, the more contact, help and care is possible. By contrast, the farther 
they live apart, the less opportunity there is for personal contact and support. 
Having more space enhances the opportunity for generations to live in the same 
household. Parents with larger homes are more likely to still have adult children 
living with them. 
Need 
Much intergenerational solidarity is due to necessity. Family members do not 
leave one another to fend for themselves when problems strike. Parents support 
their offspring when they are in need, and adult children care for their parents, 
for example, when they become frail – and doing so often comes with considerable 
sacrifices in either case. One particularly crucial need factor is health. When their 
parents’ health is poor, adult children are more likely to help, and the poor health 
of parents is the most important factor responsible for adult children providing 
care. Poor health is also associated with more conflict, which is further evidence 
supporting the strain hypothesis. Another need factor is the employment situation. 
When adult children are in education, parents are much more likely to provide 
living space or give money. Age plays a relevant role, too. Parents particularly 
support their young adult children by giving space and money, whereas children 
are more likely to provide help and care to older parents. 
Family 
There are a number of family aspects that influence intergenerational relations. 
Gender combinations have already been mentioned. Another crucial factor is 
partnership. Married parents have the most frequent contact with their adult chil­
dren, whereas divorced and single parents show particularly low contact rates 
with their offspring. Parents who have a partner also give money more frequently, 
whereas adult children with a partner are less likely to receive financial transfers. 
Moreover, it is especially rare that these children still live with their parents. The 
number of offspring plays a role, too. Having more children leads to partitioning
resources. The more children, the less contact and coresidence with each child,





Having a grandchild also diminishes coresidence, money and help, while increasing 
the likelihood of near coresidence. The number of siblings lessens contact with 
and help to parents, again showing that having more offspring reduces the support 
received from each child. 
Society 
Migration – and thus cultural differences – is one crucial factor for intergenera­
tional cohesion. Welfare states and social stratification have also been shown to be 
of utmost importance for the relationships between adult children and parents. A 
strong welfare state and more family expenditure in particular are associated with 
fewer generational conflicts, fewer adult children still having to live with their 
parents, more frequent help to parents, more current monetary transfers to adult 
children, and more bequests. By contrast, relatively small public expenditure for 
families is accompanied by more conflict and coresidence as well as less money, 
help and inheritances. Wealthy countries show more intergenerational contact and 
conflict, less (near) coresidence, more large inter vivos transfers of money and 
more bequests. Living in a country with a high poverty rate also goes hand in hand 
with more contact and conflict, but at the same time with more (near) coresidence, 
less help and fewer large monetary transmissions including bequests. 
Connections 
A core feature of intergenerational relations is ‘connections’ (Szydlik 2012b).
Family generations connect (a) individuals, (b) people with time, (c) forms
and factors of solidarity, (d) research agendas and (e) individuals and fami­
lies with society. 
First of all, intergenerational relations connect individuals. The analyses in 
this book provide ample evidence of the lifelong bonds between parents and chil­
dren. Intergenerational relations connect the young with the old. Family life offers 
opportunities for mutual recognition and understanding, but also for conflict. 
Family generations connect individuals with (historical) time, linking present, 
past and future. Listening to one’s parents’ or grandparents’ life stories means 
reflecting on former times. Interacting with children gives parents the opportunity 
to look at new times, new technologies, new ways of thinking and seeing things 
through their children’s eyes. 
Various forms of solidarity are connected with one another, for example, when 
it comes to reciprocity between money and time. Solidarity factors are linked in 
many ways, too, which has been shown via the ONFC model and the empirical 
analyses based thereon. There are links among micro, meso and macro levels, that 
is, individual, family and society. 
When investigating intergenerational relations, it is crucial to combine the­
oretical reasoning with empirical investigations, and vice versa. Research on 
generations also connects various sociological subdisciplines such as economic, 





social stratification research. Furthermore, generation research connects scientific
disciplines. For example, Künemund and Szydlik (2009) compiled generation 
research in sociology, biology, Egyptology, history, pedagogy, ethnology, psychology, 
literary studies, media studies, economics, law and political science. 
Family solidarity is a basis for social cohesion and thus connects individu­
als and families with society. There exist connections between family and social 
generations, be it in political, cultural or economic terms. Intergenerational fam­
ily relations link societal domains and political fields, such as education, fam­
ily, finance, labour, law etc. There is also a link between family generations and 
demographic change. Fertility is a key aspect of demography, and longevity has a 
great influence on intergenerational relations. Moreover, there is a strong private-
public welfare link, including connections between private and public intergen­
erational solidarity. Last but not least, there are important connections between 
intergenerational family solidarity and social inequality. 
Generation and state 
Welfare states have enormous consequences for intergenerational relations. There 
are striking differences among social-democratic, conservative, familistic and 
post-socialist countries, and also between individual states within the same group 
of nations. The country in which they live makes a huge difference to individuals 
and families. 
What is the nature of the connection between generation and state? The
empirical results support both ‘crowding-out’ and ‘crowding-in’. The welfare 
state reduces and enhances family solidarity at the same time. Living in a weak 
welfare state means that family members are more obliged to support one another. 
Here, women in particular are expected to assume care responsibilities for their 
dependent parents. In contrast, in a strong welfare state, families are more likely 
to have the option of leaving the burden of intense personal care to professionals. 
However, the results show that this crowding-out in the area of intense care would 
be misinterpreted if taken as a general retreat of family members from solidarity 
per se. On the contrary, family solidarity is still strong in strong welfare states. 
Here, help below the threshold of intense personal care is even more frequent, 
indicating crowding-in. 
Taking both results into consideration suggests a welfare mix of family and 
state, a ‘refined specialisation’ of private and public support. A stronger wel­
fare state offers adult children and parents greater choice. In this case, family 
members and public services can concentrate on the tasks that they are especially 
suited to perform. This division of labour leaves it to professionals to take care 
of regular, plannable and intensive work, whereas family members can focus on 
sporadic, short-term and less arduous tasks (Brandt et al. 2009; Igel et al. 2009). 
For example, adult children would assume tasks such as practical household help, 
organising care provision amongst family members and professionals, helping 
with paperwork and bureaucratic matters and in general providing attention to 
and emotional support for their parents. Such a ‘refined specialisation’ could be to 
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the benefit of frail elderly, and would also benefit adult children because intense 
care often places an extreme burden on the caregivers, even to the point of over­
burdening them (e.g., Colombo et al. 2011: 85ff.). Furthermore, reconciling work 
and family is not only a problem for parents of small children, but also for adult 
children with frail parents. In any case, according to Figure 3.4, a combination of 
private and public responsibility would reflect the opinion of the overwhelming 
majority of the respondents. 
However, offering a refined mix of public and private welfare is rendered even 
more difficult by a number of major challenges. One such challenge is demo­
graphic change. Longer lives belong to the best news of our time. Family gen­
erations obviously make use of those gained years. Nevertheless, demographic 
change also involves many more people being in need of intense support and care. 
Another challenge is the increased flexibility demands in working life (‘flexibili­
sation’; Szydlik 2008b). Flexible time demands put a daily strain on the employed 
and their relatives: families need stability and reliability, whereas employers 
demand flexibility. At the same time, increased work-induced demands for geo­
graphical mobility make it increasingly difficult for adult family generations to 
support one another (BMFSFJ 2006: 142). This is all the more important since the 
analyses show that spatial proximity is one of the most significant conditions for 
intergenerational contact, help and care. Developments in family structures rep­
resent a further challenge. Less stable partnerships and fewer siblings who could 
share care work decrease support resources, and put more strain on those who are 
still available (Szydlik 2012b: 101f.). All in all, the greater need for solidarity 
comes up against fewer opportunities to provide it. 
Against this background, the retreat of the welfare state poses a serious addi­
tional problem. The availability of fewer public services puts much more pres­
sure on family members – and especially women – to provide intensive support 
(Schmid 2014; Haberkern et al. 2015). The analyses in this book have further 
shown that private financial transfers are extremely dependent on resources. 
Part of the money that is publicly transferred from young to old (i.e., from the 
employed population to pensioners) is privately returned by the old to the young 
(Kohli 1999). Diminished means thus equate to less monetary support for fam­
ily generations in need. The connection between public and private transfers is 
of particular significance to the lower classes. Smaller pensions for less affluent 
groups would not only reduce the quality of life of those pensioners, but would 
also result in less private support for their offspring. Instead, adult children might 
be urged to give money to their parents in need – if they can afford to do so. This 
interplay of public and private intergenerational solidarity could ultimately also 
reduce the acceptance of the public ‘intergenerational contract’. 
Strong family cohesion might inspire the political protagonists of a ‘lean’ wel­
fare state to champion the reduction of public spending, since an argument might 
be made that, in this case, the family would take over. However, the connection 
of family and welfare state is less one of competition than of complementarity. 
Precisely because relatives support one another in difficult situations, they should 




more likely to avoid excessive strains and an overburdening of caring relatives, 
and thus consequential costs for individuals, families and societies. 
Generation and inequality 
There is a precarious relation between intergenerational solidarity and social 
inequality. Family cohesion is closely connected with social stratification. The 
relationship goes in both directions. On the one hand, education and income as 
well as societal wealth and poverty greatly influence how parents and children 
share their lives: social inequality affects intergenerational solidarity. On the other 
hand, parents’ lifelong support for their children has immense consequences for 
social stratification. Intergenerational solidarity is one of the main driving forces 
for the preservation and even widening of social disparities. 
Parents care deeply for their offspring. Lifelong solidarity lasts from cradle to 
grave, and even beyond. This family cohesion ‘transfers’ social inequality from 
one generation to the next (Swartz 2009: 207). The mechanisms are elaborated 
in Chapter 2. At each stage of their children’s life course, parents support their 
offspring as well as they can, but affluent parents can do more. In fact, one can 
observe an accumulation of social inequality over the life course (Szydlik 2012a). 
Better-educated and rich parents have abundant resources that they use for the 
benefit of their offspring. Children are born into higher- or lower-class families, 
which has tremendous consequences for their whole lives, including education, 
school, vocation, job, career, income, prestige, job security, (un)employment, 
partnership and the social background of their partner, poverty or wealth, hous­
ing, travel, quality of life, self-esteem, health, pension, morbidity and mortality. 
The connections between intergenerational solidarity and social inequality also 
apply to functional solidarity (the giving and receiving of space, money and time) 
between generations in adulthood. Providing living space can be seen as part of 
an investment of resourceful parents in a better education for their adult children, 
including university studies. At the same time, high poverty and youth unemploy­
ment greatly increase the proportion of young adults still living in their parents’ 
home. In both cases, those adult children who can rely on their parents to provide 
space have an advantage. Nevertheless, the empirical findings also suggest that 
permanent coresidence of adult family generations is more a result of economic 
pressure and less a matter of choice. The fact that higher income is associated with 
less intergenerational coresidence attests to this. Although adult children and par­
ents do prefer to share their lives, they would rather do so at a (preferably short) 
distance. The affluent have the ability to put that preference into practice. 
The other forms of functional solidarity – money and time – display a positive
correlation between resources and solidarity. Having more money increases the 
frequency of help, not least because helping others often requires a certain amount 
of financial resources, too. This applies to monetary transfers from parents
to adult children by the very nature of the transaction. Since current financial 
support goes particularly to adult children in education, this may even lead to 






However, in the long run, these transfers can be seen as investments in higher 
education, leading to more subsequent inequality between children of poor and 
of affluent parents. Wealthy parents are in a much better position to support
their children with money, and these children are much more likely to receive 
something. 
This also applies to the transfer of wealth from one generation to the next. 
An argument could be made that, on the whole, bequests do not greatly affect 
social inequality, since inheritances stem mostly from parents and thus stay within 
families: rich families stay rich, poor families stay poor. One might also point 
to relatively high gains of the less affluent in relation to their previous ‘wealth’. 
Nevertheless, the empirical results show that it is affluent adult children in par­
ticular who benefit from notable bequests. From a life course perspective, wealthy 
parents pass on their assets to affluent children in the second half of their lives, 
while these children have already profited substantially from the previous support 
of their parents. Those who have, give – and those whose parents have, receive. 
Adult children with no or few resources are in particular financial need. However, 
poor children rarely have wealthy parents. The findings confirm the Matthew 
principle: ‘To him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance’. 
Last but not least, it is important to emphasise that the connections between 
generation and inequality are orchestrated by political decisions. Three brief exam­
ples from a life course perspective serve to underline this. First, in the early stages 
of life, the division of pupils into basic and advanced schools by state-regulated
educational systems plays a major role in lifelong inequality. Dividing up children 
at an early stage favours the offspring of affluent parents by facilitating their path 
toward a better education, and thus more favourable social positions throughout 
life. Second, in later years, the extent of public support for families in need is cru­
cial. Living in a weak welfare state puts greater strain on less affluent families, in 
particular, to care for their relatives, thus leading to less choice in accommodating
different needs and preferences. Third, a pension, health and tax system with only 
weak redistributive elements ultimately contributes to ever increasing social dis­
parities that are perpetuated from one generation to the next. It is thus a task of 
society as a whole to closely address the unwelcome ‘side effects’ of otherwise 




Survey, sample, statistics 
This Appendix provides information on the survey, sample and statistical 
procedures. Furthermore, it documents the number of cases (Table A1), opera­
tionalisations of the dependent and independent variables (Tables A2 and A3) as
well as the results of multivariate analyses (Tables A4.1 to A9.2). 
Survey 
The empirical analyses are based on the ‘Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe’ (SHARE), a representative survey of the population aged 50 years and 
older that offers detailed information on respondents and their family members, 
including parents and (adult) children. This book uses the release of SHARE data 
that was distributed to researchers in 2014, which offers the best available data 
quality for the first two SHARE waves, whereas investigations based on previous 
releases need to be treated with more caution. 
Researchers using SHARE data are asked to issue the following declaration: 
This paper uses data from SHARE Waves 1 and 2 release 2.6.0, as of 
November 29th 2013 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.260 and 10.6103/ 
SHARE.w2.260). The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded 
by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme 
(project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of 
Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-
CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, 
CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme 
(SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, 
N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging 
(U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 
AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the 
German Ministry of Education and Research as well as from various national 
sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list 
of funding institutions). 
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Sample 
The first two waves of the SHARE survey, on which the empirical investigations 
of this book are based, were collected in 2004/05 and 2006/07. The third 
wave (2008/09), focusing on people’s life histories, does not contain sufficient 
information on intergenerational solidarity so it was not possible to use this data 
for the book at hand. The fourth wave (2010/12) did replicate a number of relevant 
generational questions of the first two waves. However, crucial information is 
missing. On the one hand, the fourth wave only partly tells which adult child 
received/gave time or money from/to parents. In fact, this information is limited 
to the respondents’ social network, which considerably restricts the possibility 
of conducting thorough analyses on intergenerational time support and financial 
transfers. On the other hand, the fourth wave provides no information on 
(intergenerational) conflict, making it impossible to use this data to conduct the 
corresponding analyses documented in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
All analyses refer to first-time respondents. This decision has three important 
advantages: 
1 	 The underlying time frame is crucial to a number of key questions of this study. 
For example, in the first interview, each respondent is asked whether he or 
she received/provided help or care in the last twelve months. In the following 
interview, the respondents are asked whether this applied to the time since the 
last interview. The same time frame was used when asking about giving and 
receiving financial transfers. As the time period between the interviews varies 
from 11 to 40 months, the question is hardly comparable across respondents,
since a different time frame for various respondents greatly affects the 
respective reply. The longer the time frame, the greater the likelihood of the 
occurrence of help, care or financial transfers. This problem is avoided by 
concentrating on first-time respondents. 
2 	 Since all questions were answered by the respondents for the very first time, 
this avoids a possible survey effect from asking the same question repeatedly 
and treating first- and second-time responses in the same way. 
3 	Concentrating on the first interview of both waves offers information on 
more observations than by only focusing on the second wave. 
The following 14 European countries are included in the analyses (ordered from 
north to south): Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Greece. 
A further distinction is made between West Germany and East Germany in order 
to observe long-term influences of the different political and economic regimes in 
the ‘former’ Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 
Thus, the model statistics count East and West Germany as separate observations, 
which technically amounts to a total of 15 ‘countries’. 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, although in general 
referring to respondents aged 50, also interviews younger partners of the main 
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respondents. In order to avoid possible age-related effects, all empirical analyses 
refer to respondents who are at least 50 years of age. Furthermore, people living 
in institutions such as nursing homes are excluded, and this also applies to those 
who, according to the interviewers, were on the whole not able to understand the 
survey questions. All in all, the investigations include over 39,000 respondents, 
12,500 child-parent and over 82,000 parent-child dyads (see Table A1). 
The results documented in the figures are weighted, except for Ireland, for 
which SHARE provides no weighting factor. 
Statistical procedures 
The theoretical considerations as well as the structure of the data suggest distin­
guishing up to four levels: dyads, individuals, households and countries. To do 
justice to the influences and differences at all levels, multilevel models are applied 
(Hox 1995; Guo and Zhao 2000; Snijders and Bosker 2012). Even though, from 
a statistical standpoint, only relatively ‘few’ countries are considered, multilevel 
analyses have a number of advantages. They make it possible to take into account 
the hierarchical structure of the data and the theoretical model. They also take into 
consideration that the hierarchical data structure generally makes it impossible to 
ensure the independence of observations (multiple individuals in the same house­
hold, individuals and households in the same country), so that we cannot assume 
unbiased and efficient coefficient estimates when performing ordinary ordered 
probit models or logistic regressions. 
The model statistics for the multilevel models include (a) the variances for 
the various levels, (b) the intraclass correlation and (c) the number of cases. 
The variances refer to the full model including the first macro indicator (social 
expenditure). The total variance of the dependent variable is partitioned into the 
variances for the various levels, where the lowest level is set to π2/3 ( 3.29) as the 
standard logistic distribution (Snijders and Bosker 2012). The intraclass correla­
tion (ICC) is calculated for the empty model. It refers to the ‘highest’ ( country) 
level. The letter ‘n’ stands for the number of cases. 
Because of the number of cases (countries) at the ‘highest’ level of the multi­
level models, the macro variables are included in the multivariate models one at 
a time. The listed net coefficients of the other independent variables always refer 
to the model with the first documented macro variable (social expenditure). Stata 
software (GLLAMM) was used to estimate the multilevel models. 
Tables A4.1–A9.2 list the results of the ordered probit models and (multino­
mial) logistic regressions. In the case of the ordered probit models, a negative 
coefficient indicates a statistically negative association of the corresponding 
independent and dependent variables, whereas a positive parameter denotes a 
statistically positive relation. The documented coefficients of the (multinomial) 
logistic regression analyses are odds ratios. Coefficients greater than 1 indicate 
a greater likelihood with regard to the dependent variable (e.g., of receiving an 
inheritance) compared to the reference group, whereas those less than 1 indicate 













Table A1 Cases 
Respondents Dyads 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Waves  Resp. – Resp. – 
12 parent child* 
Education: Lower 13,242 6,464 19,706 4,378 44,166
 Medium 7,502 4,984 12,486 4,924 24,186
 Higher 4,645 2,515 7,160 3,226 14,011 
Income: – – 2,591 1,832 4,423 1,290 10,074 
  6,533 4,520 11,053 3,232 23,577 
   8,991 4,479 13,470 4,357 27,565 
  7,274 3,132 10,406 3,649 21,147 
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When interpreting the results in terms of their relative relevance, one needs
to consider the scale of the independent variable. For example, a coefficient
for a variable with only two values (e.g., gender) is likely to be higher than a
coefficient for a variable with ten values. This fact is also taken into account
when transferring the net parameters into (more or fewer) ‘+’ and ‘–’ in the
overview figures of this book. In this case, only significant coefficients (5%
level) are considered. The following limits are applied to positive and negative
relations, respectively: contact (0.4/0.8, 0.4/0.8), conflict (0.1/0.2, 0.1/0.2),
space, money, time, inheri tance (1.5/2, 0.67/0.5). For metric variables, half of
the range is used as a basis. 
In the ‘gross’ models, the influence of independent variables is estimated without 
considering control variables, as opposed to the ‘net’ models in which the coefficients 
are determined including the other independent variables (except for the macro 
variables in the case of the country models). 
In the country models (Tables A4.1, A5.1, A6.1, A7.1, A8.1, A9.1), West 
Germany serves as the reference group. West Germany not only offers a fairly 
large number of observations, but is also a medium case, which leads to a conser­
vative estimate without running the risk of exaggerating the country differences. 
The units of analysis are either individuals or dyads; ‘dyad’ means that inter-
generational relationships are considered. For instance, the relationship of a 
mother with her first daughter is considered as one unit of analysis (one dyad), 
whereas the mother’s relationship with her second daughter is another dyad. 
Information on the operationalisation of the dependent and independent
variables is provided in Tables A2 and A3. If not specified otherwise, the inde­
pendent variables refer to the respondent. For example, the variable ‘education’ 
refers to the education of the respondent. The abbreviation ‘(ref.)’ stands for
‘reference group’. 
Cases, variables, analyses 
Female 13,704 7,510 21,214 6,718 45,225 
Male 11,685 6,453 18,138 5,810 37,138 
Migrant 2,010 913 2,923 994 6,248 
Native 23,379 13,050 36,429 11,534 76,115 
Sweden 2,838 643 3,481 1,207 7,811 
Denmark 1,517 1,257 2,774 960 5,917 
Ireland 1,033 1,033 200 2,946 
Netherlands 2,693 755 3,448 1,118 7,721 
Belgium 3,506 285 3,791 1,295 7,823 
France 2,790 825 3,615 1,503 7,621 
Germany 2,745 895 3,640 1,156 6,612 
West Germany 2,226 720 2,946 942 5,273 
East Germany 519 175 694 214 1,339 
Poland 2,294 2,294 540 5,693 
Czech Republic 2,598 2,598 693 4,977 
Austria 1,476 54 1,530 357 2,916 
Switzerland 856 713 1,569 604 3,058 
Italy 2,326 1,113 3,439 982 6,816 
Spain 2,047 661 2,708 699 6,169 
Greece 2,595 837 3,432 1,214 6,283 
All 25,389 13,963 39,352 12,528 82,363 
Source: SHARE. First-time respondents, unweighted. Resp.: respondent. *: child at least 18 years old. 
 Table A2 Dependent variables [Chapter in this book] 
Contact [4] 0: Less often. 1: About once a week. 2: Several times a week. 3: Daily. 
Time: Last twelve months. Level: Dyads 
Conflict [5] 0: Never. 1: Rarely. 2: Sometimes. 3: Often. Time: Current. Level: 
Individuals 
Space [6] 0: Parent and adult child live in different houses. 1: Parent and adult 
child live in the same household (coresidence). 2: Parent and adult 
child live in the same house but in different households (near 
coresidence). Time: Current. Level: Dyads 
Money [7] 1: Financial transfer to adult child of at least 250 €. 0: No transfer of at 
least 250 € to adult child. / 1: Financial transfer to adult child of at 
least 2,000 €. 0: No transfer of at least 250 € to adult child. Time: 
Last twelve months. Level: Dyads 
Time [8] Help: 1: Household help or help with paperwork to parent, no care. 
0: No help or care to parent. / Care: 1: Personal care to parent 
averaging at least one hour per week. 0: No personal care to parent. 
Time: Last twelve months. Level: Dyads 
Inheritance [9] Previous: 1: Inheritance from deceased parent worth more than 
5,000 €. 0: No inheritance of more than 5,000 € from deceased 
parent. Time: Ever. / Future: 1: At least 50% chance of receiving an 
inheritance. 0: Less than 50% chance of receiving an inheritance. 
Time: Next ten years. Level: Individuals 
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 Table A3 Independent variables [Chapter(s) in this book]
 
Age In years [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Child Respondent has at least one child [9] 
Contact Day: Daily contact. Week: Several times a week. Month: ‘About 
once a week’ or ‘About every two weeks’ or ‘About once a 
month’. Year: ‘Less than once a month’ or ‘Never’ [5, 7] 
Distance  1: Same house/2: < 1 km/3: 15 km/4: 525 km/5: 25100
 km/6: 100500 km/7: > 500 km/8: > 500 km, other country
[4, 8] 
Education Highest level of formal education completed according to the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997 
(see OECD 1999). Lower: Lower secondary education/Medium: 
Upper or post-secondary education/Higher: Tertiary education 
(academics) [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Employment Education: In vocational training/retraining/education/Full-time 
status employed or self-employed/Part-time employed (< 30 hours per 
week)/Unemployed/Not in workforce: Parental leave or looking 
after home/family or (early) retirement or permanently sick/ 
disabled or other [6, 7] 
Family status Married: Married and living with a spouse or in a registered 
partnership/Partner: Never married, but living with a partner/ 
Widowed/Divorced: Divorced or living separated from the 
spouse/Single: Never married, no partner [4, 5, 6, 7, 9] 
Future Contact/conflict with parents: At least 50% chance of receiving an 
inheritance inheritance in the next ten years, including property and other 
valuables. Contact/conflict with children: Respondent or partner 
has at least 50% chance of leaving an inheritance, including 
property and other valuables [4, 5]. Help/care: At least 50% 
chance of receiving an inheritance in the next ten years, including 
property and other valuables [8] 
Gender dyads Daughter-mother, daughter-father, son-mother, son-father dyads (and 
vice versa) [4, 6, 7, 8] 
Grandchild Respondent has at least one living grandchild [4, 5, 7, 8]. Child of 
respondent has at least one living child [6] 
Health 1: Health is less than good (worst two of five values). 0: Health is 
good/excellent (best three of five values) [4, 5, 6, 8] 
Income 1: Thinking of household’s total monthly income: Household is able 
to make ends meet (fairly) easily. 0: … with some/great difficulty 
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Migrant 1: The country of birth is not the country of residence or the 
respondent does not have the citizenship of the country of 
residence. 0: The country of birth is the country of residence and 
the respondent has the citizenship of the country of residence [4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9] 
Money in bank Money of respondent and partner in the bank, transaction or saving 
accounts at the end of the year before the interview in 1,000 € 




Money transfer Financial transfer of at least 250 € within dyad in the last twelve 
months, either given or received [4]. Financial transfer of at least 
250 € from respondent to parent/adult child in the last twelve 
months [5]. Financial transfer of at least 250 € from parent to 
respondent in the last twelve months [8] 
Mother/  Mother alive: Mother is alive, father is deceased/Father alive: Father is
father alive  alive, mother is deceased/Parents deceased: Mother and father are
both deceased/Parents alive: Mother and father are both alive [9] 
Number of Range: 0 to 10 (the few cases with more than ten children are set to 
children 10) [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] 
Number of Number of rooms for household members’ personal use, including 
rooms	 bedrooms, excluding kitchen, bathrooms, hallways and (sub)let 
rooms. Range: 0 to 8 (the few cases with more than eight rooms 
are set to 8) [6] 
Number of Range: 0 to 10 (the few cases with more than ten siblings are set to 
siblings 10) [4, 5, 8]. No sibling: Respondent has no sibling/1 sibling: 
Respondent has one sibling/2 siblings: Respondent has two 
siblings/3 siblings: Respondent has at least three siblings [9] 
Partner Married and living with a spouse or in a registered partnership, or 
never married but living with a partner [7] 
Partner child	 Child has a partner who lives with her/him [4, 7] 
Partner parent Both parents of the respondent are alive, and both parents live in the 
same geographical distance to the respondent (=assumption that 
parents live together, due to a lack of direct information on 
parents’ partnership in the survey) [4, 8] 
Previous Respondent or partner has ever received a gift or inherited money, 
inheritance goods or property worth more than 5,000 € [9] 
Property Property ownership (including own residence, secondary homes, 
holiday homes, other property, land or forestry; not including 
special time-sharing arrangements) [9] 
Time transfer Help or care from respondent to parent/adult child in the last twelve 
months [5]. Help or care to respondent from child in the last 
twelve months [7]. Help or care from respondent to parent in the 
last twelve months [9] 
Woman	 Respondent is female [5, 9] 
Macro variables [Chapter(s) in this book] (see Figure 2.3) 
Social Total public expenditure (for old age, survivors, incapacity related, 
expenditure families, active labour market programmes, housing, other social 
policy areas) in per cent of GDP per country, 2005. Source: 
OECD 2012 [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Family Total public expenditure for families (family allowances, maternity 
expenditure and parental leave, other cash benefits, day care/home-help 
services, other benefits in kind) in per cent of GDP per country, 
2005. Source: OECD 2012 [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Wealth per Per capita wealth per country adjusted for purchasing power parity 
capita in 10,000 €, in 2000. Source: Davies et al. 2007 [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Poverty rate  Percentage of people below 60 per cent of the median net equivalent
income in a country, mid 2000s. Source: OECD 2008 [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
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 A4 Contact 
Table A4.1 Contact: Countries 
Contact with parents Contact with children 
Gross Net Gross Net 
Sweden 0.05 0.32*** 0.10*** 0.36*** 
Denmark 0.06 0.15*** 0.02 0.19*** 
Ireland 0.32*** 0.72*** 0.36*** 0.81*** 
Netherlands 0.01 0.25*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 
Belgium 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
France 0.04 0.37*** 0.03 0.23*** 
West Germany 
East Germany 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.11*** 0.03 
Poland 0.02 0.15** 0.08*** 0.12*** 
Czech Republic 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.10*** 
Austria 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.06** 0.04 
Switzerland 0.18*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.08*** 
Italy 0.84*** 0.91*** 0.85*** 0.91*** 
Spain 0.72*** 0.91*** 0.66*** 0.77*** 
Greece 0.68*** 0.91*** 1.00*** 1.10*** 
n 11,799 11,799 61,264 61,264 
Source: SHARE. Ordered probit models, unweighted, no coresidence. Coefficients significant at the 
* 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
174 Appendix: Data 
Model statistics for Table A4.2 
Variance (full model)
 dyads S2/3 S2/3
 individuals 7.04 0.00
 households 2.29 1.38
 countries 0.38 0.15 
ICC (empty model) 0.03 0.03 
n dyads 11,799 61,264 
n individuals 9,553 29,712 
n households 8,398 20,375 
n countries 15 15 
 
 Table A4.2 Explaining contact 
Contact with parents Contact with children
 
Gross Net Gross Net
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Grandchild 





















































































Source: SHARE. Multilevel ordered probit models, unweighted, no coresidence. Coefficients signifi­
cant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
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 Table A5.1 Conflict: Countries 
Contact with parents Contact with children 








































































n 5,468 5,468 19,637 19,637 
 Source: SHARE. Ordered probit models, unweighted. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, 
*** 0.01-level. 
Model statistics for Table A5.2 
Variance (full model) 
 individuals π2/3 π2/3 
 households 0.39 0.83 
 countries 0.20 0.07 
ICC (empty model) 0.03 0.02 
n individuals 5,468 19,637 
n households 4,871 14,209 
n countries 15 15 
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A5 Conflict 
 
 Table A5.2 Explaining conflict 
Conflict with parents Conflict with children
 
Gross Net Gross Net
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Grandchild 
























































































Source: SHARE. Multilevel ordered probit models, unweighted. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, 
** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
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 Table A6.1 Space: Countries 
Coresidence  Near coresidence 








































































n 74,372 74,372 74,372 74,372 
Source: SHARE. Multinomial logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Parent (respondents)­
adult child dyads. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
Model statistics for Table A6.2 
Variance (full model) 
 dyads π2/3 π2/3 
 individuals 0.00 0.00 
 households 4.71 4.71 
 countries 0.95 0.95 
ICC (empty model) 0.12 0.12 
n dyads 74,372 74,372 
n individuals 33,558 33,558 
n households 23,419 23,419 
n countries 15 15 
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A6 Space 
 
 Table A6.2 Explaining space 
Coresidence Near coresidence 
Gross Net Gross Net 
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Source: SHARE. Multilevel multinomial logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Parent 
   (respondents)-adult child dyads. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
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A7 Money 
Table A7.1 Money: Countries 
At least 250 € At least 2,000 € 
Gross Net Gross Net 
Sweden 1.29*** 1.48*** 0.56*** 0.64*** 
Denmark 1.15*** 1.02 1.14 0.94 
Ireland 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.88 0.85 
Netherlands 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.69*** 0.66*** 
Belgium 0.75*** 0.93 0.73*** 0.90 
France 0.78*** 1.08 0.81*** 1.09 
West Germany 
East Germany 1.21** 1.15 1.14 1.01 
Poland 0.41*** 0.95 0.09*** 0.26*** 
Czech Republic 0.61*** 1.11 0.13*** 0.30*** 
Austria 0.85*** 1.08 0.62*** 0.80* 
Switzerland 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.75** 0.68*** 
Italy 0.58*** 1.15** 0.62*** 1.37*** 
Spain 0.19*** 0.38*** 0.21*** 0.46*** 
Greece 0.84*** 1.40*** 1.04 1.66*** 
n 59,623 59,623 53,231 53,231 
Source: SHARE. Logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Parent (respondents)-adult child 
dyads, no coresidence. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
Model statistics for Table A7.2 
Variance (full model)
 dyads S2/3 S2/3
 individuals 0.00 0.00
 households 15.19 19.71
 countries 0.34 0.73 
ICC (empty model) 0.12 0.09 
n dyads 59,623 53,231 
n individuals 29,074 26,603 
n households 19,926 18,336 
n countries 15 15 
Table A7.2 Explaining money 
At least 250 € At least 2,000 € 
Gross Net Gross Net 
Opportunity Structures 
Education: Lower (ref.)
 Medium 2.59*** 1.47*** 2.73*** 1.68***
 Higher 5.67*** 2.63*** 6.95*** 3.88*** 
Income 10.83*** 4.90*** 4.20*** 3.87*** 
Money in bank 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.06*** 1.04*** 
Contact: Day 1.01 1.08 1.20* 1.22
 Week (ref.)
 Month 0.65*** 0.73*** 0.54*** 0.70***
 Year 0.30*** 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.32*** 
Need Structures 
Child: Education (ref.)
 Full-time 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.01*** 0.05***
 Part-time 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.01*** 0.06***
 Unemployed 0.23*** 0.56*** 0.02*** 0.22*** 
 Not in workforce 0.07*** 0.25*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 
Age child 0.87*** 0.91*** 0.86*** 0.92*** 
Time transfer 1.21** 1.87*** 1.01 1.23 
Family Structures 
Mother-daughter (ref.)
 Father-daughter 1.29*** 1.01 1.26** 1.09
 Mother-son 0.75*** 0.83*** 0.85 0.99
 Father-son 0.91 0.78*** 0.87 0.90 
Partner 4.02*** 1.47*** 4.83*** 1.15 
Partner child 0.33*** 0.54*** 0.38*** 0.58*** 
Number of children 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.38*** 0.54*** 
Grandchild 0.09*** 0.75*** 0.08*** 0.44*** 
Cultural-contextual Structures 
Migrant 0.86 1.10 0.80 0.82 
Social expenditure 1.09*** 1.04*** 1.19*** 0.92*** 
Family expenditure 5.66*** 1.51*** 0.18*** 0.94 
Wealth per capita 0.83*** 1.02 1.27*** 1.15*** 
Poverty rate 0.65*** 1.03 0.70*** 0.90*** 
Source: SHARE. Multilevel logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Parent (respondents)-adult 
child dyads, no coresidence. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
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A8 Time 
Table A8.1 Time: Countries 
Help Care
 
Gross Net Gross Net
 
Sweden 1.44*** 1.79*** 0.85 0.90 
Denmark 1.52*** 1.66*** 0.79 0.81 
Ireland 0.75 1.05 2.10*** 2.26*** 
Netherlands 1.18 1.47*** 1.24 1.43* 
Belgium 1.27** 1.25** 0.97 1.11 
France 0.75*** 1.14 0.62** 0.83 
West Germany 
East Germany 0.87 0.90 1.26 0.99 
Poland 0.37*** 0.51*** 0.93 0.76 
Czech Republic 0.69*** 0.81 1.34 1.32 
Austria 0.58*** 0.64*** 1.44 1.62* 
Switzerland 0.97 1.14 0.69 0.70 
Italy 0.42*** 0.41*** 1.91*** 1.56** 
Spain 0.33*** 0.35*** 1.35 1.48* 
Greece 0.45*** 0.49*** 1.05 1.19 
n 11,085 11,085 11,633 11,633 
Source: SHARE. Logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Adult child (respondents)-parent 
dyads, no coresidence. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
Model statistics for Table A8.2 
Variance (full model)
 dyads S2/3 S2/3
 individuals 1.44 5.52
 households 3.64 2.88
 countries 0.29 0.08 
ICC (empty model) 0.04 0.02 
n dyads 11,085 11,633 
n individuals 8,971 9,425 
n households 7,929 8,299 
n countries 15 15 
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Table A8.2 Explaining time 
Help Care
 




 Medium 1.55*** 1.31*** 1.62** 1.91***
 Higher 1.95*** 1.81*** 1.45* 2.23*** 
Income 2.19*** 1.73*** 0.98 0.93 
Future inheritance 2.96*** 2.33*** 1.54** 1.51*** 
Health 0.58*** 0.68*** 1.54** 0.93 
Distance 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 
Need Structures 
Money transfer 2.86*** 2.27*** 2.41** 2.21** 
Age parent 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 
Health parent 1.16* 1.43*** 7.08*** 6.06*** 
Family Structures 
Daughter-mother (ref.)
 Daughter-father 0.91 0.87 0.48*** 0.45***
 Son-mother 0.64*** 0.53*** 0.10*** 0.09***
 Son-father 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
Married (ref.)
 Partner 0.76 0.96 1.18 1.75
 Widowed 1.24 1.22 1.85 0.87
 Divorced 1.05 1.01 1.27 0.93
 Single 1.70*** 1.21 2.57** 1.77 
Partner parent 0.89 0.82** 0.29*** 0.52*** 
Number of children 0.81*** 0.91** 0.82*** 0.90 
Grandchild 0.64*** 0.70*** 1.21 0.74* 
Number of siblings 0.76*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.95 
Cultural-contextual Structures 
Migrant 0.19*** 0.63** 0.27*** 0.74 
Social expenditure 1.09*** 1.08** 0.93** 0.94** 
Family expenditure 2.17*** 2.22*** 0.75 0.83 
Wealth per capita 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.04 
Poverty rate 0.81*** 0.80*** 1.09** 1.06 
Source: SHARE. Multilevel logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Adult child (respondents)­
parent dyads, no coresidence. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
184 Appendix: Data 
A9 Inheritance 
Table A9.1 Inheritance: Countries 
Previous inheritance Future inheritance
 
Gross Net Gross Net
 
Sweden 1.42*** 1.70*** 1.82*** 2.20*** 
Denmark 1.62*** 1.49*** 1.75*** 1.64*** 
Ireland 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.72*** 1.08 
Netherlands 0.78*** 0.91 1.37*** 1.65*** 
Belgium 1.58*** 1.94*** 1.75*** 2.25*** 
France 0.79*** 1.07 1.32*** 1.49*** 
West Germany 
East Germany 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.72** 0.71** 
Poland 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.38*** 
Czech Republic 0.32*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.42*** 
Austria 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.55*** 
Switzerland 1.62*** 2.07*** 1.52*** 1.75*** 
Italy 0.49*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.98 
Spain 0.50*** 0.81** 0.74*** 1.34*** 
Greece 0.69*** 0.99 0.66*** 0.71*** 
n 35,720 35,720 36,834 36,834 
Source: SHARE. Logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Coefficients significant at the * 0.10-, 
** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 
Model statistics for Table A9.2 
Variance (full model)
 individuals S2/3 S2/3
 households 0.15 3.58
 countries 0.13 0.29 
ICC (empty model) 0.03 0.06 
n individuals 35,720 36,834 
n households 25,787 26,474 
n countries 15 15 
Table A9.2 Explaining inheritance 
Previous inheritance Future inheritance
 




 Medium 1.71*** 1.50*** 3.70*** 1.53***
 Higher 2.67*** 2.28*** 6.65*** 2.38*** 
Income 1.74*** 1.64*** 2.25*** 1.59*** 
Previous inheritance / / 1.84*** 1.54*** 
Mother alive 0.71*** 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.60***
 Father alive 0.77*** 0.48*** 0.66*** 0.80*** 
 Parents deceased (ref.) 0.02*** 0.04*** 
 Parents alive (ref.) / / 
Need Structures 
Property / / 2.75*** 1.40*** 
Age 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.84*** 0.93*** 
Time transfer / / 3.67*** 1.64*** 
Family Structures 
Woman 0.88*** 0.96 0.98 0.93 
Married (ref.)
 Partner 0.89 0.82*** 1.43*** 1.09
 Widowed 0.68*** 1.01 0.10*** 0.72***
 Divorced 1.27*** 1.36*** 0.99 0.95
 Single 1.90*** 1.91*** 0.84 1.17 
Child 0.76*** 1.02 1.13 1.06 
No sibling (ref.)
 1 sibling 1.10** 0.88 1.78*** 1.00
 2 siblings 0.99 0.86** 1.82*** 0.93
 3 siblings 0.68*** 0.60*** 1.25*** 0.69*** 
Cultural-contextual Structures 
Migrant 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 
Social expenditure 1.08*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.10*** 
Family expenditure 1.40*** 1.38*** 1.60*** 1.15*** 
Wealth per capita 1.01* 1.10*** 1.20*** 1.19*** 
Poverty rate 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 
Source: SHARE. Multilevel logistic regressions, unweighted, odds ratios. Coefficients significant at 
the * 0.10-, ** 0.05-, *** 0.01-level. 





Aassve, Arnstein, Francesco C. Billari, Stefano Mazzuco, Fausta Ongaro 2002: Leaving 
Home: A Comparative Analysis of ECHP Data. In: Journal of European Social Policy, 
12, 4: 259–275. 
Abrahamson, Peter, Thomas P. Boje, Bent Greve 2005: Welfare and Families in Europe. 
Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate. 
Ahrons, Constance R., Jennifer L. Tanner 2003: Adult Children and Their Fathers: 
Relationship Changes 20 Years after Parental Divorce. In: Family Relations, 52, 4: 
340–351. 
Alber, Jens, Ulrich Köhler (eds.) 2004: Health and Care in an Enlarged Europe. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Albert, Isabelle, Dieter Ferring (eds.) 2013: Intergenerational Relations – European 
Perspectives on Family and Society. Bristol, Chicago: Policy Press. 
Albertini, Marco, Martin Kohli, Claudia Vogel 2007: Intergenerational Transfers of Time 
and Money in European Families: Common Patterns – Different Regimes? In: Journal 
of European Social Policy, 17, 4: 319–334. 
Albertini, Marco, Jonas Radl 2012: Intergenerational Transfers and Social Class: Inter­
vivos Transfers as Means of Status Reproduction? In: Acta Sociologica, 55, 2:
107–123. 
Alt, Christian 1994: Reziprozität von Eltern-Kind-Beziehungen in Mehrgenera­
tionennetzwerken. In: Bien, Walter (ed.), Eigeninteresse oder Solidarität – Beziehungen 
in modernen Mehrgenerationenfamilien. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 197–222. 
Angelini, Viola, Anne Laferrère 2013: Parental Altruism and Nest Leaving in Europe: 
Evidence from a Retrospective Survey. In: Review of Economics of the Household, 11, 
3: 393–420. 
Angelone, Domenico, Erich Ramseier 2012: Die Kluft öffnet sich. Herkunftseffekte auf 
die schulischen Leistungen verstärken sich im Verlauf der Primarschule. In: Swiss 
Journal of Sociology, 38, 2: 223–244. 
Antonucci, Toni C., James S. Jackson, Simon Biggs 2007: Intergenerational Relations: 
Theory, Research, and Policy. In: Journal of Social Issues, 63, 4: 679–693. 
Anttonen, Anneli, Jorma Sipilä 1996: European Social Care Services: Is It Possible to 
Identify Models? In: Journal of European Social Policy, 6, 2: 87–100. 
Aquilino, William S. 1990: The Likelihood of Parent–Adult Child Coresidence: Effects of 
Family Structure and Parental Characteristics. In: Journal of Marriage and the Family, 
52, 2: 405–419. 
Aquilino, William S. 1994a: Impact of Childhood Family Disruption on Young Adults’
Relationships with Parents. In: Journal of Marriage and the Family, 56, 2: 295–313. 
 
References 187 
Aquilino, William S. 1994b: Later Life Parental Divorce and Widowhood: Impact on 
Young Adults’ Assessment of Parent-Child Relations. In: Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 56, 4: 908–922. 
Arber, Sara, Claudine Attias-Donfut (eds.) 2000: The Myth of Generational Conflict – The 
Family and State in Ageing Societies. London, New York: Routledge. 
Archer, John 1999: The Nature of Grief – The Evolution and Psychology of Reactions to 
Loss. London, New York: Routledge. 
Ariès, Philippe 1977: L’homme devant la mort. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Armingeon, Klaus 2001: Institutionalising the Swiss Welfare State. In: Lane, Jan-Erik 
(ed.), The Swiss Labyrinth – Institutions, Outcomes and Redesign. London, Portland: 
Frank Cass, 145–168. 
Armingeon, Klaus, Fabio Bertozzi, Guiliano Bonoli 2004: Swiss Worlds of Welfare. In: 
West European Politics, 27, 1: 20–44. 
Arts, Wil, John Gelissen 2002: Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-
the-Art Report. In: Journal of European Social Policy, 12, 2: 137–158. 
Attias-Donfut, Claudine 1995: Le double circuit des transmissions. In: Attias-Donfut, 
Claudine, Alain Rozenkier (eds.), Les solidarités entre générations – Vieillesse, familles, 
État. Paris: Nathan, 41–81. 
Attias-Donfut, Claudine, François-Charles Wolff 2000: The Redistributive Effects of 
Generational Transfers. In: Arber/Attias-Donfut, 22–46. 
Attias-Donfut, Claudine, Jim Ogg, François-Charles Wolff 2005: European Patterns of 
Intergenerational Financial and Time Transfers. In: European Journal of Ageing, 2, 3: 
161–173. 
Bäckman, Olof, Anders Nilsson 2011: Pathways to Social Exclusion – A Life-Course 
Study. In: European Sociological Review, 27, 1: 107–123. 
Bahle, Thomas 2008: Family Policy Patterns in the Enlarged EU. In: Alber, Jens, Tony 
Fahey, Chiara Saraceno (eds.), Handbook of Quality of Life in the Enlarged European 
Union. London, New York: Routledge, 100–125. 
Bambra, Clare 2007: Going Beyond the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: Regime 
Theory and Public Health Research. In: Journal of Epidemiology and Community 
Health, 61, 12: 1098–1102. 
Barnett, Amanda E. 2013: Pathways of Adult Children Providing Care to Older Parents. 
In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 75, 1: 178–190. 
Bawin-Legros, Bernadette, Jean-Francois Stassen 2002: Intergenerational Solidarity: 
Between the Family and the State. In: Current Sociology, 50, 2: 243–262. 
Becker, Rolf, Wolfgang Lauterbach (eds.) 2010: Bildung als Privileg – Erklärungen und 
Befunde zu den Ursachen der Bildungsungleichheit. Fourth revised edition. Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Beckert, Jens 2008: Inherited Wealth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Behning, Ute 2005: Changing Long-Term Care Regimes: A Six-Country Comparison of 
Directions and Effects. In: Pfau-Effinger/Geissler, 73–91. 
Bengtson, Vern L., Joseph A. Kuypers 1971: Generational Difference and the Develop­
mental Stake. In: Aging and Human Development, 2, 4: 249–260. 
Bengtson, Vern L., Robert E. L. Roberts 1991: Intergenerational Solidarity in Aging 
Families: An Example of Formal Theory Construction. In: Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 53, 4: 856–870. 
Bengtson, Vern L. 1993: Is the ‘Contract Across Generations’ Changing? Effects of 









Vern L., W. Andrew Achenbaum (eds.), The Changing Contract Across Generations. 
New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 3–24. 
Bengtson, Vern L. 2001: Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing Importance of 
Multigenerational Bonds. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 63, 1: 1–16. 
Bengtson, Vern L., Roseann Giarrusso, J. Beth Mabry, Merril Silverstein 2002: Solidarity, 
Conflict, and Ambivalence: Complementary or Competing Perspectives on Intergene­
rational Relationships? In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 3: 568–576. 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers 1985: The Strategic 
Bequest Motive. In: Journal of Political Economy, 93, 6: 1045–1076. 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Sergei Severinov 2003: Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for 
the Equal Division Puzzle. In: Journal of Political Economy, 111, 4: 733–764. 
Berry, Brent 2008: Financial Transfers from Living Parents to Adult Children – Who Is 
Helped and Why? In: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67, 2: 207–239. 
Bertogg, Ariane, Marc Szydlik 2016: The Closeness of Young Adults’ Relationships with 
Their Parents. In: Swiss Journal of Sociology, 42, 1: 41–59. 
Bertogg, Ariane 2016: Zwischen Autonomie und Verbundenheit: Junge Erwachsene und 
ihre Eltern. University of Zurich: Dissertation thesis. 
Bertram, Hans 2000: Die verborgenen familiären Beziehungen in Deutschland: Die multi­
lokale Mehrgenerationenfamilie. In: Kohli, Martin, Marc Szydlik (eds.), Generationen 
in Familie und Gesellschaft. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 97–121. 
Billari, Francesco C., Dimiter Philipov, Pau Baizán 2001: Leaving Home in Europe: The 
Experience of Cohorts Born Around 1960. In: International Journal of Population 
Geography, 7, 5: 339–356. 
Billari, Francesco C., Aart C. Liefbroer 2007: Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Impact 
of Age Norms on Leaving Home. In: Demography, 44, 1: 181–198. 
Blanc, David le, François-Charles Wolff 2006: Leaving Home in Europe: The Role of
Parents’ and Children’s Incomes. In: Review of Economics of the Household, 4, 1: 53–73. 
Blau, Peter M. 1964: Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley. 
Blome, Agnes, Wolfgang Keck, Jens Alber 2009: Family and the Welfare State in Europe –
Intergenerational Relations in Ageing Societies. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward 
Elgar. 
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter 2009: Educational Assortative Marriage in Comparative Perspective. 
In: Annual Review of Sociology, 35: 513–530. 
BMFSFJ 2006: Familie zwischen Flexibilität und Verlässlichkeit – Perspektiven für eine 
lebenslaufbezogene Familienpolitik (Siebter Familienbericht). Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag und Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (written 
by Jutta Allmendinger, Hans Bertram, Wassilios E. Fthenakis, Helga Krüger, Uta Meier-
Gräwe, C. Katharina Spieß and Marc Szydlik). 
Bonoli, Giuliano 1997: Classifying Welfare States: A Two-Dimension Approach. In: 
Journal of Social Policy, 26, 3: 351–372. 
Bonoli, Giuliano, Silja Häusermann 2011: Swiss Welfare Reforms in a Comparative 
European Perspective – Between Retrenchment and Activation. In: Trampusch/Mach, 
186–204. 
Bordone, Valeria 2009: Contact and Proximity of Older People to Their Adult Children:
A Comparison Between Italy and Sweden. In: Population, Space and Place, 15, 4:
359–380. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel, Hendrik Jürges (eds.) 2005a: Health, Ageing and Retirement in 






Börsch-Supan, Axel, Karsten Hank, Hendrik Jürges 2005b: A New Comprehensive and 
International View on Ageing: The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. 
Mannheim: University of Mannheim. 
Boudon, Raymond 1974: Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality – Changing 
Prospects in Western Society. New York: Wiley. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claude Passeron 1971: Die Illusion der Chancengleichheit – 
Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Bildungswesens am Beispiel Frankreichs. Stuttgart: 
Klett. 
Bourdieu, Pierre 1979: La Distinction – Critique sociale du jugement. Paris: Les Éditions 
de Minuit. 
Braiker, Harriet B., Harold H. Kelley 1979: Conflict in the Development of Close 
Relationships. In: Burgess, Robert L., Ted L. Huston (eds.), Social Exchange in 
Developing Relationships. New York: Academic Press, 135–168. 
Brandt, Martina, Marc Szydlik 2008: Soziale Dienste und Hilfe zwischen Generationen in 
Europa. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 37, 2: 301–320. 
Brandt, Martina 2009: Hilfe zwischen Generationen – Ein europäischer Vergleich. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Brandt, Martina, Klaus Haberkern, Marc Szydlik 2009: Intergenerational Help and Care in 
Europe. In: European Sociological Review, 25, 5: 585–601. 
Brandt, Martina, Christian Deindl 2013: Intergenerational Transfers to Adult Children in 
Europe: Do Social Policies Matter? In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 75, 1: 235–251. 
Buchmann, Marlis, Irene Kriesi 2010: Schuleintritt und Schulleistungen im mittleren 
Primarschulalter. In: Swiss Journal of Sociology, 36, 2: 325–344. 
Buchmann, Marlis, Irene Kriesi 2011: Transition to Adulthood in Europe. In: Annual 
Review of Sociology, 37: 481–503. 
Bucx, Freek, Frits van Wel, Trudie Knijn, Louk Hagendoorn 2008: Intergenerational 
Contact and the Life Course Status of Young Adult Children. In: Journal of Marriage 
and Family, 70, 1: 144–156. 
Buhl, Heike M. 2009: My Mother: My Best Friend? Adults’ Relationships with Significant 
Others Across the Lifespan. In: Journal of Adult Development, 16, 4: 239–249. 
Bühlmann, Felix, Céline Schmid Botkine, Peter Farago, François Höpflinger, Dominique 
Joye, René Levy, Pasqualina Perrig-Chielio, Christian Suter (eds.) 2012: Sozialbericht 
2012: Fokus Generationen. Zürich: Seismo. 
Canary, Daniel J., William R. Cupach, Susan J. Messman 1995: Relationship Conflict –Conflict
in Parent-Child, Friendship, and Romantic Relationships. Thousand Oaks et al.: Sage. 
Castles, Francis G. (ed.) 1993: Families of Nations – Patterns of Public Policy in Western 
Democracies. Aldershot et al.: Dartmouth. 
Castles, Francis G. 1995: Welfare State Development in Southern Europe. In: West 
European Politics, 18, 2: 291–313. 
Cerami Alfio 2006: Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe – The Emergence of a 
New European Welfare Regime. Berlin: LIT. 
Cheal, David 1987: ‘Showing Them You Love Them’: Gift Giving and the Dialect of 
Intimacy. In: The Sociological Review, 35, 1: 150–169. 
Choi, Namkee G. 2003: Coresidence Between Unmarried Aging Parents and Their Adult
Children – Who Moved in with Whom and Why? In: Research on Aging, 25, 4: 384–404. 
Clarke, Edward J., Mar Preston, Jo Raksin, Vern L. Bengtson 1999: Types of Conflicts and
Tensions Between Older Parents and Adult Children. In: The Gerontologist, 39, 3: 261–270. 





Colombo, Francesca, Ana Llena-Nozal, Jérôme Mercier, Frits Tjadens 2011: Help 
Wanted? Providing and Paying for Long-Term Care. Paris: OECD (http://dx.doi. 
org/10.1787/9789264097759-en). 
Connidis, Ingrid Arnet, Julie Ann McMullin 2002a: Sociological Ambivalence and Family 
Ties: A Critical Perspective. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 3: 558–567. 
Connidis, Ingrid Arnet, Julie Ann McMullin 2002b: Ambivalence, Family Ties, and Doing 
Sociology. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 3: 594–601. 
Connidis, Ingrid Arnet 2015: Exploring Ambivalence in Family Ties: Progress and 
Prospects. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 77, 1: 77–95. 
Cordón, Juan Antonio Fernández 1997: Youth Residential Independence and Autonomy. 
In: Journal of Family Issues, 18, 6: 576–607. 
Coser, Rose Laub 1966: Role Distance, Sociological Ambivalence, and Transitional Status 
Systems. In: American Journal of Sociology, 72, 2: 173–187. 
Cox, Donald 1987: Motives for Private Income Transfers. In: Journal of Political 
Economy, 95, 3: 508–546. 
Cox, Donald, Oded Stark 2005: On the Demand for Grandchildren: Tied Transfers and the 
Demonstration Effect. In: Journal of Public Economics, 89, 9–10: 1665–1697. 
Curran, Sara R. 2002: Agency, Accountability, and Embedded Relations: ‘What’s Love 
Got to Do with It?’ In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 3: 577–584. 
Daatland, Svein O. 2001: Ageing, Families and Welfare Systems: Comparative Perspectives. 
In: Zeitschrift für Gerontologie und Geriatrie, 34, 1: 16–20. 
Daatland, Svein Olav, Katharina Herlofson 2003a: Norms and Ideals about Elder Care. In: 
Lowenstein/Ogg, 125–163. 
Daatland, Svein Olav, Katharina Herlofson 2003b: Families and Welfare States: 
Substitution or Complementarity. In: Lowenstein/Ogg, 281–305. 
Daatland, Svein O., Ariela Lowenstein 2005: Intergenerational Solidarity and the Family-
Welfare State Balance. In: European Journal of Ageing, 2, 3: 174–182. 
Davies, James B., Susanna Sandström, Anthony Shorrocks, Edward N. Wolff 2007: 
Estimating the Level and Distribution of Global Household Wealth. United Nations 
University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). 
Research Paper 2007/77. 
De Graaf, Paul M., Tineke Fokkema 2007: Contacts Between Divorced and Non-Divorced 
Parents and Their Adult Children in the Netherlands: An Investment Perspective. In: 
European Sociological Review, 23, 2: 263–277. 
Deindl, Christian 2010: Finanzielle Leistungen zwischen betagten Eltern und ihren 
Kindern im europäischen Vergleich. In: Ette et al., 283–300. 
Deindl, Christian 2011: Finanzielle Transfers zwischen Generationen in Europa. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Deindl, Christian, Martina Brandt 2011: Financial Support and Practical Help Between 
Older Parents and Their Middle-Aged Children in Europe. In: Ageing & Society, 31, 4: 
645–662. 
DeWit, David J., B. Gail Frankel 1988: Geographic Distance and Intergenerational 
Contact: A Critical Assessment and Review of the Literature. In: Journal of Aging 
Studies, 2, 1: 25–43. 
DiMaggio, Paul, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neuman, John P. Robinson 2001: Social 
Implications of the Internet. In: Annual Review of Sociology, 27: 307–336. 
Dykstra, Pearl A., Tineke Fokkema 2011: Relationships Between Parents and Their Adult 








Easterlin, Richard A. 1980: Birth and Fortune – The Impact of Numbers on Personal 
Welfare. New York: Basic Books. 
Elmelech, Yuval 2005: Attitudes Toward Familial Obligation in the United States and in 
Japan. In: Sociological Inquiry, 75, 4: 497–526. 
Emery, Thomas 2013: Intergenerational Transfers and European Families: Does the 
Number of Siblings Matter? In: Demographic Research, 29, 10: 247–274. 
Engstler, Heribert, Oliver Huxhold 2010: Beeinflusst die Beziehung älterer Menschen zu 
ihren erwachsenen Kindern die räumliche Nähe zwischen den Generationen? 
Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Wohnentfernung, Kontakthäufigkeit und Beziehungsenge 
im Längsschnitt. In: Ette et al., 175–197. 
Ermisch, John, Markus Jäntti, Timothy Smeeding (eds.) 2012: From Parents to Children –
The Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 1990: The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 1999: Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ette, Andreas, Kerstin Ruckdeschel, Rainer Unger (eds.) 2010: Potenziale intergenerationaler
Beziehungen – Chancen und Herausforderungen für die Gestaltung des demografischen
Wandels. Würzburg: Ergon. 
Fenger, H.J.M. 2007: Welfare Regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating Post-
Communist Countries in a Welfare Regime Typology. In: Contemporary Issues and 
Ideas in Social Sciences, 3, 2: 1–30. 
Ferge, Zsuzsa 2008: Is There a Specific East-Central European Welfare Culture? In: 
Oorschot et al., 141–161. 
Ferrera, Maurizio 1996: The ‘Southern Model’ of Welfare in Social Europe. In: Journal of 
European Social Policy, 6, 1: 17–37. 
Ferrera, Maurizio 1998: The Four ‘Social Europes’: Between Universalism and Selectivism. 
In: Rhodes, Martin, Yves Mény (eds.), The Future of European Welfare – A New Social 
Contract? London: Macmillan, 81–96. 
Ferring, Dieter, Tom Michels, Thomas Boll, Sigrun-Heide Filipp 2009: Emotional 
Relationship Quality of Adult Children with Ageing Parents: On Solidarity, Conflict and 
Ambivalence. In: European Journal of Ageing, 6, 4: 253–265. 
Ferring, Dieter 2010: Intergenerational Relations in Aging Societies: Emerging Topics in 
Europe. In: Journal of Intergenerational Relationships, 8, 1: 101–104. 
Finch, Janet, Jennifer Mason 1990: Filial Obligations and Kin Support for Elderly People. 
In: Ageing & Society, 10, 2: 151–175. 
Fingerman, Karen L. 2000: ‘We Had a Nice Little Chat’: Age and Generational Differences 
in Mothers’ and Daughters’ Descriptions of Enjoyable Visits. In: Journal of Gerontology: 
Psychological Sciences, 55B, 2: 95–106. 
Fingerman, Karen L., Lindsay Pitzer, Eva S. Lefkowitz, Kira S. Birditt, Daniel Mroczek
2008: Ambivalent Relationship Qualities Between Adults and Their Parents: Impli­
cations for the Well-Being of Both Parties. In: Journal of Gerontology: Psychological
Sciences, 63B, 6: 362–371. 
Fingerman, Karen L., Kyungmin Kim, Eden M. Davis, Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., Kira S. 
Birditt, Steven H. Zarit 2015: ‘I’ll Give You the World’: Socioeconomic Differences in 
Parental Support of Adult Children. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 77, 4: 844–865. 
Finley, Nancy J., M. Diane Roberts, Benjamin F. Banahan, III 1988: Motivators and 
Inhibitors of Attitudes of Filial Obligation Toward Aging Parents. In: The Gerontologist, 






Flaquer, Lluís 2000: Is There a Southern European Model of Family Policy? In: Pfenning/ 
Bahle, 15–33. 
Foa, Edna B., Uriel G. Foa 1980: Resource Theory – Interpersonal Behavior as Exchange. 
In: Gergen, Kenneth J., Martin S. Greenberg, Richard H. Willis (eds.), Social Exchange –
Advances in Theory and Research. New York, London: Plenum Press, 77–94. 
Foa, Uriel G., John Converse, Jr., Kjell Y. Törnblom, Edna B. Foa (eds.) 1993: Resource 
Theory – Explorations and Applications. San Diego, London: Academic Press. 
Fokkema, Tineke, Susan ter Bekke, Pearl A. Dykstra 2008: Solidarity Between Parents and 
Their Adult Children in Europe. Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute 
(NIDI), Report No. 76. Amsterdam: KNAW. 
Frank, Hallie 2007: Young Adults’ Relationship with Parents and Siblings: The Role of 
Marital Status, Conflict and Post-Divorce Predictors. In: Journal of Divorce & 
Remarriage, 46, 3/4: 105–124. 
Frankel, B. Gail, DeWit, David J. 1986: Geographic Distance and Intergenerational 
Contact: An Empirical Examination of the Relationship. In: Journal of Aging Studies, 
3, 2: 139–162. 
Fritzell, Johan, Carin Lennartsson 2005: Financial Transfers Between Generations in 
Sweden. In: Ageing & Society, 25, 3: 397–414. 
Gal, John 2010: Is There an Extended Family of Mediterranean Welfare States? In: Journal 
of European Social Policy, 20, 4: 283–300. 
Gans, Daphna, Merril Silverstein 2006: Norms of Filial Responsibility for Aging Parents 
Across Time and Generations. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 68, 4: 961–976. 
Gapp, Patrizia 2007: Konflikte zwischen den Generationen? Familiäre Beziehungen in 
Migrantenfamilien. In: Weiss, Hilde (ed.), Leben in zwei Welten – Zur sozialen 
Integration ausländischer Jugendlicher der zweiten Generation. Wiesbaden: Verlag
für Sozial wissenschaften, 131–153. 
Giarrusso, Roseann, Michael Stallings, Vern L. Bengtson 1995: The ‘Intergenerational 
Stake’ Hypothesis Revisited: Parent-Child Differences in Perceptions of Relationships 
20 Years Later. In: Bengtson, Vern L., K. Warner Schaie, Linda M. Burton (eds.), Adult 
Intergenerational Relations – Effects of Societal Change. New York: Springer, 227–263. 
Giarrusso, Roseann, Merril Silverstein, Daphna Gans, Vern L. Bengtson 2005: Ageing 
Parents and Adult Children: New Perspectives on Intergenerational Relationships. In: 
Johnson, Malcolm L., Vern L. Bengtson, Peter G. Coleman, Thomas B. L. Kirkwood 
(eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Age and Ageing. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 413–421. 
Goldscheider, Frances K., Julie DaVanzo 1989: Pathways to Independent Living in Early 
Adulthood: Marriage, Semiautonomy, and Premarital Residential Independence. In: 
Demography, 26, 4: 597–614. 
Greenwell, Lisa, Vern L. Bengtson 1997: Geographic Distance and Contact Between 
Middle-Aged Children and Their Parents: The Effects of Social Class Over 20 Years. In: 
Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 52B, 1: 13–26. 
Gruber, Siegfried, Patrick Heady 2010: Domestic Help. In: Heady/Kohli, 83–125. 
Grundy, Emily, Nicola Shelton 2001: Contact Between Adult Children and Their Parents 
in Great Britain 1986–99. In: Environment and Planning A, 33, 4: 685–697. 
Grundy, Emily, John C. Henretta 2006: Between Elderly Parents and Adult Children: A
New Look at the Intergenerational Care Provided by the ‘Sandwich Generation’. In: 
Ageing & Society, 26, 5: 707–722. 
Guo, Guang, Hongxin Zhao 2000: Multilevel Modeling for Binary Data. In: Annual 





Haberkern, Klaus, Marc Szydlik 2008: Pflege der Eltern – Ein europäischer Vergleich. In: 
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 60, 1: 78–101. 
Haberkern, Klaus 2009: Pflege in Europa – Familie und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Haberkern, Klaus, Marc Szydlik 2010: State Care Provision, Societal Opinion and Children’s
Care of Older Parents in 11 European Countries. In: Ageing & Society, 30, 2: 299–323. 
Haberkern, Klaus, Tina Schmid, Marc Szydlik 2015: Gender Differences in Intergenerational 
Care in European Welfare States. In: Ageing & Society, 35, 2: 298–320. 
Halbwachs, Maurice 1925: Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire. Paris: Félix Alcan. 
Hank, Karsten 2007: Proximity and Contacts Between Older Parents and Their Children: 
A European Comparison. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 69, 1: 157–173. 
Hareven, Tamara K. 1995: Historical Perspectives on the Family and Aging. In: Blieszner, 
Rosemary, Victoria Hilkevitch Bedford (eds.), Handbook of Aging and the Family. 
Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 13–31. 
Hartnett, Caroline Sten, Frank F. Furstenberg, Kira S. Birditt, Karen L. Fingerman 2012: 
Parental Support During Young Adulthood: Why Does Assistance Decline with Age? In: 
Journal of Family Issues, 34, 7: 975–1007. 
Häusermann, Silja 2010: The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe – 
Modernization in Hard Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Heady, Patrick, Martin Kohli (eds.) 2010: Family, Kinship and State in Contemporary Europe.
Volume 3: Perspectives on Theory and Policy. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus. 
Henz, Ursula 2010: Parent Care as Unpaid Family Labor: How Do Spouses Share? In: 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 72, 1: 148–164. 
Hocker, Joyce L., William W. Wilmot 2014: Interpersonal Conflict. Ninth edition. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Hoff, Andreas 2007: Patterns of Intergenerational Support in Grandparent-Grandchild and 
Parent-Child Relationships in Germany. In: Ageing & Society, 27, 5: 643–665. 
Hogerbrugge, Martijn J.A., Aafke E. Komter 2012: Solidarity and Ambivalence: 
Comparing Two Perspectives on Intergenerational Relations Using Longitudinal Panel 
Data. In: The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 67, 3: 372–383. 
Holdsworth, Clare 2005: ‘When Are the Children Going to Leave Home!’: Family Culture 
and Delayed Transitions in Spain. In: European Societies, 7, 4: 547–566. 
Höpflinger, François 1999: Generationenfrage – Konzepte, theoretische Ansätze und 
Beobachtungen zu Generationenbeziehungen in späteren Lebensphasen. Lausanne: 
Éditions Réalités sociales. 
Höpflinger, François, Valérie Hugentobler 2005: Familiale, ambulante und stationäre 
Pflege im Alter – Perspektiven für die Schweiz. Bern: Huber. 
Howse, Kenneth 2007: Long-Term Care Policy: The Difficulties of Taking a Global View. 
In: Ageing Horizons, 6: 1–11. 
Hox, Joop 1995: Applied Multilevel Analysis. Amsterdam: TT-Publikaties. 
Huber, Manfred, Ricardo Rodrigues, Frédérique Hoffmann, Katrin Gasior, Bernd Marin 
2009: Facts and Figures on Long-Term Care – Europe and North America. Vienna: 
European Centre for Social Welfare and Research. 
Huinink, Johannes 1995: Warum noch Familie? Zur Attraktivität von Partnerschaft und 
Elternschaft in unserer Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus. 
Igel, Corinne, Martina Brandt, Klaus Haberkern, Marc Szydlik 2009: Specialization 
Between Family and State – Intergenerational Time Transfers in Western Europe. In: 





Igel, Corinne, Marc Szydlik 2011: Grandchild Care and Welfare State Arrangements in 
Europe. In: Journal of European Social Policy, 21, 3: 210–224. 
Igel, Corinne 2012: Großeltern in Europa – Generationensolidarität im Wohlfahrtsstaat. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Imhof, Kurt 2006: Sonderfall Schweiz. In: Swiss Journal of Sociology, 32, 2: 197–223. 
Isengard, Bettina, Marc Szydlik 2012: Living Apart (or) Together? Coresidence of Elderly 
Parents and Their Adult Children in Europe. In: Research on Aging, 34, 4: 449–474. 
Isengard, Bettina 2013: ‘The Apple Doesn’t Live Far from the Tree’: Living Distances 
Between Parents and Their Adult Children in Europe. In: Comparative Population 
Studies – Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft, 38, 2: 237–262 (German version: 
263–290). 
Isengard, Bettina 2015: Nähe oder Distanz? Verbundenheit von Familiengenerationen in 
Europa. University of Zurich: Habilitation thesis. 
Kalmijn, Matthijs, Chiara Saraceno 2008: A Comparative Perspective on Intergenerational 
Support – Responsiveness to Parental Needs in Individualistic and Familialistic 
Countries. In: European Societies, 10, 3: 479–508. 
Kalmijn, Matthijs 2015: How Childhood Circumstances Moderate the Long-Term Impact 
of Divorce on Father–Child Relationships. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 77, 4: 
921–938. 
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 2003: Varianten des Wohlfahrtsstaats – Der deutsche Sozialstaat 
im internationalen Vergleich. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
Keck, Wolfgang 2008: The Relationship Between Children and Their Frail Elderly Parents 
in Different Care Regimes. In: Saraceno, 147–169. 
Keister, Lisa A., Stephanie Moller 2000: Wealth Inequality in the United States. In: Annual 
Review of Sociology, 26: 63–81. 
Keister, Lisa A., Hang Young Lee 2014: The One Percent: Top Incomes and Wealth in 
Sociological Research. In: Social Currents, 1, 1: 13–24. 
Kenrick, Douglas T., Vladas Griskevicius, Steven L. Neuberg, Mark Schaller 2010: 
Renovating the Pyramid of Needs: Contemporary Extensions Built Upon Ancient 
Foundations. In: Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 3: 292–314. 
Kiecolt, K. Jill, Rosemary Blieszner, Jyoti Savla 2011: Long-Term Influences of 
Intergenerational Ambivalence on Midlife Parents’ Psychological Well-Being. In: 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 73, 2: 369–382. 
King, Lawrence P., Iván Szelényi 2005: Post-Communist Economic Systems. In: Smelser, 
Neil J., Richard Swedberg (ed.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Second edition. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 205–229. 
Klaus, Daniela 2009: Why Do Adult Children Support Their Parents? In: Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies, 40, 2: 227–241. 
Kohli, Martin 1999: Private and Public Transfers Between Generations: Linking the 
Family and the State. In: European Societies, 1, 1: 81–104. 
Kohli, Martin, Harald Künemund, Andreas Motel, Marc Szydlik 2000a: Families Apart?
Intergenerational Transfers in East and West Germany. In: Arber/Attias-Donfut,
88–99. 
Kohli, Martin, Harald Künemund, Andreas Motel-Klingebiel, Marc Szydlik 2000b: 
Generationenbeziehungen. In: Kohli, Martin, Harald Künemund (eds.), Die zweite 
Lebenshälfte – Gesellschaftliche Lage und Partizipation im Spiegel des Alters-Survey. 
Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 176–211. 
Kohli, Martin, Marc Szydlik 2000: Einleitung. In: Kohli, Martin, Marc Szydlik (eds.), 
Generationen in Familie und Gesellschaft. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 7–18. 
References 195 
Kohli, Martin 2005: Generational Changes and Generational Equity. In: Johnson, Malcolm 
L., Vern L. Bengtson, Peter G. Coleman, Thomas B. L. Kirkwood (eds.), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Age and Ageing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 518–526. 
Kollmorgen, Raj 2009: Postsozialistische Wohlfahrtsregime in Europa – Teil der ‘Drei 
Welten’ oder eigener Typus? Ein empirisch gestützter Rekonzeptualisierungsversuch. 
In: Pfau-Effinger, Birgit, Slađana Sakač Magdalenić, Christof Wolf (eds.), International 
vergleichende Sozialforschung – Ansätze und Messkonzepte unter den Bedingungen der 
Globalisierung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 65–92. 
König, Ronny 2015a: Educational Inequality and the Welfare State. In: Journal of 
Research on Contemporary Society, 1, 1: 1–20. 
König, Ronny 2016: Bildung, Schicht und Generationensolidarität in Europa. Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS. 
Korpi, Walter 2000: Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class and Patterns of Inequalities in 
Different Types of Welfare States. In: Social Politics, 7, 2: 127–191. 
Korupp, Sylvia E., Marc Szydlik 2005: Causes and Trends of the Digital Divide. In: 
European Sociological Review, 21, 4: 409–422. 
Kosmann, Marianne 1998: Wie Frauen erben – Geschlechterverhältnis und Erbprozeß. 
Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Avia Spivak 1981: The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market. 
In: Journal of Political Economy, 89, 2: 372–391. 
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., John N. Morris 1989: How Much Care Do the Aged Receive from 
Their Children? A Bimodal Picture of Contact and Assistance. In: Wise, David A. (ed.), 
The Economics of Aging. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 151–175. 
Künemund, Harald, Martin Rein 1999: There is More to Receiving than Needing: 
Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Explorations of Crowding In and Crowding Out. 
In: Ageing & Society, 19, 1: 93–121. 
Künemund, Harald, Andreas Motel 2000: Verbreitung, Motivation und Entwick­
lungsperspektiven privater intergenerationeller Hilfeleistungen und Transfers. In: 
Kohli, Martin, Marc Szydlik (eds.), Generationen in Familie und Gesellschaft. Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich, 122–137. 
Künemund, Harald, Andreas Motel-Klingebiel, Martin Kohli 2005: Do Intergenerational 
Transfers from Elderly Parents Increase Social Inequality Among Their Middle-Aged 
Children? Evidence from the German Aging Survey. In: Journal of Gerontology: Social 
Sciences, 60B, 1: 30–36. 
Künemund, Harald 2008: Intergenerational Relations Within the Family and the State. In: 
Saraceno, 105–122. 
Künemund, Harald, Marc Szydlik (eds.) 2009: Generationen – Multidisziplinäre 
Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Lauterbach Wolfgang 1995: Die gemeinsame Lebenszeit von Familiengenerationen. In: 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 24, 1: 22–41. 
Lauterbach, Wolfgang, Kurt Lüscher 1996: Erben und die Verbundenheit der Lebensverläufe 
von Familienmitgliedern. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 
48, 1: 66–95. 
Lawton, Leora, Merril Silverstein, Vern L. Bengtson 1994: Solidarity Between Generations 
in Families. In: Bengtson, Vern L., Robert A. Harootyan (eds.), Intergenerational 
Linkages – Hidden Connections in American Society. New York: Springer, 19–42. 
Lee, Gary R., Jeffrey W. Dwyer 1996: Aging Parent-Adult Child Coresidence – Further 






Leibfried, Stephan 1992: Towards a European Welfare State? On Integrating Poverty 
Regimes into the European Community. In: Ferge, Zsuzsa, Jon Eivind Kolberg (eds.), 
Social Policy in a Changing Europe. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus, 245–279. 
Leisering, Lutz 2000: Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Generationen. In: Kohli, Martin, Marc Szydlik 
(eds.), Generationen in Familie und Gesellschaft. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 59–76. 
Leitner, Sigrid 2003: Varieties of Familialism – The Caring Function of the Family in 
Comparative Perspective. In: European Societies, 5, 4: 353–375. 
Lendon, Jessica P., Merril Silverstein, Roseann Giarrusso 2014: Ambivalence in Older 
Parent–Adult Child Relationships: Mixed Feelings, Mixed Measures. In: Journal of 
Marriage and Family, 76, 2: 272–284. 
Lennartsson, Carin, Merril Silverstein, Johan Fritzell 2010: Time-for-Money Exchanges 
Between Older and Younger Generations in Swedish Families. In: Journal of Family 
Issues, 31, 2: 189–210. 
Leopold, Thomas, Thorsten Schneider 2010: Schenkungen und Erbschaften im
Lebenslauf – Vergleichende Längsschnittanalysen zu intergenerationalen Transfers.
In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 39, 4: 258–280. 
Leopold, Thomas, Marcel Raab 2011: Short-Term Reciprocity in Late Parent-Child 
Relationships. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 73, 1: 105–119. 
Lessenich, Stephan 1994: ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ – oder vier? Strukturwandel 
arbeits- und sozialpolitischer Regulierungsmuster in Spanien. In: Politische Viertel­
jahresschrift, 35, 2: 224–244. 
Lettke, Frank 2004: Subjektive Bedeutungen des Erbens und Vererbens. Ergebnisse des 
Konstanzer Erbschafts-Surveys. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und 
Sozialisation, 24, 3: 277–302. 
Lewis, Jane 1992: Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes. In: Journal of 
European Social Policy, 2, 3: 159–173. 
Lipszyc, Barbara, Etienne Sail, Ana Xavier 2012: Long-Term Care: Need, Use and 
Expenditure in the EU-27. Economic Papers 469. Brussels: European Commission. 
Litwak, Eugene 1985: Helping the Elderly – The Complementary Roles of Informal 
Networks and Formal Systems. New York, London: The Guilford Press. 
Litwak, Eugene, Merril Silverstein, Vern L. Bengtson, Ynez Wilson Hirst 2003: Theories 
about Families, Organizations and Social Supports. In: Bengtson, Vern L., Ariela 
Lowenstein (eds.), Global Aging and Challenges to Families. New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter: 27–53 
Logan John R., Glenna D. Spitze 1996: Family Ties – Enduring Relations Between Parents 
and Their Grown Children. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Lowenstein, Ariela, Jim Ogg (eds.) 2003: OASIS – Old Age and Autonomy: The Role of 
Service Systems and Intergenerational Family Solidarity. Final Report. University of 
Haifa. 
Lowenstein, Ariela 2007: Solidarity–Conflict and Ambivalence: Testing Two Conceptual 
Frameworks and Their Impact on Quality of Life for Older Family Members. In: Journal 
of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 62B, 2: 100–107. 
Luetzelberger, Therese 2014: Independence or Interdependence – Norms of Leaving 
Home in Italy and Germany. In: European Societies, 16, 1: 28–47. 
Lüscher, Kurt, Karl Pillemer 1998: Intergenerational Ambivalence: A New Approach to 
the Study of Parent-Child Relations in Later Life. In: Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 60, 2: 413–425. 
Lüscher, Kurt 2002: Intergenerational Ambivalence: Further Steps in Theory and Research. 
In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 3: 585–593. 
 
References 197 
Lye, Diane N. 1996: Adult Child-Parent Relationships. In: Annual Review of Sociology, 
22: 79–102. 
Mackenbach, Johan P., Irina Stirbu, Albert-Jan R. Roskam, Maartje M. Schaap, Gwenn 
Menvielle, Mall Leinsalu, Anton E. Kunst 2008: Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health 
in 22 European Countries. In: The New England Journal of Medicine, 358, 23: 2468– 
2481. 
Majamaa, Karoliina 2013: The Effect of Socio-economic Factors on Parental Financial 
Support from the Perspectives of the Givers and the Receivers. In: European Societies, 
15, 1: 57–81. 
Mannheim, Karl 1952: The Problem of Generations. In: Kecskemeti, Paul (ed.), Essays on 
the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 276–322. Original 
publication: Mannheim, Karl 1928: Das Problem der Generationen. In: Kölner 
Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie, 7, 2: 157–185; 3: 309–330. 
Marí-Klose, Pau, Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes 2013: The Southern European Welfare 
Model in the Post-Industrial Order – Still a Distinctive Cluster? In: European Societies, 
15, 4: 475–492. 
Maslow, Abraham H. 1943: A Theory of Human Motivation. In: Psychological Review, 
50, 4: 370–396. 
Maslow, Abraham H. 1954: Motivation and Personality. New York, Evanston, London: 
Harper & Row. 
Mauss, Marcel 1950: Essai sur le don. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Max-Neef, Manfred A., Antonio Elizalde, Martin Hopenhayn 1991: Development and 
Human Needs. In: Max-Neef, Manfred A., with contributions from Antonio Elizalde, 
Martin Hopenhayn (eds.), Human Scale Development – Conception, Application and 
Further Reflections. New York, London: Apex Press, 13–54. 
May, Christina 2013: Generation in Itself or for Itself? The Conflict Potential of Cohorts 
in the German, Dutch and British Pension Systems Compared. In: European Societies, 
15, 1: 4–25. 
Mayer, Karl Ulrich 2001: The Paradox of Global Social Change and National Path 
Dependencies – Life Course Patterns in Advanced Societies. In: Woodward, Alison, 
Martin Kohli (eds.), Inclusions and Exclusions in European Societies. London, New 
York: Routledge, 89–110. 
Mayer, Karl Ulrich 2004: Whose Lives? How History, Societies, and Institutions Define 
and Shape Life Courses. In: Research in Human Development, 1, 3: 161–187. 
McGarry, Kathleen, Robert F. Schoeni 1995: Transfer Behavior in the Health and 
Retirement Study – Measurement and the Redistribution of Resources Within the 
Family. In: The Journal of Human Resources, 30, Supplement: S184-S226. 
McGarry, Kathleen 1999: Inter Vivos Transfers and Intended Bequests. In: Journal of 
Public Economics, 73, 3: 321–351. 
Meinert, Karin 1996: Mit Dreißig noch im Kinderzimmer – Wie man Nesthocker los wird, 
bevor es zu spät ist. Frankfurt/Main: Eichborn. 
Merton, Robert K., Elinor Barber 1963: Sociological Ambivalence. In: Tiryakian, Edward 
A. (ed.), Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change – Essays in Honor of 
Pitirim A. Sorokin. New York, Evanston: Harper & Row, 91–120. 
Merz, Eva-Maria, Ezgi Özeke-Kocabas, Frans J. Oort, Carlo Schuengel 2009: 
Intergenerational Family Solidarity: Value Differences Between Immigrant Groups and 
Generations. In: Journal of Family Psychology, 23, 3: 291–300. 






Mood, Carina 2010: Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can 
Do, and What We Can Do About It. In: European Sociological Review, 26, 1: 67–82. 
Motel, Andreas, Marc Szydlik 1999: Private Transfers zwischen den Generationen. In: 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 28, 1: 3–22. 
Motel-Klingebiel, Andreas, Clemens Tesch-Römer, Hans-Joachim von Kondratowitz 
2005: Welfare States Do Not Crowd Out the Family: Evidence for Mixed Responsibility 
from Comparative Analyses. In: Ageing & Society, 25, 6: 863–882. 
Motel-Klingebiel, Andreas, Clemens Tesch-Römer 2006: Familie im Wohlfahrtsstaat – 
zwischen Verdrängung und gemischter Verantwortung. In: Zeitschrift für 
Familienforschung, 18, 3: 290–314. 
Nauck, Bernhard 2009: Patterns of Exchange in Kinship Systems in Germany, Russia, and 
the People’s Republic of China. In: Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 40, 2: 
255–278. 
Nauck, Bernhard, Anja Steinbach 2010: Intergenerational Relationships. In: German Data 
Forum (RatSWD) (ed.), Building on Progress – Expanding the Research Infrastructure 
for the Social, Economic, and Behavioral Sciences. Opladen, Farmington Hills, MI: 
Budrich UniPress, 1057–1080 (www.ratswd.de/publikationen/building-on-progress). 
Nave-Herz, Rosemarie 1998: Die These über den ‘Zerfall der Familie’. In: Friedrichs, 
Jürgen, M. Rainer Lepsius, Karl Ulrich Mayer (eds.), Die Diagnosefähigkeit der 
Soziologie. Sonderheft 35 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 286–315. 
Nave-Herz, Rosemarie (ed.) 2002: Family Change and Intergenerational Relations in 
Different Cultures. Würzburg: Ergon. 
Neuberger, Franz, Klaus Haberkern 2014: Structured Ambivalence in Grandchild Care and 
the Quality of Life Among European Grandparents. In: European Journal of Aging, 11, 
2: 171–181. 
Neuberger, Franz 2015: Kinder des Kapitalismus – Subjektivität, Lebensqualität und
intergenerationale Solidarität in Europa. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
Noack, Peter, Heike M. Buhl 2004: Child-Parent Relationships. In: Lang, Frieder R., 
Karen L. Fingerman (eds.), Growing Together – Personal Relationships Across the Life 
Span. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 45–75. 
Nollert, Michael 2007: Sonderfall im rheinischen Kapitalismus oder Sonderweg im lib­
eralen Wohlfahrtskapitalismus? Zur Spezifität des Sozialstaats Schweiz. In: Eberle, 
Thomas S., Kurt Imhof (eds.), Sonderfall Schweiz. Zürich: Seismo, 153–171. 
Norris, Joan E., Joseph A. Tindale 1994: Among Generations – The Cycle of Adult 
Relationships. New York: Freeman. 
Novak, Mojca 2001: Reconsidering the Socialist Welfare State Model. In: Woodward, 
Alison, Martin Kohli (eds.), Inclusions and Exclusions in European Societies. London, 
New York: Routledge, 111–126. 
Obinger, Herbert 1998: Politische Institutionen und Sozialpolitik in der Schweiz – Der 
Einfluß von Nebenregierungen auf Struktur und Entwicklungsdynamik des schweiz­
erischen Sozialstaates. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. 
Obinger, Herbert, Klaus Armingeon, Giuliano Bonoli, Fabio Bertozzi 2005: Switzerland – 
The Marriage of Direct Democracy and Federalism. In: Obinger, Herbert, Stephan 
Leibfried, Francis G. Castles (eds.), Federalism and the Welfare State – New World and 
European Experiences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 263–304. 
O’Connor, Julia S. 1993: Gender, Class and Citizenship in the Comparative Analysis of 
Welfare State Regimes: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. In: The British Journal 






OECD 1999: Classifying Educational Programmes: Manual for ISCED-97 Implementation 
in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD. 
OECD 2008: Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries 
(www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality/GU). Data retrieved on 08/07/2013. 
OECD 2010a: PISA 2009 Results: What Students Know and Can Do – Student Perfor­
mance in Reading, Mathematics and Science. Volume I (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
9789264091450-en). 
OECD 2010b: PISA 2009 Results: Overcoming Social Background – Equity in Learning 
Opportunities and Outcomes. Volume II (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264091504-en). 
OECD 2012: OECD National Accounts Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView. 
aspx?oecd_bv_id=na-data-en&doi=na-data-en). Data retrieved on 22/03/2014. 
Oesch, Daniel 2008: Stratifying Welfare States: Class Differences in Pension Coverage in
Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. In: Swiss Journal of Sociology, 34, 3: 533–554. 
Oorschot, Wim van, Michael Opielka, Birgit Pfau-Effinger (eds.) 2008: Culture and 
Welfare State – Values and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective. Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
Opielka, Michael 2008: Christian Foundations of the Welfare State: Strong Cultural Values 
in Comparative Perspective. In: Oorschot et al., 89–114. 
Orloff, Ann Shola 1993: Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis
of Gender Relations and Welfare States. In: American Sociological Review, 58, 3: 303–328. 
Österle, August (ed.) 2011: Long-Term Care in Central and South Eastern Europe. 
Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. 
Parkes, Colin Murray, Holly G. Prigerson 2010: Bereavement – Studies of Grief in Adult 
Life. London, New York: Routledge. 
Parsons, Talcott 1942: Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States. In: 
American Sociological Review, 7, 5: 604–616. 
Parsons, Talcott, Robert F. Bales 1956: Family, Socialization and Interaction Process. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Perrig-Chiello, Pasqualina, François Höpflinger 2005: Aging Parents and Their Middle-
Aged Children: Demographic and Psychosocial Challenges. In: European Journal of 
Ageing, 2, 3: 183–191. 
Perrig-Chiello, Pasqualina, Sara Hutchison 2010: Family Caregivers of Elderly Persons – A
Differential Perspective on Stressors, Resources, and Well-Being. In: The Journal of 
Gerontopsychology and Geriatric Psychiatry, 23, 4: 195–206. 
Pett, Marjorie A., Nancy Lang, Anita Gander 1992: Late-Life Divorce – Its Impact on 
Family Rituals. In: Journal of Family Issues, 13, 4: 526–552. 
Pfau-Effinger, Birgit 2005: Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex 
Interrelation. In: Journal of Social Policy, 34, 1: 3–20. 
Pfau-Effinger, Birgit, Birgit Geissler (eds.) 2005: Care and Social Integration in European 
Societies. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Pfenning, Astrid, Thomas Bahle (eds.) 2000: Families and Family Policies in Europe – 
Comparative Perspectives. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. 
Piketty, Thomas 2014: Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA, London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Pillemer, Karl, J. Jill Suitor 2002: Explaining Mothers’ Ambivalence Toward Their Adult 
Children. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 3: 602–613. 
Pillemer, Karl, J. Jill Suitor, Steven E. Mock, Myra Sabir, Tamara B. Pardo, Jori Sechrist 
2007: Capturing the Complexity of Intergenerational Relations: Exploring Ambivalence 




Pillemer, Karl, Christin L. Munsch, Thomas Fuller-Rowell, Catherine Riffin, J. Jill Suitor 
2012: Ambivalence Toward Adult Children: Differences Between Mothers and Fathers. 
In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 74, 5: 1101–1113. 
Pinnelli, Antonella 2001: Determinants of Fertility in Europe: New Family Forms, Context 
and Individual Characteristics. In: Pinnelli, Antonella, Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, 
Beat Fux (eds.), Fertility and New Types of Households and Family Formation in 
Europe. Population Studies 35. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 47–101. 
Qureshi, Hazel, Alan Walker 1989: The Caring Relationship – Elderly People and Their 
Families. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Rainer, Helmut, Thomas Siedler 2012: Family Location and Caregiving Patterns from an 
International Perspective. In: Population and Development Review, 38, 2: 337–351. 
Reher, David Sven 1998: Family Ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts. In: 
Population and Development Review, 24, 2: 203–234. 
Reil-Held, Anette 2006: Crowding Out or Crowding In? Public and Private Transfers in 
Germany. In: European Journal of Population, 22, 3: 263–280. 
Roberts, Robert E. L., Leslie N. Richards, Vern L. Bengtson 1991: Intergenerational 
Solidarity in Families: Untangling the Ties that Bind. In: Pfeifer, Susan K., Marvin B. 
Sussman (eds.), Families: Intergenerational and Generational Connections. New York, 
London: Haworth, 11–46. 
Rosenbaum, Heidi 1982: Formen der Familie – Untersuchungen zum Zusammenhang von 
Familienverhältnissen, Sozialstruktur und sozialem Wandel in der deutschen Gesellschaft 
des 19. Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
Rosenmayr, Leopold, Eva Köckeis 1961: Sozialbeziehungen im höheren Lebensalter. In: 
Soziale Welt, 12, 3: 214–229. 
Rosenmayr, Leopold, Eva Köckeis 1963: Propositions for a Sociological Theory of Aging 
and the Family. In: International Social Science Journal, 15, 3: 410–426. 
Rossi, Alice S., Peter H. Rossi 1990: Of Human Bonding – Parent-Child Relations Across 
the Life Course. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Rossi, Giovanna 1997: The Nestlings: Why Young Adults Stay at Home Longer: The 
Italian Case. In: Journal of Family Issues, 18, 6: 627–644. 
Rusconi, Alessandra 2006: Leaving the Parental Home in Italy and West Germany: 
Opportunities and Constraints. Aachen: Shaker. 
Rys, Vladimir 2001: Transition Countries of Central Europe Entering the European 
Union: Some Social Protection Issues. In: International Social Security Review, 54, 
2–3: 177–189. 
Sackmann, Reinhard, Ansgar Weymann 1995: Die Technisierung des Alltags –
Generationen und technische Innovationen. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus. 
Sackmann, Reinhard, Oliver Winkler 2013: Technology Generations Revisited: The 
Internet Generation. In: Gerontechnology, 11, 4: 493–503. 
Sainsbury, Diane (ed.) 1994: Gendering Welfare States. London et al.: Sage. 
Sandberg-Thoma, Sara E., Anastasia R. Snyder, Bohyun Joy Jang 2015: Exiting and 
Returning to the Parental Home for Boomerang Kids. In: Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 77, 3: 806–818. 
Saraceno, Chiara (ed.) 2008: Families, Ageing and Social Policy – Intergenerational 
Solidarity in European Welfare States. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
Saraceno, Chiara, Wolfgang Keck 2010: Can We Identify Intergenerational Policy 
Regimes in Europe? In: European Societies, 12, 5: 675–696. 
Sarasa, Sebastian, Sunnee Billingsley 2008: Personal and Household Caregiving from 




Sarkisian, Natalia, Naomi Gerstel 2008: Till Marriage Do Us Part: Adult Children’s 
Relationships with Their Parents. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 2: 360–376. 
Sarkisian, Natalia, Naomi Gerstel 2012: Nuclear Family Values, Extended Family Lives – 
The Power of Race, Class, and Gender. New York, London: Routledge. 
Schenk, Niels, Pearl A. Dykstra, Ineke Maas 2010: The Role of European Welfare States 
in Intergenerational Money Transfers: A Micro-Level Perspective. In: Ageing & 
Society, 30, 8: 1315–1342. 
Schlomann, Heinrich 1992: Vermögensverteilung und private Altersvorsorge. Frankfurt/ 
Main, New York: Campus. 
Schmid, Tina, Martina Brandt, Klaus Haberkern 2012: Gendered Support to Older Parents: 
Do Welfare States Matter? In: European Journal of Ageing, 9, 1: 39–50. 
Schmid, Tina 2014: Generation, Geschlecht und Wohlfahrtsstaat – Intergenerationelle 
Unterstützung in Europa. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Schubert, Klaus, Simon Hegelich, Ursula Bazant (eds.) 2009: The Handbook of European 
Welfare Systems. London, New York: Routledge. 
Schulz, Erika, Reiner Leidl, Hans-Helmut König 2001: Starker Anstieg der 
Pflegebedürftigkeit zu erwarten – Vorausschätzungen bis 2020 mit Ausblick auf 2050. 
In: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin, 68: 65–77. 
Schupp, Jürgen, Marc Szydlik 2004a: Inheritance and Gifts in Germany – The Growing Fiscal
Importance of Inheritance Tax for the Federal States. In: Economic Bulletin, 41, 3: 95–102. 
Schupp, Jürgen, Marc Szydlik 2004b: Zukünftige Vermögen – wachsende Ungleichheit. In: 
Szydlik, Marc (ed.), Generation und Ungleichheit. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissen­
schaften, 243–264. 
Schwarz, Beate 2013: Intergenerational Conflict: The Case of Adult Children and Their 
Parents. In: Albert/Ferring, 131–145. 
Segrin, Chris, Jeanne Flora 2011: Family Communication. Second edition. New York, 
London: Routledge. 
Seltzer, Judith A., Suzanne M. Bianchi 2013: Demographic Change and Parent-Child 
Relationships in Adulthood. In: Annual Review of Sociology, 39: 275–290. 
Seltzer, Judith A., Esther M. Friedman 2014: Widowed Mothers’ Coresidence with Adult 
Children. In: The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 69, 1: 63–74. 
Sev’er, Aysan, Jan E. Trost 2011: Introduction: Opening Closets, Rattling Family 
Skeletons: What Will They Say? In: Sev’er, Aysan, Jan E. Trost (eds.), Skeletons in the 
Closet – A Sociological Analysis of Family Conflicts. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1–32. 
Shapiro, Adam 2003: Later-Life Divorce and Parent-Adult Child Contact and Proximity – A
Longitudinal Analysis. In: Journal of Family Issues, 24, 2: 264–285. 
Silverstein, Merril, Leora Lawton, Vern L. Bengtson 1994: Types of Relations Between 
Parents and Adult Children. In: Bengtson, Vern L., Robert A. Harootyan (eds.), 
Intergenerational Linkages – Hidden Connections in American Society. New York: 
Springer, 43–76 (Appendix: 252–264). 
Silverstein, Merril, Vern L. Bengtson 1997: Intergenerational Solidarity and the Structure 
of Adult Child–Parent Relationships in American Families. In: American Journal of 
Sociology, 103, 2: 429–460. 
Silverstein, Merril, Daphna Gans, Ariela Lowenstein, Roseann Giarrusso, Vern L. 
Bengtson 2010: Older Parent–Child Relationships in Six Developed Nations: 
Comparisons at the Intersection of Affection and Conflict. In: Journal of Marriage and 






Silverstein, Merril, Roseann Giarrusso 2012: Aging Individuals, Families, and Societies:
Micro-Meso-Macro Linkages in the Life Course. In: Settersten, Richard A., Jr., Jacqueline
L. Angel (eds.), Handbook of Sociology of Aging. New York: Springer, 35–49. 
Simmel, Georg 2009: Sociology – Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms. 
Translated and edited by Anthony J. Blasi, Anton K. Jacobs, Mathew Kanjirathinkal. 
Leiden: Brill. Original publication: Simmel, Georg 1908: Soziologie – Untersuchungen 
über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Smits, Annika, Ruben I. van Gaalen, Clara H. Mulder 2010: Parent–Child Coresidence: 
Who Moves in with Whom and for Whose Needs? In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 
72, 4: 1022–1033. 
Snijders, Tom A. B., Roel J. Bosker 2012: Multilevel Analysis – An Introduction to Basic 
and Advanced Multilevel Modeling. Second edition. London et al.: Sage. 
Soldo, Beth J., Martha S. Hill 1993: Intergenerational Transfers: Economic, Demographic, 
and Social Perspectives. In: Annual Review of Gerontology and Geriatrics, 13: 187–216. 
Soldo, Beth J., Martha S. Hill 1995: Family Structure and Transfer Measures in the Health 
and Retirement Study. In: The Journal of Human Ressources, 30, Supplement: 
S108-S137. 
Stamm, Isabell, Peter Breitschmid, Martin Kohli (eds.) 2011: Doing Succession in Europe –
Generational Transfers in Family Businesses in Comparative Perspective. Zürich, Basel,
Genf: Schulthess, also Opladen & Farmington Hills: Budrich Uni Press. 
Stark, Oded 1995: Altruism and Beyond – An Economic Analysis of Transfers and 
Exchanges Within Families and Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Steinbach, Anja 2008: Intergenerational Solidarity and Ambivalence: Types of Relationships 
in German Families. In: Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 39, 1: 115–127. 
Steinbach, Anja, Johannes Kopp 2010: Determinanten der Beziehungszufriedenheit: Die 
Sicht erwachsener Kinder auf die Beziehungen zu ihren Eltern. In: Ette et al., 95–116. 
Steinbach, Anja 2012: Intergenerational Relations Across the Life Course. In: Advances in 
Life Course Research, 17, 3: 93–99. 
Steinbach, Anja 2013: Family Structure and Parent–Child Contact: A Comparison of 
Native and Migrant Families. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 75, 5: 1114–1129. 
Stierlin, Helm 1974: Separating Parents and Adolescents – A Perspective on Running Away, 
Schizophrenia, and Waywardness. New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book. 
Suitor, J. Jill, Karl Pillerner 1991: Family Conflict when Adult Children and Elderly 
Parents Share a Home. In: Pillemer, Karl, Kathleen McCartney (eds.), Parent-Child 
Relations Throughout Life. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 179–199. 
Suitor, J. Jill, Megan Gilligan, Karl Pillemer 2011: Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Intergenerational Ambivalence in Later Life. In: The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 66, 6: 769–781. 
Suitor, J. Jill, Jori Sechrist, Megan Gilligan, Karl Pillemcr 2012: Intergenerational 
Relations in Later-Life Families. In: Settersten, Richard A., Jr., Jacqueline L. Angel 
(eds.), Handbook of Sociology of Aging. New York: Springer, 161–178. 
Swartz, Teresa Toguchi 2009: Intergenerational Family Relations in Adulthood: Patterns, 
Variations, and Implications in the Contemporary United States. In: Annual Review of 
Sociology, 35: 191–212. 
Szinovacz, Maximiliane E., Adam Davey (eds.) 2008: Caregiving Contexts: Cultural, 
Familial, and Societal Implications. New York: Springer. 
Szydlik, Marc 1994: Incomes in a Planned and a Market Economy: The Case of the 
German Democratic Republic and the ‘Former’ Federal Republic of Germany. In: 
European Sociological Review, 10, 3: 199–217. 
References 203
 
Szydlik, Marc 1995: Die Enge der Beziehung zwischen erwachsenen Kindern und ihren 
Eltern – und umgekehrt. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 24, 2: 75–94. 
Szydlik, Marc 1996: Parent-Child Relations in East and West Germany Shortly After the 
Fall of the Wall. In: International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 16, 12: 63–88. 
Szydlik, Marc 2000: Lebenslange Solidarität? Generationenbeziehungen zwischen 
erwachsenen Kindern und Eltern. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Szydlik, Marc 2002: Vocational Education and Labour Markets in Deregulated, Flexibly 
Coordinated, and Planned Societies. In: European Societies, 4, 1: 79–105. 
Szydlik, Marc 2004: Inheritance and Inequality: Theoretical Reasoning and Empirical 
Evidence. In: European Sociological Review, 20, 1: 31–45. 
Szydlik, Marc, Jürgen Schupp 2004: Wer erbt mehr? Erbschaften, Sozialstruktur und 
Alterssicherung. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 56, 4: 
609–629. 
Szydlik, Marc 2008a: Intergenerational Solidarity and Conflict. In: Journal of Comparative 
Family Studies, 39, 1: 97–114. 
Szydlik, Marc 2008b: Flexibilisierung und die Folgen. In: Szydlik, Marc (ed.), 
Flexibilisierung – Folgen für Arbeit und Familie. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozial­
wiss enschaften, 7–22. 
Szydlik, Marc 2011a: Bequests: Motives, Model, Money. In: Stamm et al., 153–170. 
Szydlik, Marc 2011b: Erben in Europa. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, 63, 4: 543–565. 
Szydlik, Marc 2012a: Von der Wiege bis zur Bahre: Generationentransfers und Ungleichheit. 
In: Bühlmann et al., 58–71. 
Szydlik, Marc 2012b: Generations: Connections Across the Life Course. In: Advances in 
Life Course Research, 17, 3: 100–111. 
Tartler, Rudolf 1961: Das Alter in der modernen Gesellschaft. Stuttgart: Enke. 
Therborn, Göran 1993: Beyond the Lonely Nation-State. In: Castles, 329–340. 
Thomson, David 1989: The Welfare State and Generation Conflict: Winners and Losers. 
In: Johnson, Paul, Christoph Conrad, David Thomson (eds.), Workers Versus Pensioners: 
Intergenerational Justice in an Ageing World. Manchester, New York: Manchester 
University Press, 33–56. 
Timonen, Virpi, Catherine Conlon, Thomas Scharf, Gemma Carney 2013: Family, State, 
Class and Solidarity: Re-Conceptualising Intergenerational Solidarity through the 
Grounded Theory Approach. In: European Journal of Ageing, 10, 3: 171–179. 
Todd, Emmanuel 1983: La Troisième Planète – Structures Familiales et Systèmes 
Idéologiques. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Todd, Emmanuel 1990: L’Invention de L’Europe. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Tomassini, Cecilia, Stamatis Kalogirou, Emily Grundy, Tineke Fokkema, Pekka 
Martikainen, Marjolein Broese van Groenou, Antti Karisto 2004: Contacts Between 
Elderly Parents and Their Children in Four European Countries: Current Patterns and 
Future Prospects. In: European Journal of Ageing, 1, 1: 54–63. 
Trampusch, Christine, André Mach (eds.) 2011: Switzerland in Europe – Continuity and 
Change in the Swiss Political Economy. London, New York: Routledge. 
Treas, Judith, Zoya Gubernskaya 2012: Farewell to Moms? Maternal Contact for Seven 
Countries in 1986 and 2001. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 74, 2: 297–311. 
Trifiletti, Rossana 1999: Southern European Welfare Regimes and the Worsening Position 
of Women. In: Journal of European Social Policy, 9, 1: 49–64. 
Tyrell, Hartmann 1976: Konflikt als Interaktion. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 




Usita, Paula M. 2001: Interdependency in Immigrant Mother-Daughter Relationships. In: 
Journal of Aging Studies, 15, 2: 183–199. 
Usita, Paula M., Barbara C. Du Bois 2005: Conflict Sources and Responses in Mother-
Daughter Relationships: Perspectives of Adult Daughters of Aging Immigrant Women. 
In: Journal of Women & Aging, 17, 1/2: 151–165. 
Valentine, Christine 2008: Bereavement Narratives – Continuing Bonds in the Twenty-
First Century. London, New York: Routledge. 
Van Gaalen, Ruben I., Pearl A. Dykstra 2006: Solidarity and Conflict Between Adult 
Children and Parents: A Latent Class Analysis. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 68, 
4: 947–960. 
Viazzo, Pier Paolo 2010: Macro-regional Differences in European Kinship Culture. In: 
Heady/Kohli, 271–294. 
Walker, Alan 1996: Intergenerational Relations and the Provision of Welfare. In: Walker, 
Alan (ed.), The New Generational Contract – Intergenerational Relations, Old Age and 
Welfare. London: UCL, 10–36. 
Walker, Robert 2005: Social Security and Welfare – Concepts and Comparisons. 
Maidenhead, Birkshire: Open University Press. 
Ward, Russell, John Logan, Glenna Spitze 1992: The Influence of Parent and Child Needs 
on Coresidence in Middle and Later Life. In: Journal of Marriage and the Family, 54, 1: 
209–221. 
Ward, Russel A., Glenna Spitze, Glenn Deane 2009: The More the Merrier? Multiple 
Parent-Adult Child Relations. In: Journal of Marriage and Family, 71, 1: 161–173. 
Ward, Russell, Glenn Deane, Glenna Spitze 2014: Life-Course Changes and Parent–Adult 
Child Contact. In: Research on Aging, 36, 5: 568–602. 
White, Lynn 1994: Coresidence and Leaving Home: Young Adults and Their Parents. In: 
Annual Review of Sociology, 20: 81–102. 
White, Lynn, Debra Peterson 1995: The Retreat from Marriage: Its Effect on Unmarried
Children’s Exchange with Parents. In: Journal of Marriage and the Family, 57, 2: 428–434. 
Wicki, Martin 2001: Soziale Sicherung in der Schweiz: Ein europäischer Sonderfall? In: 
Kraus, Katrin, Thomas Geisen (eds.), Sozialstaat in Europa – Geschichte, Entwicklung, 
Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 249–272. 
Wilkinson, Richard, Kate Pickett 2010: The Spirit Level – Why Equality Is Better for 
Everyone. London: Penguin Books. 
Willson, Andrea E., Kim M. Shuey, Glen H. Elder, Jr., K.A.S. Wickrama 2006: 
Ambivalence in Mother-Adult Child Relations: A Dyadic Analysis. In: Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 69, 3: 235–252. 
Zissimopoulos, Julie M., James P. Smith 2011: Unequal Giving: Monetary Gifts to 
Children Across Countries and over Time. In: Smeeding, Timothy M., Robert Erikson, 
Markus Jäntti (eds.), Persistence, Privilege, and Parenting – The Comparative Study of 
Intergenerational Mobility. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 289–328. 
Zukowski, Maciej 2009: Social Policy Regimes in the European Countries. In: Golinowska, 
Stanislawa, Peter Hengstenberg, Maciej Zukowski (eds.), Diversity and Commonality 
in European Social Policies: The Forging of a European Social Model. Warsaw: 






abuse 19, 63 

adolescence 40, 42, 106, 141
 
affection: affectual solidarity 15; bequests 

141, 145; gifts 41, 113–15, 118, 121–3; 

mixed emotions 25; motives 109–10
 
affectual solidarity 14–16, 20, 25–6, 43
 
age group 9–10, 12–13, 77–8, 91, 148
 
Ahrons, Constance R. 82
 
Albertini, Marco 109, 112–13, 127
 














appreciation 22, 109, 114–15, 121–2
 






Armingeon, Klaus 30 

Arts, Wil 30, 31
 










autonomy: ambivalence 26–7; categories 

19, 46, 55, 57–9; conflict 79, 82; poles 

















belonging 22, 110, 123
 












Billari, Francesco C. 96
 
Blanc, David le 96
 






bonding 17, 26, 61–3, 66, 75, 157
 
bonding glue 110, 115, 123
 
Bonoli, Giuliano 29–30 








Bourdieu, Pierre 39, 40
 
Braiker, Harriet B. 79
 










Buhl, Heike M. 1, 79
 
burden: conclusions 163–4; conflict 17, 

86, 90, 92; contact 63, 66; crisis 45, 57; 

cultural-contextual structures 24; space 

98; time 125, 130, 137–8, 140; welfare 






Canary, Daniel J. 79 
cascade model 6, 117, 123, 158 
Castles, Francis G. 29 
Cerami, Alfio 30 
challenge 14, 43, 45, 66, 74, 125, 164 
Cheal, David 110 
childhood: contact 65, 76; family 
structures 23; inequality 37–8, 40, 42, 
44, 144; inheritance 141, 144; welfare 
state 30 
Choi, Namkee G. 96 
Clarke, Edward J. 79–80, 82 
closeness-conflict hypothesis 85 
cohort 9–14, 77–8, 91, 145, 153 
Colombo, Francesca 36, 125, 164 
communication 64, 72, 80–1, 141 
competition 12, 30, 82, 142, 164 
competitor 6, 24, 66, 114, 122, 124, 146 
complementarity 164 
conflictual autonomy 18–19, 46, 55, 57, 59 
conflictual solidarity 18–19, 26, 46, 55, 59 
connectedness 18, 66, 110, 114–15, 122 
connections 162–3 
Connidis, Ingrid Arnet 25–6 
consensual autonomy 18–19, 46, 55, 59 
consensual solidarity 14–15, 18–19, 43, 
46, 55, 57–9 
contact-conflict hypothesis 81, 89 
Cordón, Juan Antonio Fernández 96 
Coser, Rose Laub 25 
Cox, Donald 109 
crowding-in: conclusions 163–5; contact 
66; introduction 35–7, 44; money 
114–15, 122; time 6, 126, 128, 130, 
134–5, 138, 140 
crowding-out: conclusions 163–5; contact 
24, 66, 70, 74, 76; introduction 35–7, 
44; money 114–15, 124; space 106, 108; 
time 6, 126–8, 130, 134–5, 138, 140 
cultural-contextual structures: conclusions 
162; introduction 24–5, 43; see also
ONFC model 
cultural generation 11–14, 43, 77 
Curran, Sara R. 26 
Daatland, Svein Olav 36, 52, 128–9 
DaVanzo, Julie 95 
Davies, James B. 34, 173 
De Graaf, Paul M. 64, 66 
Deindl, Christian ix, 20, 111–12 
demographic change 1, 45, 125–6, 142, 
163–4 
dependence: ambivalence 26; conclusions 
158; conflict 81, 85, 88, 90; money 110; 
strain hypothesis 36; time 128; transfers 
17 
deprivation 78 
DeWit, David J. 63 
digital divide 38 
dilemmas 26–7 
DiMaggio, Paul 38 
discrimination 66, 90 
divorce: conclusions 161; conflict 80, 82, 
88, 90, 177; contact 64–6, 72–5, 175; 
crisis 45; family structures 23, 161; 
inequality 41; inheritance 145, 152–3, 
185; introduction 1; money 117; space 
94, 96, 98, 103, 105, 179; time 136, 183 
drift hypothesis 92, 114, 129, 138, 160 
Du Bois, Barbara C. 80 
Dwyer, Jeffrey W. 96 
Dykstra, Pearl A. 54, 79–80 
Easterlin, Richard A. 12 
economic generation 11–13, 43, 77 
Elmelech, Yuval 52 
Emery, Thomas 112 
emotional closeness 15, 20, 43, 80 
Engstler, Heribert, 72 
Ermisch, John 38 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 27–31 
exchange 6, 62, 73, 109–10, 127, 139 
existence of generations 46–9 
family in context 33–5 
family structures: conclusions 161–2; 
introduction 23–4, 43; see also ONFC 
model 
Fenger, H.J.M. 30 
Ferge, Zsuzsa 30 
Ferrera, Maurizio 28–30 
Ferring, Dieter 26, 54 
financial security 42, 83, 148 
Finch, Janet 52 
Fingerman, Karen L. 25, 65, 95 
Finley, Nancy J. 53 
Flaquer, Lluís 29 
flexibilisation 1, 45, 125, 164 
flexibility 27, 45, 51, 125, 164 







Foa, Edna B. 21 
Foa, Uriel G. 21 
Fokkema, Tineke 54, 64, 66 
Frank, Hallie 82 
Frankel, B. Gail 63 
Friedman, Esther M. 96 
Fritzell, Johan 112 
functional differentiation 36 
functional solidarity: conclusions 157, 
165; inequality 40, 165; introduction 5, 
14–16, 43; money 111, 116–17; ONFC 
model 20, 25; space 94, 97, 99, 107–8; 
time 126, 138; types 55, 57 
Gaalen, Ruben I. van 54, 79–80 
Gans, Daphna 52–3 
Gapp, Patrizia 80 
gatekeeper 23, 82, 85, 90, 114 
Gelissen, John 30–1 
generational labels 8–9 
geographical distance 49–52 
geographical mobility: conclusions 164; 
conflict 86; contact 66; crisis 45, 51; 
introduction 1; space 97, 104, 107; time 
125 
Gerstel, Naomi 63, 65 
Giarrusso, Roseann 26, 113 
globalisation 1 
Goldscheider, Frances K. 95 
gratitude 73, 110, 121 
Greenwell, Lisa 72 
Gruber, Siegfried 127 
Grundy, Emily 64, 127 
Gubernskaya, Zoya 64 
Guo, Guang 169 
Haberkern, Klaus 25, 29, 37, 50, 127, 129, 
133, 164 
habits 80, 82 
Halbwachs, Maurice 141 
Hank, Karsten 63, 67–8, 95 
Hareven, Tamara K. 9 
harmonious 5, 63, 86, 93 
harmony 16–19, 26, 46, 92 
Hartnett, Caroline Sten 112 
Heady, Patrick 127 
Henretta, John C. 127 
Herlofson, Katharina 36, 52, 128 
Hill, Martha S. 16, 112 
Hocker, Joyce L. 79 
Hogerbrugge, Martijn J.A. 25 
Holdsworth, Clare 96 
hostility 17–19, 46 
Hotel Mum 93 
Howse, Kenneth 129 
Hox, Joop 169 
Huber, Manfred 129 
Hutchison, Sara 125 
Huxhold, Oliver 72 
Igel, Corinne ix, 36, 50, 82, 98, 127–8, 
163 
Imhof, Kurt 30 
incentive 114, 130 
independence: conflict 79, 89, 91;
inequality 38, 42; ONFC model 21–2,
27; solidarity and conflict 17–18;
space 96, 106; statistical procedures
169 
individualisation 1, 2, 5, 45, 75, 157 
integration 17, 82, 86, 90, 98 
interaction: (associational) solidarity 
15–16, 43; ambivalence 25; conflict 
77, 79–81; contact 62; geographical 
distance 4, 45, 49; introduction 2, 4; 
ONFC model 21, 43; types 56 
interdependence 96 
intergenerational contract 13–14, 110, 123, 
164 
intergenerational justice 13 
intimacy 26, 97 
investment 38, 40, 109–10, 113, 120–1, 
123, 165–6 
Isengard, Bettina ix, 20, 72, 94–6, 98–9 
isolation 1, 2, 58, 63, 75, 78, 157 
Kalmijn, Matthijs 64 
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 125 
Keck, Wolfgang 31, 127, 129 
Keister, Lisa A. 143 
Kelley, Harold H. 79 
Kenrick, Douglas T. 22 
Kiecolt, K. Jill 25–6 
King, Lawrence P. 30 
King Lear effect 42, 145, 153 
kinkeeper: conclusions 159; conflict 86, 
89; contact 65, 73, 75; time 129; types 
58 
Klaus, Daniela 127 
Köckeis, Eva 26, 97 
208 Index
 
Kohli, Martin ix, 11, 13, 35–6, 94, 128, 
164 
Kollmorgen, Raj 30 
Komter, Aafke E. 25 
König, Ronny ix, 39, 96, 112 
Kopp, Johannes 20 
Korupp, Sylvia E. 11, 38, 64 
Kosmann, Marianne 141, 145 
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. 109, 145 
Kriesi, Irene 39 
Künemund, Harald ix, 36, 41, 110,  
127–8, 145, 163 
Kuypers, Joseph A. 113 
Laferrère, Anne 96 
Lauterbach, Wolfgang 1, 39, 143 
Lawton, Leora 14–15 
Lee, Gary R. 96 
Leibfried, Stephan 27, 29 
Leisering, Lutz 13 
Leitner, Sigrid 31 
Lendon, Jessica P. 26 
Lennartsson, Carin 112–13 
Leopold, Thomas 20, 42, 127 
Lessenich, Stephan 28–9 
Lettke, Frank 141 
Lewis, Jane 31 
life course: conclusions 162, 165–6; 
inequality 37, 42–4, 165–6; inheritance 
144; introduction 4–5; political 
economies 31; space 96 
lifelong inequality 38, 166 
lifelong solidarity: conclusions 157–8, 
165; inequality 38, 42–3, 165; 
inheritance 42–3, 144, 149, 151, 155; 
introduction ix, 1–2; money 117; social 
generations 14; time 133, 137 
lifestyle 15, 18, 77, 80, 82, 86, 90 
Lipszyc, Barbara 125 
Litwak, Eugene 36, 128 
Logan, John R. 
loneliness 17, 63, 65 
longevity 1, 44–5, 47, 163 
Lowenstein, Ariela 25, 36, 79–80, 128 
Luetzelberger, Therese 96 
Lüscher, Kurt 25, 143 
Mackenbach, Johan P. 39, 49 
Majamaa, Karoliina 112–13 
Mannheim, Karl 10–12, 14 
Marí-Klose, Pau 29 
Maslow, Abraham H. 22 
Mason, Jennifer 52 
Matthew principle 155, 166 
Mauss, Marcel 110 
Max-Neef, Manfred A. 22 
May, Christina 13 
Mayer, Karl Ulrich ix, 31 
McGarry, Kathleen 112 
McMullin, Julie Ann 25–6 
Meinert, Karin 93 
Merton, Robert K. 25 
Merz, Eva-Maria 52 
middle generation: conflict 82, 85, 90; 
contact 73; inheritance 154; money 109, 
112, 114, 122; ONFC model 23, 27; 
space 105, 107; time 127, 129, 138 
Millar, Jane 129 
mixed emotions 25 
mixed responsibility 36, 52, 59, 128, 130 
Moller, Stephanie 143 
Moreno-Fuentes, Francisco Javier 29 
Morris, John N. 109 
Motel-Klingebiel, Andreas ix, 36, 110, 
112, 127–8, 145 
multigenerational 4, 46–7, 111 
multilevel: analyses 175, 177, 179, 181, 
183, 185; conclusions 160; conflict 87, 
177; contact 61, 67, 175; inheritance 
151, 185; money 112, 181; space 179; 
statistical procedures 169; time 183 
Nauck, Bernhard 3, 54 
Nave-Herz, Rosemarie 1 
necessity hypothesis 5, 94, 101, 106, 108, 
158, 161 
need structures: conclusions 161; 
introduction 21–3, 43; see also ONFC 
model 
nestlings 93–4, 105, 107 
Neuberger, Franz ix, 25 
Nilsson, Anders 40 
Noack, Peter 1 
Nollert, Michael 30 
normative solidarity 14–15 
norms: ambivalence 25, 27; conflict 
77, 82, 86, 90; family in context 35; 
inheritance 145, 153; introduction 5; 
Index 209
 
money 109–10, 115, 118, 122; R
obligation 45, 52, 54, 59; ONFC model R
22–4, 43; space 93, 96, 100, 105–6; R
welfare state 29, 31 re
Norris, Joan E. 96 re
Obinger, Herbert 30 
obligations: ambivalence 25–7; 
conclusions 158–9; contact 66; R
introduction 3–4; money 47, 109–10, re
117; normative solidarity 15; overview R
45, 52–4, 59; time 127, 129–30, 134 re
O’Connor, Julia S. 31 
OECD 34, 39, 172–3 
Oesch, Daniel 30 
old age: conclusions 157–8; conflict re
78; contact 65; inheritance 142, 145, ri
148; intergenerational justice 13; need R
structures 22; social expenditure 33, R
106, 173; space 94, 106; time 127; R
welfare state 36 R
old generation 77 R
ONFC model: ambivalence 26; R
conclusions 160–2; conflict 81; contact r
61–2, 64; inheritance 144; introduction R
19–25, 43; money 112; space 96 R
opportunity structures: conclusions 161; 
introduction 21, 43; see also ONFC model S
Orloff, Ann Shola 31 s
out of sight 2, 19, 61, 75, 157 
overburden 36–7, 164–5 S
S
Parkes, Colin Murray 141 S
Parsons, Talcott 2, 36, 61, 65 S
Passeron, Jean-Claude 39 S
pensioners 13–14, 110, 123, 125, 164 S
pension-inheritance paradox 142, 148, 155 S
Perrig-Chiello, Pasqualina 125 S
Peterson, Debra 96 S
Pett, Marjorie A. 66 S
Pfau-Effinger, Birgit 125 S
Pickett, Kate 83 S
Pillemer, Karl 25, 79 S
political generation 11, 43, 77 S
power 8, 21, 91, 141, 145 s
prestige 37, 38–9, 44, 113, 123, 165 S
Prigerson, Holly G. 141 S
S
Qureshi, Hazel 127 S
aab, Marcel 127 
adl, Jonas 109, 113 
amseier, Erich 39 
ciprocal 62, 79, 114, 126, 145 
ciprocity: conclusions 162; inequality 
41; inheritance 141, 153; introduction 
6; money 109; need structures 23; time 
127–8, 137 
eher, David Sven 29 
imbursement 114, 121, 141 
ein, Martin 36, 128 
sponsibility: conclusions 164; conflict 
89–90; distance 50; obligations 52–3; 
space 93; time 128, 130, 133; welfare 
state 29, 36, 52–3, 59, 128, 130, 164 
ward 23, 113–14, 121, 153–4 
sk hypothesis 81, 88–9, 91 
oberts, Robert E. L. 14–15 
osenbaum, Heidi 145 
osenmayr, Leopold 26, 97 
ossi, Alice S. 58, 65, 129, 157 
ossi, Giovanna 96 
ossi, Peter H. 58, 65, 129, 157 
ules 24, 35, 40, 43, 142 
usconi, Alessandra 96 
ys, Vladimir 30 
ackmann, Reinhard 11 
afe haven hypothesis 66, 74, 76, 98, 
105–7, 160 
ainsbury, Diane 29 
andberg-Thoma, Sara E. 96 
araceno, Chiara 1, 31, 129 
arkisian, Natalia 63, 65 
chenk, Niels 112 
chlomann, Heinrich 143 
chmid, Tina ix, 127, 164 
chneider, Thorsten 20, 42 
choeni, Robert F. 112 
chulz, Erika 125 
chupp, Jürgen ix, 142–3, 148 
chwarz, Beate 79 
egrin, Chris 79 
eltzer, Judith A. 96 
eparation 19, 45, 51, 58–9, 73, 75, 104 
ev’er, Aysan 79 
everinov, Sergei 145 
hapiro, Adam 64, 66 





Silverstein, Merril 15, 26, 52–4
 




Smith, James P. 112
 
Smits, Annika 96, 98
 
Snijders, Tom A. B. 169
 
social generation 9–14, 43, 77, 91, 163
 
social inequality: conclusions 163, 165–6; 

introduction ix, 2, 4, 6; money 123; 

overview 37–44; welfare state 28
 
social security 13, 28–9, 142
 
social stratification: conclusions 162–3, 

165; conflict 78, 83, 86, 90; contact 61, 

66, 76; cultural-contextual structures 24; 

family in context 33–4; introduction 2, 

5–7; money 122; political economies 31; 









Soldo, Beth J. 16, 112
 










status reproduction 109, 113, 120, 123
 
stay-at-homes 94, 97, 101, 107
 
Steinbach, Anja 3, 20, 26, 64
 
Stierlin, Helm 17, 79
 
strain hypothesis: conclusions 158, 

160–1, 164–6; conflict 81–2, 86, 

88–92; crowding-in 36; introduction 5; 





Suitor, J. Jill 26, 79
 
Swartz, Teresa Toguchi 1, 165
 




Tanner, Jennifer L. 82
 
















Trost, Jan E. 79
 












Walker, Alan 125, 127
 




















Wolff, François-Charles 96, 113
 
worlds of welfare 27–32, 44
 
worlds or states 31–3
 
young generation 10, 77, 109
 




Zissimopoulos, Julie M. 112
 
Zukowski, Maciej 30
 
